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Introduction
No one better epitomizes the golden age of theodicy that straddled the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-
1716). To the age-old problem of how to reconcile God's supreme goodness and
perfect justice with the evil of this world, Leibniz provided a clear and
straightforward answer: our world is in fact the best of all possible worlds, and
therefore God cannot be impugned for failing to make a better one. From a
twenty-first-century perspective, it is easy to wonder why such a notable
thinker was drawn to adopt such a counter-intuitive position. For while the
claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds may go a long way towards
absolving God from the charge of being unjust or unworthy of worship, the
trouble with it is that it does not appear to be aprimafacie plausible claim, since
our world just does not seem to be the best of all those possible. Yet in the late
seventeenth century and first half of the eighteenth century the belief that ours
was the best of all possible worlds, i.e. the doctrine of optimism, was a very
popular one, and Leibniz was by no means alone in holding it. Among
Leibniz's contemporaries notable optimists included Henry More,1 Ralph
Cudworth,2 Lord Shaftesbury,3 William King,4 Lord Henry Bolingbroke,5
Alexander Pope6 and Christian Wolff.7 Even two post-Leibnizian thinkers who
were later to become bitter opponents of optimism were initially enthusiastic
supporters of it, namely Voltaire8 and Immanuel Kant.9 In fact there was a
whole optimistic tradition running back all the way to Plato, who endorsed a
form of optimism in his Timaeus.10 Like many of his fellow optimists from the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Leibniz was strongly influenced by this
tradition, having been introduced to it by his university teachers.
But the fact that contemporaries and eminent ancients nailed their colours
to the optimist mast does not in itself explain why Leibniz did so. By common
consent, Leibniz was a universal genius, a man of uncommonly rare insight.
As one of his earliest English translators, Charles William Russell, put it:
[Leibniz] was one of those extraordinary men whom, at rare and distant
intervals, nature sends into the world, in the prodigal exercise of her
creative powers, and as if to display their wondrous versatility. With a
compass of intellect which falls to the lot but of a favoured few, he
cultivated every branch of human knowledge, and excelled in all.11
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To the modern mind it no doubt seems odd that a man of such singular
genius and insight should argue that the world was unimprovable when to
most it seems so obviously capable of being improved. In fact Leibniz,
probably more so than the other optimists mentioned above, was acutely
aware that in and of itself optimism was counter-intuitive. He frequently
conceded that, on a casual consideration, our world indeed seemed not to be
the best, but he just as frequently argued that a more in-depth consideration
would in fact reveal the opposite. Leibniz thus drew a sharp distinction
between appearance (the world is improvable) and reality (the world is
unimprovable). From this it is evident that, for Leibniz, our world was not
best in any particularly obvious sense, such as being the one in which there is
no evil, or in which there exist only happy or virtuous individuals, which is
what modern philosophers seem to have in mind when they speak of the best
possible world. This raises the question of what exactly Leibniz meant when
he claimed that our world was the best. The object of this book is to answer
this very question. While many other attempts to answer this question have
been made over the years by various Leibniz commentators, we shall see in
what follows that these previous efforts have all fallen somewhat wide of the
mark. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, Leibniz's conception
of the best possible world is usually treated in brief, either in a journal article
or a book chapter of comparable length. Yet Leibniz's understanding of the
best possible world is so intricate that such a short treatment cannot possibly
succeed in doing it justice. Another problem is that some of Leibniz's key
pronouncements on this issue have been ignored, while other key texts have
been misinterpreted, misread, or have had their meaning obscured by
mistranslation. As this work unfolds it will become clear exactly where I
think these errors have occurred; it will also become clear exactly where my
interpretation of Leibniz's optimism differs from previous interpretations,
and the reasons why I believe it has to differ. I hope that by comparing
previous interpretations of Leibniz's optimism with my own the reader will
be better placed to judge the plausibility of the rival interpretations.
Ultimately, of course, I hope to persuade the reader that what I offer
accurately captures Leibniz's vision of the best possible world. In the next
chapter I shall examine Leibniz's grounds for holding that this is the best of
all possible worlds; the question of what Leibniz meant when he called our
world the best will be the focus of the remaining chapters, so resistant is it to
a simple answer.
Before immersing ourselves in Leibniz's philosophy of optimism, however,
it is important to note a number of issues which bear on any work of Leibniz
scholarship. First, Leibniz was one of the great systemizers in the history of
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philosophy, and consequently the various parts of his philosophy interweave
and quite often draw support from each other. His doctrine of optimism,
which forms part of a much wider collection of doctrines, is no exception.
Second, like most thinkers, Leibniz occasionally changed his mind. Although
he never wavered from his belief that our world is the best one possible, his
conception of the best world, and his understanding of some of the ideas that
underlie that conception, did undergo some slight modification over the
course of his life. Third, Leibniz was a prodigious writer and left around
50,000 papers after his death, comprising books, articles, letters, personal
essays and reading notes, which together total around 200,000 pages. Of
these, a fair proportion has still to be published. Of those that have been
published, some have yet to be accurately dated while others are only
currently available as fragments.
Clearly all of these burdens must be carried by anyone looking to
undertake a serious study of any aspect of Leibniz's thought, but there are
ways to minimize the strain they could potentially place on such a study. As a
consequence of the first issue, for instance, it is common for exegetes of
Leibniz to make frequent references to other aspects of his philosophy, for
even though these other aspects are not part of the exposition proper, they do
nevertheless throw light on it. I shall therefore make such references where
necessary. In response to the second issue, Leibniz's commentators sometimes
give the dates of composition for most or all of the passages they cite.
However, even where this is done, it is still difficult to plot with certainty all
the diachronic changes that may have occurred in a given area of his thought,
simply because there are so many of his writings still unavailable in whole or
in part, and others whose date is uncertain. So far as can be made out,
however, Leibniz's optimism did not undergo any radical revision throughout
his lifetime, which relieves the need to make the present study a full-blown
work of history. I shall therefore not give the dates of the texts cited as a
matter of course, but only when I feel it would be helpful, e.g. to plot changes
in his thinking, or to establish the plausibility of an interpretation. For those
interested in dates, I have provided an index locorum at the end of the book,
to which all citations may be crosschecked. As for the third issue, which as I
have just noted impacts on the second, we should note that in many studies of
Leibniz's philosophy it is in fact common to find a degree of hesitancy
regarding the interpretation being put forward, and hopefully the very nature
of the third issue the fact that many of Leibniz's papers have yet to be
published - will make it clear why the present study can be no exception.
However, the wider the range of material we use, the more confident we can
be about what we attribute to him. We will therefore look at a great number
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of texts, including many that have been overlooked, misinterpreted or
mistranslated by other Leibniz scholars who have attempted to expound his
doctrine of the best possible world.
A fourth difficulty, and one no less troublesome than the others, concerns
Leibniz's sincerity. Ever since Bertrand Russell's monumental study of
Leibniz's philosophy in 1900, questions have been raised over whether
Leibniz in fact had two philosophies, a public one that he revealed in his
published writings, and a private one that emerged only in his unpublished
writings and was divulged to a select few of his acquaintances. But while there
is little doubt that Leibniz was sometimes less than upfront about his true
beliefs in his published writings, this insincerity, if we can call it that, does not
appear to have extended to his doctrine of optimism. That Leibniz was an
optimist there can be little doubt. His belief that ours is the best of all possible
worlds is to be found in an enormous number of writings, from very early in
his career until the end of life. What is more, Leibniz declares his optimism in
a wide range of texts — it is the centrepiece doctrine of the only philosophical
book he saw fit to publish within his lifetime, the Theodicy (1710), and it is
affirmed in a large number of private letters, notes and jottings written only
for himself, as well as in many private reading notes. But even if the question
of Leibniz's sincerity on the broad matter of optimism does not arise, it does
unfortunately rear its head in connection with a related issue, as we shall see
in Chapter 7.
A fifth and final problem concerns Leibniz's influences. For Leibniz, of
course, did not work in a vacuum, and was no less influenced by the
intellectual landscape of his time than any other philosopher one cares to
mention. He appropriated a number of ideas and concepts that were
common currency in his day, not just among optimists, and in some cases
wove these into his picture of the best possible world. Because these ideas and
concepts were in some cases so commonplace and widely accepted, Leibniz
did not generally feel the need to explain their origin, which of course is
unsurprising, given that his writings were intended for him and his
contemporaries, and not a twenty-first-century readership unfamiliar with
the philosophical landscape of his day. But in order for us to get a truly
accurate picture of Leibnizian optimism, it will be necessary from time to
time to see which parts of the intellectual soup of the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries he used as ingredients in his recipe for the best of
all possible worlds.
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2The Grounds for Optimism
God's choice of the best
Before we embark on our study of Leibniz's conception of the best of all
possible worlds, we need to consider the source of his confidence that our
world is indeed the best one possible. Leibniz offered one straightforward
argument for optimism — this world must be the best because God exists, and
his nature ensures that he would produce nothing but the best. This two-part
argument is, in essence, the answer Leibniz gave throughout his life to the
question of why we should suppose our world to be the best. But as we will
see, he interpreted it in two different ways.
The first part of Leibniz's argument for optimism is: God exists. It has been
said of Leibniz that he 'never met a proof for the existence of God that he
didn't like', and this is a fair assessment.1 To prove God's existence Leibniz
employed forms of the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, the
argument from eternal truths, and even one of his own devising, the
argument from the pre-established harmony (which is often portrayed by
scholars as a kind of teleological argument). By employing the first of these
proofs, the ontological, Leibniz secured to his satisfaction not only the
existence of God, but a concept of God as an absolutely perfect being, i.e. as a
being in whom all possible perfections are united (cf. A VI iii 579/D103). And
this led Leibniz to the second part of his argument for optimism, namely that
God must make the best. As he wrote in 1671: 'Since God is the most perfect
mind . . . it is impossible for him not to be affected by the most perfect
harmony, and thus to be necessitated to do the best' (A II i 117/L146). The
argument seems obviously valid God, being perfect, cannot but want to do
the best he can, therefore he necessarily creates the best world possible. But
Leibniz had a love-hate relationship with this argument, flirting with it in two
later texts, one from the early 1690s (Gr336), the other from 1706 (Gr493/
SLT III.B.5), while more often disassociating himself from it, denouncing it
as 'an opinion so bad' (G VI 217/H234) and 'an error so pernicious' (Gr486/
SLT III.A.3) on the grounds that if God was necessitated to create the best
then he would not be worthy of worship or praise. To preserve his worthiness
in these regards, Leibniz commonly invoked the freedom of God's will and
accordingly amended the second part of his argument for optimism to state
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that, so far from being driven to create the best out of necessity, 'God freely
chooses the most perfect' (A VI iv 1452/SLT III.B.2, emphasis mine). While
this alteration neutralizes the concern about God's praiseworthiness, it does
lead us back to the question of how Leibniz was able to be confident that our
world is the best one possible. For what guarantee do we have that a free God
will plump for the best?
Leibniz didn't talk of providing a guarantee, only that 'we can regard it as
certain that everything is done by God in the most perfect way' (A VI iv
1656/P109). For even when Leibniz rejected the idea of God creating the best
possible world out of necessity, he continued to believe that the perfect nature
of God ensures that God will produce nothing but the best. Thus he tells us
that, 'God wills the best through his own nature' (A VI iv 1447/AG20), 'as
his perfection requires of him' (Gr485/SLT III.A.3, cf. Gr479/SLT III.A.3,
Gr580/SLT V.C.2/R84) and consequently that his will 'is indefectible and
always tends towards the best' (G VI 386/H387). On the basis of remarks
such as these one could be forgiven for thinking that Leibniz did not in fact
stray at all from the view that God creates the best out of necessity. But there
was a shift in Leibniz's thinking, and if it appears subtle this is because at the
times Leibniz denied that God is forced to create the best out of metaphysical
necessity (which we would today call logical necessity), he did not exempt the
actions of God from all forms of necessity. Specifically, Leibniz considered
God to be subject to what he called moral necessity, 'whereby a wise being
chooses the best, and every mind follows the strongest inclination' (G VII
389/L696, cf. G VI 255/H270, G VI 333/H345). In other words, a moral
necessity is a requirement to do whatever is most fitting, or at least to do what
one deems to be most fitting. To understand how strong a necessity this is, we
need to delve into Leibniz's concept of the will.
The nature of the will
As is well known, Leibniz endorsed the view of the will handed down by the
Greeks, which holds that the will always aims at what it considers best (cf. A
VI iv 1456). This view satisfied the demands of what was arguably Leibniz's
most famous axiom, the principle of sufficient reason, which states that
nothing happens without a reason, or that there must be a reason why things
happen thus and not otherwise. With no exceptions to the principle of
sufficient reason permitted, Leibniz insisted that no will could ever act 'for no
reason' and indeed every will must invariably be drawn towards the option it
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perceives as the most attractive (cf. A VI vi 186/NE186). For the more
attractive a particular option, the greater the reason to favour it over rival
options, with the most attractive choice giving the will the strongest
(sufficient) reason to act. In Leibniz's view, every act of every will could be
explained this way, even evil acts. For as he saw it, men and other rational
creatures invariably follow the course perceived by them to be the best, but as
they do not always have a proper and clear perception of what is truly best,
they can and frequently do act in ways contrary to it. God, however, on
account of his supreme wisdom, is not similarly hampered, and so can never
be ignorant of what is best or more perfect. Consequently 'God cannot fall
into error in choosing, and therefore always chooses what is most fitting' (G
VI 441/S117, cf. G III 59/W182).
But although God's will (like all wills) is under a moral necessity to choose
only that which it considers best, according to Leibniz 'this is so little opposed
to his freedom that it rather renders it more perfect' (G VI 441/S117-118, cf.
A VI iii 135, G VI 258-259/H273, G VII 390/L697). Behind this claim lies
the compatibilist conception of free will that Leibniz favoured throughout his
life. Following Aquinas, Leibniz argued that an agent acts freely when he acts
in accordance with his own nature and is not constrained by external factors
(cf. A VI iv 1406/SLT III.A.l, G VII 110/SLT III.A.2, Gr481/SLT III.A.3,
G VI 128/H148). An unfree action, on the other hand, is one that an agent is
compelled or constrained to perform by factors outside himself. A being is
thus more free the more the stimulus for its actions comes from its own will
rather than from anything outside it. And God, having nothing outside him
at all which could constrain his will, has the highest degree of freedom
possible, or absolute freedom:
It can even be said that substances are all the more free when they are
removed from indifference and determined by themselves. And the more
they approach the divine perfection the less need they have to be
determined from the outside. For God, being the most free and most
perfect substance, is also the most determined by himself to do the most
perfect. (G VII 110- 111/SLT III.A.2, cf. A VI iv 1454/SLT III.B.2, G
VII 304/SLT I.A.3/P139, G VI 385/H386)
So as a confirmed compatibilist, Leibniz did not deny that rational beings up
to and including God were determined to choose the actions they choose. But
for him, as for all compatibilists, what matters when assessing the freedom of
an action is whether the final determination for that action comes from the
agent himself or from something outside him. But Leibniz was well aware that
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in order to convince doubters that God's choice of the best was genuinely free
and not necessitated, it would be necessary to show that an unconstrained
God could have acted otherwise. And he believed that this could be done:
God does not fail to choose the best, but he is not constrained to do so; nay,
more, there is no necessity in the object of God's choice, for another
sequence of things is equally possible. (G VI 128/H148, cf. G VI 255/
H270, G VI 333/H345)
So for Leibniz, the crux of the matter was this: if what God does not choose is
still possible, then he could not have been necessitated in his choice, for if he
had been, nothing but the object of his choice would have been possible. Yet
we know that other things are indeed possible,
for since there are many things which have never happened and never will
happen, and which nevertheless are clearly conceivable, and imply no
contradiction, how can one say they are absolutely impossible? (G VI 257/
H272, cf. A VI iv 1449)
'That which does not imply contradiction' was Leibniz's customary definition
of'possible' (A VI iv 867), and conceivability (or intelligibility) was Leibniz's
usual test for it in any given case (cf. A VI iii 128, G III 558). So in Leibniz's
view, if the concept of a thing could be conceived then the thing itself must be
possible, because if it contained or implied a contradiction then it would
literally be inconceivable or unintelligible. And given that it is possible to
conceive of any number of people and places that have never existed (and
presumably never will exist), and events that have never happened (and
presumably never will happen), there must, following Leibniz's reasoning, be
any number of people, places and events that are still possible despite not
featuring in this world. In Leibniz's view, the fact that there are unactualized
possibles demonstrated that there could not have been just one course open to
God, i.e. it demonstrated that he could not have been necessitated. For these
possibles, qua possibles, are objects of God's power, if not actually his will,
which is another way of saying that he could make them, because on account
of his omnipotence he 'can produce everything that is possible or whatever
does not imply a contradiction', but won't, because on account of his will, he
will only 'produce what is the best among possible things' (G VII 409/L709,
cf. A VI iv 1452/SLT III.B.2). Thus to those who pressed the point that God
could only bring about the best,2 Leibniz responded by saying that they had
confused 'the will of God with his power', and overlooked all the possibles
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that God had left unrealized (G VII 409/L709). As these things are possible,
and thus fall under the scope of his omnipotence, God could produce them,
and this very fact was proof enough that he could not have been necessitated.
And on the strength of this, Leibniz felt perfectly at liberty to say that God's
choice is made 'between several possible courses' even though it is certain that
he will choose only the best of them (G VI 256/H271). Or, to summarize
using Leibniz's own words:
all concepts that do not imply contradiction are possible. I concede that God could act in
another way. But it was certain that he would not do so; it is precisely for this reason
that he is free, because there is more than one possible system. (Gr493)
The standards of goodness
While it is now clear why Leibniz thought our world must be the best, it
might seem that his position is not free from all traces of ambiguity.
Specifically, when he insists that 'God freely chooses the most perfect' (A VI
iv 1452/SLT III.B.2) it is possible to construe him as making either of two
claims: (a) that God freely chooses to create that world which is the most
perfect according to whatever objective standards of goodness pertain to
world-making, or (b) that God freely chooses what the most perfect will be,
i.e. what the standards of worldly goodness will be, and then selects from the
full range of possible worlds the one that best answers that description. The
fact that Leibniz wrote of God choosing the best rather than deciding which
world would qualify as best suggests that (a) is a more likely explanation of
his position than (b), i.e. that he believed his notion of the best possible world
was determined objectively and not by a whim of God. However, Andrew
Carlson has argued that 'in Leibniz's Christian world, there are no ...
transcendent standards of goodness to which God might refer',3 and so prior
to choosing a world, Leibniz's God first had to choose the standards of
goodness by which all things and actions would henceforth be judged.
Although Carlson does not seem to realize it, such a claim imputes to Leibniz
the view that God could act without reason, for if perfection was not
determined independently of God then God could not have rationally
adopted one definition of perfection over another. For if each definition of
perfection was of equal value to all the others (and it would be absurd to say
that one or more of the possible definitions was 'better' or 'more perfect' than
the others before God had even decided which definition of perfection would
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apply!), then there could be no sufficient reason for God to prefer it over the
claims of its rivals. The Leibniz who wrote of God that he chooses the best
'since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason'
would have been horrified! (G VI 107/H128, cf. Gr580/SLT V.C.2/R84)
But there is an even stronger reason to reject Carlson's claim, namely that
it is flatly contradicted by Leibniz's many assertions that the standards of
goodness are determined independently of God, who merely recognizes them:
I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no
rules of goodness and of perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas
God has of them, and that the works of God are good only for the formal
reason that God made them . . . Thus to say that things are good by no rule
of goodness but only by the will of God alone is to thoughtlessly destroy, it
seems to me, all the love and glory of God. For why praise him for what he
has done if he would be equally praiseworthy for doing the opposite? (A
VI iv 1532-3/DM §2, cf. R46-8, G VI 219/H237)
We must now consider what these objective standards of goodness are, and
how they determine which possible world will be the best.
Notes
1. Sleigh (2001), p. 167.
2. E.g. Samuel Clarke. See G VII 385/L694.
3. Carlson (2001), p. 644, cf. pp. 15 and 97. The claim was first made by Gale
(1976), p. 87.
3The Perfection of Things
The varieties of perfection
In the Monadology Leibniz explains that the reason for God's choice of world
out of all those possible 'can only be found in the fitness or in the degrees of
perfection that these worlds contain, each possible world having a right to
claim existence in the measure of the perfection which it enfolds' (G VI 616/
Mon §54, cf. Gr492). It is therefore proper to begin the analysis of his
conception of the best of all possible worlds by examining the notion of
'perfection' he employed. In this chapter I shall concentrate on what Leibniz
meant by the perfection of individual things, while in the next two I shall
consider how these are spun together to give rise to the perfection of worlds.
Leibniz identified three major forms of perfection moral, physical and
metaphysical. He characterized these as follows:
Metaphysical good or evil, in general, consists in the perfection or
imperfection of all creatures, even those not endowed with intelligence
. . . Physical good or evil is understood as applying especially to the
advantage or disadvantage of intelligent substances. An example of this is
the evil of punishment. Moral good or evil is attributed to the virtuous or
vicious actions of those substances, for example the evil of guilt. (G VI 443/
SI20, cf. G VI 242/H258)
It is notable that whenever Leibniz talked of perfection without specifying
any particular kind, he almost always meant metaphysical perfection, and
this can be seen by looking at the many places where he attempts to define
the notion of perfection (e.g. A VI iii 392/D45, A VI iii 577/D99, A VI iv
867, A VI iv 1430, A VI iv 1531/DM §1 etc.). The other two kinds of
perfection are usually either referred to in full as physical perfection and
moral perfection, or more frequently by the words 'pleasure' and 'happiness'
for the former, and 'virtue' for the latter. We shall examine each of these in
turn.
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Metaphysical perfection
In an unpublished note from March 1676, Leibniz gave the following as a
definition of metaphysical perfection:
Perfection is an affirmative absolute attribute, and it always contains
everything of its own genus, for there is nothing that limits it. (A VI iii 392/
D45)
In a paper written eight months later, he identified perfections as 'absolute
positive qualities' (A VI iii 575/D97), before adding the stipulation that to
qualify as a perfection an attribute or quality must also be simple (i.e. non-
analyzable):
I term a perfection every simple quality which is positive and absolute, or,
which expresses without any limits whatever it does express. (A VI iii 577/
D99, A V I iii 578/D101)
The 'or' here is the Latin 'seu' (often best translated as 'or rather', 'i.e.' or
'that is'), which reveals that Leibniz is equating 'absolute' and 'an expression
without limit'.1 The former expression takes the place of the latter in another
attempt at defining perfection, this time from the mid-1680s: 'A perfection . . . is
that which is positive and absolute in essence' (A VI iv 556). Here there is no
mention of attributes or qualities, just essence, and the requirement for
simplicity is absent too.
Despite appearances to the contrary, Leibniz did indeed have a
consistent idea of what metaphysical perfection was, and the differences
in expression are in fact just that - differences in expression, with the
underlying concept remaining the same.2 Among the definitions cited there
are many terms that Leibniz clearly treated as synonymous. I have already
mentioned the equation of'absolute' with 'an expression without limit', but
in addition 'positive' and 'affirmative' are evidently interchangeable, as are
'attribute' and 'quality', 'which taken together at the same time . . .
constitute essence' (A VI i 271/L89). So 'essence' is little more than a
plurality of attributes.3 Elsewhere we are told that 'absolute' and
'affirmative' are identical (A VI iii 519/D79), and that qualities 'modified
by limits . . . are not affirmative, but are in a way negative' (A VI iii 396/
D49). This suggests that 'absolute', 'an expression without limit', 'positive'
and 'affirmative' are all alternative expressions of the same thing, namely a
complete absence of limits. For the sake of simplicity I shall henceforth use
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'positive' as a catchall term for all these expressions. And speaking of
simplicity, what are we to make of the fact that it appears in only one of the
four definitions? There is reason to suppose that it too can be subsumed
under the umbrella of 'positiveness', not because Leibniz thought that
'simple' means 'positive', but because he thought simplicity is entailed by
positiveness. For after Leibniz wrote T term a perfection every simple
quality which is positive and absolute, or, which expresses without any
limits whatever it does express' (A VI iii 577/D99, A VI iii 578/D101), he
continued:
But since a quality of this kind is simple, it is therefore indefinable or
unanalyzable. For otherwise it will either not be one simple quality, but
will be an aggregate of several, or if it is one it will be enclosed by limits,
and so will be understood by the help of negation, contrary to the
hypothesis; for it was assumed to be purely positive. (A VI iii 577/D99, cf.
A V I iii578/D101)
What he seems to be saying here is that a quality which is not purely positive
will also not be simple. His reasoning is a little obscure but seems to be this: if
a simple quality is analyzable then it can be analyzed into the quality itself
and a limit, in which case it is not positive, because positiveness precludes
limits. So a positive quality must also be simple by virtue of its being positive,
but a simple quality need not be positive.
This leaves us with a definition of metaphysical perfection something like
'an attribute or quality which is positive' (the requirement for simplicity is
omitted because it follows from positiveness anyway). But this was not
Leibniz's final word on the matter. For under this definition, which has a lack
of limits as its only requirement, many qualities will qualify as perfections that
are quite obviously not the sorts of things that any self-respecting theist would
want to recognize as perfections, e.g. number, which is certainly capable of
expression without limit. Leibniz eventually became aware that his definition
of metaphysical perfection allowed for these unwanted results, and this
prompted him to carefully tweak his definition to rule them out; in the
Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686 he presented what was to be his settled notion
of perfection from then on:
We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure mark of one is this:
those forms or natures which are not susceptible of a highest degree are not
perfections; for example the nature of number or figure. (A VI iv 1531/
DM §1)
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The requirement here is that for a quality or attribute to be elevated to the
status of a perfection, it must admit of an ultimate degree, whereas before it
had been that a quality just be unmodified by limits. Of course a quality
could satisfy both requirements, as qualities admitting of an ultimate degree
would also be unmodified by limits. But the converse is not necessarily true; to
be unmodified by limits means only that the quality in question is not subject
to any limits. This does not guarantee that it has an ultimate degree (as we
have seen, this is the case with number, which is free from limits but has no
highest degree). Given the attributes that Leibniz went on to identify as
perfections, which we shall examine shortly, it is clear that he intended both
these requirements to be met by genuine perfections. So Leibniz's definition of
perfection in the Discourse can be seen to introduce a qualification not explicit
in his previous definitions; the requirement for positiveness remains, and is
joined by a further requirement for an ultimate degree.4 So far as I am aware,
this subtle shift in definition has gone unnoticed by even the most
heavyweight of Leibniz exegetes.3
Although this definition seems to leave us no closer to identifying any
qualities that might serve as plausible candidates for perfections, Leibniz
believed it was sufficient for him to pick out several clear examples. He went
about this in an ingenious way. Rather than wading through all possible
attributes to determine which might admit of an ultimate degree, Leibniz
reasoned that all such positive attributes must be compatible with each other
on account of their simplicity, and would therefore be united in the one subject
- God - who by definition has all possible perfections (cf. A VI iii 519/D79).
So if we want to know which qualities are perfections, we need look no further
than those of the divine being. Occasionally, however, he gave the impression
of having arrived at this result by a less direct method, for instance in the same
passage from the Discourse on Metaphysics that we have already met:
We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure mark of one is this:
those forms or natures which are not susceptible of a highest degree are not
perfections; for example the nature of number or figure. For the greatest
number of all (or rather the number of all numbers) implies contradiction,
as does the greatest of all figures, but the greatest knowledge and
omnipotence involve no impossibility. (A VI iv 1531/DM §1)
One might be forgiven for thinking that the argument here is somewhat
inchoate, and indeed it is, though it is the closest Leibniz comes to providing
any justification for his choice of attributes that qualify as perfections. The
fact that he made no attempt to argue for the claim that the notions of
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omniscience and omnipotence 'involve no impossibility' suggests that he
considered such notions to be self-evidently coherent. However, one
prominent Leibniz scholar, Robert Adams, has suggested that omniscience
falls short of being purely positive on Leibniz's own terms. For Leibniz states
that God's omniscience allows him to know all the possibles, and therefore,
Adams argues, this attribute must include 'knowledge of what is not, as well
as what is'.6 According to Adams, this entails that God's perfect knowledge
has an object that 'involves limitation and negation' because it includes
'knowledge that the non-actual systems of possibles are less perfect than the
actual system'.7 The upshot, suggests Adams, is that it is difficult to conceive
how omniscience can be a 'purely positive attribute'.8
It is somewhat odd that Adams restricts his focus to omniscience, because
the very same reasoning has the power to rob omnipotence of its positiveness
too. We have already seen, in Chapter 2, that Leibniz was happy to claim
that God has the power (if not the will) to produce any series of possible
things, even the imperfect ones, by virtue of his omnipotence. Omnipotence,
then, like omniscience, must have as its object a huge number of things that
involve limitation and negation because it bestows on its bearer the power to
do the worse as well as the best. I am uncertain as to why Adams overlooks
this.
In any case, Leibniz held that both omniscience and omnipotence are
purely positive attributes, and that they enable God to know or produce
things that are not purely positive, which strongly suggests that he did not see
the problem Adams identifies. The reason for this is that, for Leibniz, what
those purely positive attributes enable a bearer to know or do is of no
consequence so far as their positiveness is concerned, as is clear from the
following remark on omniscience from the Causa Dei: 'Since this wisdom is the
most perfect possible, it comprehends every idea and every truth, that is,
everything, simple or complex, which can be an object of the understanding'
(G VI 440/S116). So in saying that omniscience is a positive attribute,
Leibniz did not mean that the bearer of the attribute knows only the most
perfect things that can be known. As is indicated in the above passage, and
indeed from the very notion of positiveness, an attribute is positive if it is in
itself not subject to limits. So it is the possession of complete knowledge/w se
that gives omniscience its positive characteristic, and not the positiveness of
the actual objects of knowledge. Hence the limitedness (or otherwise) of the
things known does not spill over to contaminate the positiveness of the actual
knowledge of the things. This applies to the attribute of omnipotence also,
which derives its positiveness from what it allows the bearer to do, irrespective
of whether it is good, bad or neutral. Thus while Leibniz evidently took
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'positive' to mean only that there is nothing lacking (i.e. there are no
limitations or negations) in the attribute itself, Adams construes it to mean
that there is also nothing lacking in the objects of the attribute. This
interpretation enjoys no textual support at all so far as I am aware.9 In fact it
would be surprising if it did, given that Leibniz's commitment to theism
required him to accept both omnipotence and omniscience as perfections.
In fact Leibniz usually identified three, not two, separate qualities that
together, in their ultimate form, constitute perfections, and these are power,
wisdom and goodness (cf. G VI 107/H127, G VI 602/L639, G VI 615/Mon
§48). These he called the 'three perfections of God' (G VI 199/H217).10 The
attribute of goodness, however, is sometimes just referred to as 'will'; in fact
for Leibniz goodness just is will, and it is common to find him using the latter
expression in place of the former, for example in a letter from 1698 he explains
that there are in God 'three formalities: power, knowledge and will' (Grl39,
cf. Grl26/SLT I.A.5). Leibniz did occasionally add to this list,11 and
sometimes shortened it too,12 but was normally content with the three
enumerated above.
It might seem that our discussion thus far has been somewhat beside the
point. After all, the only metaphysical perfections we have identified have
been those found in God, and since Leibniz, like most theists, held that 'there
is but one God' (G VI 613/Mon §39), it would seem to follow that
metaphysical perfection cannot be predicated of anything other than God.
But although Leibniz recognized only one bearer of the qualities he identified
as metaphysical perfections, he was unwilling to restrict metaphysical
perfection to God alone. In order to understand why Leibniz thought that
metaphysical perfection could be attributed to things other than God, we
need to delve into his ontology.
The origin of things from God and nothing
It is well known that in his mature metaphysics Leibniz granted reality only
to indivisible, soul-like entities he called 'monads' which, in aggregation,
manifest as corporeal substance, i.e. bodies. While a detailed analysis of
Leibniz's doctrine of monads reveals it to be not quite the 'fantastic fairy tale'
that Bertrand Russell initially believed it to be,13 there is nevertheless no need
for it to figure in this study, nor its precursor in Leibniz's thought, namely the
doctrine of substantial forms. For Leibniz in fact held on to a more
fundamental metaphysics during his time promoting the claims of the
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substantial form and later the monad, and common to both accounts is a
deeper ontology that is of much greater relevance to our survey of Leibnizian
optimism. We can reach it, and thus go beyond the monads and substantial
forms, simply by asking: what is the source or ground of all created things?
There is good reason to believe that for much of his philosophical life
Leibniz held that all creatures are fundamentally nothing more than the
manifestation of God's own essence. If this is correct then we can properly
impute to Leibniz a form of monism whereby every creature is made of'God-
stuff. This was not an uncommon view during Leibniz's time, and had its
source in the theology of many of Plato's followers. First woven into
mainstream Christian theology by Augustine, the Neo-Platonic creation
doctrine maintains that God's goodness is so great that it overflows, spilling
out his essence and thus generating the world and all that is in it. The process
of essence-diffusion was held to occur without any loss to God of this essence,
and although the products of this great effusion possessed a certain measure of
the divine essence they were considered to be nevertheless very much separate
from God (though inextricably linked in the same way that the light emitted
from the sun and the heat produced by a fire contain something of their
sources despite remaining distinct).
Evidence that Leibniz accepted the Neo-Platonic view of creation is
plentiful in texts from the mid-1680s onwards, though there is some evidence
that he embraced it even earlier than that. For instance in a paper from 1671
Leibniz wrote, 'Mind and God do not differ except that one is finite and the
other infinite' (A VI ii 288). Seven years later Leibniz wrote a similar passage
in a short dialogue on religion, his spokesman declaring: 'It can be said that
the difference between God and man is only one of more or less, though the
ratio is infinite' (A VI iv 2234/L218).14 As suggestive as these passages are,
however, they seem to fall some way short of an outright endorsement of the
Neo-Platonic doctrine of creation.15
Much stronger evidence of this doctrine is to be found in Leibniz's later
writings. For instance, in c. 1686 he wrote:
the necessary being . . . is the ultimate reason for things, insofar as they
contain realities or perfections. And since the full reason for a thing is the
aggregate of all primitive requisites ... it is clear that the causes of all
things can be resolved into God's attributes themselves. (A VI iv 1618/
LC307)16
A similarly frank betrayal of his Neo-Platonic sympathies can be found in a
text from c. 1690, On the true mystical theology, in which he insists:
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Every perfection flows immediately from God, as essence, power, existence,
spirit, knowledge, will . . . The divine perfections are concealed in all things.
(L367, cf. G VI 449/S128-9, G VI 602-3/L639, G VI 615/Mon §48)
So although the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness
(omnibenevolence) can only be truly ascribed to God, Leibniz did not regard
them as attributes that are either possessed in their entirety or not at all.
Rather, he considered them to be attributes that can be possessed absolutely,
as in the case of God (and only God), or partially, as in the case of non-Godly
creatures which possess the same attributes as God but to a much lesser
degree. Hence:
The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses them
without limits; he is an ocean, of which we have received only drops; there
is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but in God they are
all in their entirety. (G VI 27/H51)
Yet there is something odd about Leibniz's remarks here, for he is not just
saying that created beings share the same attributes as God, but also that they
have perfections too. The insistence that 'The perfections of God are infinite,
and ours are limited' (R48), i.e. the very insistence that lesser beings than
God have perfections at all, appears to smack of a contradiction on Leibniz's
part. For after taking great pains to establish, as we have already seen, that a
perfection is an attribute that 'expresses without limits whatever it does
express' (A VI iii 577/D99, A VI iii 578/D101), it seems slightly perverse that
he is also willing to use the term to refer to a limited degree of these same
attributes. Moreover, the attribution of perfections to created beings
obviously involves a deviation from the etymological sense of 'perfect' (as
well as its cognate terms) which applies to something complete or finished (from
Latin 'perficio'). In the original sense of the term, the attributes of God, i.e.
maximal knowledge, power and goodness, can legitimately be said to be
perfect as they are complete. But to say, as Leibniz does, that created beings
are endowed with some perfection, or a degree of perfection, even though
none of their attributes are complete in the sense that God's are, is to treat
'perfection' in an entirely different way, as something approximating to
'value'. In fact from time to time he used precisely this term ('value') to refer
to 'a certain degree of created perfection' (GM VII 239/SLT I.A.4). We
should thus understand, as indeed Leibniz's contemporaries would, that for a
creature to have a perfection is for it to have some measure or value of an
attribute which is found in its fullest extent in God. Thus knowledge itself is a
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perfection, even when it is possessed in a very limited degree; likewise power
and goodness. Consequently 'perfection' refers to these attributes themselves,
rather than only the highest degree of them. For Leibniz, then, God is the
source of all perfections in creatures, and since God is defined in terms of his
omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence, non-Godly creatures derive
whatever perfection they have from their own particular (finite) combina-
tions of power, knowledge and goodness.17
The distribution of these perfections among created things is not equal,
however. Some beings possess more power or knowledge or goodness than others,
and are accordingly more perfect. Not surprisingly, Leibniz identified rational
creatures as the most perfect type of being (cf. G IV 479/SLT II.B.2/LNS13).
Hence angels are more perfect than men, men more perfect than animals,
animals more perfect than plants, etc., though Leibniz was often at pains to stress
not only the limitation of creaturely perfection vis-d-vis God but also the extent of
that limitation vis-d-vis God (e.g. R48). That is, Leibniz made plain the
distinction between the finite perfections of creatures and the infinite perfection of
God, and even provided the following note by way of helpful illustration:
every substance has in itself a certain participation in divine omniscience
and omnipotence, even though its knowledge is confused, and its action
diffused by things acting in contrary ways. (A VI iv 1400/LC249, cf. G VI
604/L640)18
What we do not yet know, however, is how created things are constructed
from God's own attributes. For an answer to that we have to return, first of
all, to On the true mystical theology. There Leibniz explains:
All creatures derive from God and from nothingness. Their self-being is of
God, their nonbeing is of nothing (Numbers too show this in a wonderful
way, and the essences of things are like numbers[)]. No creature can be
without nonbeing; otherwise it would be God. Angels and saints must have
it. (L368, cf. Gr371, G VI 613/Mon §42)19
How are we to understand the claim that every creature derives from God
and nothingness? And how do numbers shed light on it? Leibniz does not
explain either in On the true mystical theology, but elsewhere he suggests that
there is an analogy between 'the origin of things from God and nothing' and
'the origin of numbers from 1 and 0' (Gr371, cf. A VI iv 158/P2). For greater
detail on this we have to turn to a letter to Johann Schulenburg from 1698, to
whom Leibniz explained:
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And this is the origin of things from God and nothing,
positive and privative, perfection and imperfection,
value and limits, active and passive, form (i.e.
entelechy, endeavour, energy) and matter or mass
which is in itself inactive, except insofar as it has
resistance. I have made those things clear to some
extent by the origin of numbers from 0 and 1, which I
have observed is the most beautiful symbol of the
continuous creation of things from nothing, and of
their dependence on God. For when the simplest
progression is used, namely the dyadic instead of the
decadic or quaternary, all numbers can be expressed
by 0 and 1, as will be evident in the table I have
added, and in this genesis of numbers, which is
especially suitable for nature, many things lie hidden that are wonderful
for contemplation. (GM VII 239/SLT I.A.4, cf. A VI iv 158/P2)
As Leibniz clearly intends God to be the analogue of 1, and nothingness the
analogue of 0, there are two ways he could be understood here. If we follow
the way numbers are constructed in the binary table, and assume that created
things are formed in the same way,20 we arrive at the view that God produces
things that equal or surpass him. Hence God produces things with ever-
greater quantities of essence than he himself possesses, via the sort of
repetition used to build up the higher binary numbers. But since Leibniz
holds that 'there is but one God' (G VI 613/Mon §39), and recognizes
nothing greater than God, this evidently is not how he wants to be
understood. The second way to make sense of the analogy between numbers
and created things is to take Leibniz's claim that 'all numbers can be
expressed by 0 and 1' (GM VII 239/SLT I.A.4, cf. A VI iv 158/P3), and
suppose that every created thing can somehow be similarly expressed by God
and nothing. But what does Leibniz mean by 'expressed by'? Presumably that
any number can ultimately be reduced to Is and Os, or, which is much the
same thing, translated, converted or resolved into Is and Os (cf. A VI iv 1618/
LC307). Again, though, there is a serious disanalogy here between created
things and numbers, as created things are not obviously reducible to or
resolvable into God and nothing; if they were, they would presumably be
greater than God.
The analogy is obviously far more complicated than Leibniz thought. The
problem is that in the binary system, Os and Is are the elements from which
higher numbers are created through a process of simple conjunction. Thus
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any product, i.e. any number that is generated from these elements and is
neither 0 nor 1, is going to be larger than 1. In the case of created things a
different process must be envisaged, for although God and nothing are the
elements out of which all other created things are formed, any product, i.e.
anything generated from God and nothing that is neither all-God nor all-
nothing, is somehow part God and part nothing. The term Leibniz evidently
wants is 'derivation', which is sufficiently woolly to permit a very loose
analogy to turn on it. Hence it would allow him to say that just as numbers
somehow derive from Os and Is, created things somehow derive from God and
nothing, in that, in both cases, a wide variety of other things can be formed or
derived from these two elements (numbers in the first case, created things in
the second). The moment the process of derivation is enquired into, the
analogy between numbers and created things breaks down. Evidently,
though, as Leibniz considered created beings to fall somewhere between God
and nothingness, since they contain part of each, a better analogue for these
things would be the fractions between 1 and 0. So the binary table and
resulting analogy, which Leibniz obviously considered capable of greatly
illuminating the matter of the origin of created things, in fact obscures it
utterly!
Which leaves us with the following problem: given that God's essence
comprises maximal power, knowledge and goodness, how is God able to
achieve the variety of created beings he does, given that each is comprised of
the perfect divine essence and non-being, or nothingness? Robert Adams has
observed that, if Leibniz allows God to employ only the operators of'negation
and conjunction' in the construction of creatures (as Adams supposes is
plausible on the grounds that qualities for Leibniz are usually constructed this
way), then he is left facing two unacceptable choices:
either the finite things have that same perfect power that God has, or they
have the negation of it . . . If the finite things have the negation of the
primordial divine power, it is hard to see what property they can have that
is constructed from that power by negation and conjunction except
absolute powerlessness. But they are not supposed to be absolutely
powerless. On the other hand, if they have that very property that is pure
primordial power, unmodified by negation, then it seems they have one of
the perfect attributes of God . . . But finite things are not supposed to have
any of these perfect attributes.21
Adams's Dilemma, as we might call it, rests on the assumption that Leibniz is
to be taken at face value when he claims that creatures are the product of God
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and nothingness. To understand Leibniz this way, however, is to impute to
him the curious view that nothingness is the logical opposite of God's essence,
a sort of 'anti-essence' if you will. If this is indeed how nothingness is to be
understood then it is self-evident that God will not succeed in making any
finite creatures at all, as the only choices available to him will be to make
other Gods or nothing. However Leibniz was too consummate a thinker to
make such an elementary mistake, though at times he was rather careless with
his language, such as when he explained the matter to Andre Morell:
there are in him [God] three primacies: power, knowledge and will; the
result of these is the operation or creature, which is varied according to the
different combinations of unity and zero. (Grl26/SLT I.A.5)
By appealing to 'the different combinations of unity and zero' Leibniz appears
to walk straight into the problem identified by Adams, that the combination
of God (1) and nothing (0) cannot give rise to anything between these two
extremes. But if we let him finish, we will find that he goes on to give Morell
an account that does not fall foul of this problem:
there are in him [God] three primacies: power, knowledge and will; the
result of these is the operation or creature, which is varied according to the
different combinations of unity and zero; or rather of the positive with the
privative, for the privative is nothing other than limits, and there are limits
everywhere in a creature, just as there are points everywhere in the line.
However, a creature is something more than limits, because it has received
some perfection or power from God, just as the line is more than points.
For ultimately the point (the end of the line) is nothing more than the
negation of the progress beyond which it ends. (Grl26/SLT I.A.5)
Much the same is said elsewhere too:
Without doubt boundaries or limits are of the essence of creatures, but
limits are something privative and consist in the denial of further progress.
(GM VII 239/SLT I.A.4, cf. Gr371, Gr412, Gr486/SLT III.A.3, G VI
613/Mon §42)
Adams's understanding is that when Leibniz's God produces a creature he
divests the full amount of his essence to that creature along with the negation
of this essence, which leaves the creature with no essence or properties at all.
It is clear, however, that Leibniz envisages a different process, whereby God
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divests a finite portion of his essence to the creature and then stops, the
stopping point marking the limit of the creature. Strictly speaking, then,
nothingness is not an element of the creation process as such; it is merely a
poetic way of referring to a limit, the fact that a creature contains some of
God's essence but not all. We should therefore not construe a creature as
literally a mixture of God-stuff and nothingness, but rather as a finite
instantiation (or dilution) of the former.
While it requires no great stretch of imagination to understand how
creatures can have a limited part of God's perfect power and knowledge, it is
less easy to see how creatures can be said to possess some but not all of God's
perfect goodness, given that this is identified with will. As we know, the line
Leibniz takes on the will is that it always aims towards what the agent perceives
as best. On the basis of that it might seem that every creature has the full
measure of God's goodness as God too aims at what he perceives to be the best.
The only difference between God and creatures is that the former always aims
right while the latter often do not. But for Leibniz this is the crucial difference.
For as he saw it, the extent to which any being's will is perfect depends on the
extent to which it aims at the true best. This itself is determined by the degree
of wisdom possessed by the owner of a will, since 'to will is to be brought to act
through a reason perceived by the intellect' (G IV 362/L389). If wisdom is
lacking, the will acts on bad reasons which it mistakenly judges to be good (cf.
A VI vi 180/NE180). And in creatures wisdom is always lacking to some
extent, in that it never matches up to the omniscience of God. Thus creatures
are only as good as they are wise, i.e. their wills are only as perfect as the
knowledge that drives them. So taking the perceived best course is no
guarantee of goodness at all, and certainly not perfect goodness, as taking the
perceived best course is merely what every creature does.
Thus the composition of creatures as part God and part nothingness (or
'perfection and limitation' as he more helpfully puts it at Gr371) allowed
Leibniz to claim that while creatures 'are the sparks of the divine image' (G
VI 452/S134) and contain 'a footprint or reflection . . . of God' (L368),22 they
are still essentially limited and therefore distinct from God. Moreover, as
'[ejvery creature is limited in this sense, that its greatness, power, knowledge
and all its other perfections are limited or restricted' it is easy to see how
Leibniz intends to explain the presence of moral evil (sin), for while 'there is
no perfection or positive reality [in the creature] which is not due to God' the
creature does not possess the full extent of these perfections (G VI 449/S129,
cf. GW50, G VI 614/Mon §47). It can therefore easily fall into sin because it
has insufficient wisdom to always know what the right actions are:
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For we must consider that there is an original imperfection in the creature before
sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; from which it follows that
it cannot be all knowing, and that it can deceive itself and commit other
errors. (G VI 115/H135)
By holding that 'the root of evil lies in nothingness', Leibniz saw himself as
continuing a line of argument that could be traced back to Augustine 'and
others' (A VI iv 1577/DM §30, cf. A VI iv 2358/SLT VI.C.1/CWR5, Gr364-
5/AG114-15).23 We shall address this later in the chapter, when we examine
Leibniz's notion of moral perfection.
One last point deserves our attention. So far I have said that God diffuses
his essence to creatures, and in most texts in which the creation doctrine is
discussed this is precisely what Leibniz says. But in a passage we have already
seen, it is clear that he wishes to go further than this:
the necessary being ... is the ultimate reason for things, insofar as they
contain realities or perfections. And since the full reason for a thing is the
aggregate of all primitive requisites . . . it is clear that the causes of all
things are resolved into God's attributes themselves. (A VI iv 1618/LC307)
It is interesting to note here that Leibniz is not just recognizing God's
attributes of power, wisdom and goodness in all creatures, but in all created
things. This is also evident in another previously quoted passage:
Every perfection flows immediately from God, as essence, power, existence,
spirit, knowledge, will . . . The divine perfections are concealed in all
things. (L367)
This marks a clear break with the creation doctrine as found in Plotinus and
Augustine, both of whom held that there is in fact one created thing to which
these attributes were not granted - matter. But Leibniz drew no distinction
between creatures and created things, because for him all created things are
creatures. Even the bodies of creatures, he maintained, are composed of other
creatures in turn: the body of every animal and of every plant is composed of
other animals and of other plants, or of other living and organic beings (G VI
235/H252). And as there is, he argued, 'no part of matter which is not actually
divided and does not contain organic bodies' (G VI 545/L590), then there can
ultimately be nothing in the universe beyond the attributes of God manifested
in creatures. Riding on the coat tails of Leibniz's version of the Neo-Platonic
creation story, then, is a form of vitalism, for if everything in the universe
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possesses some measure of God's essence, and this essence is to be understood as
the divine attributes of power, wisdom and knowledge, then everything in the
universe is presumably not just organic, in the sense that a carbon molecule is
today understood to be organic, but alive (which seems to follow on account
that power, wisdom and goodness are attributes that can only meaningfully be
predicated of living beings). So Leibniz's belief that all created things are
constructed from 'God-stuff inevitably leads to panorganicism which, being a
model of consistency, he was more than happy to endorse:
not only is there life everywhere . . . but there are also infinite degrees of it.
(G VI 599/L637, cf. G VII 344/AG319, A VI iii 565/LC209)
(The matter of there being infinite degrees of life is an important one and
shall be examined in much greater detail in the following chapter.) Although
many might have considered such panorganicism an unwelcome conse-
quence, Leibniz on the other hand revelled in it, and even considered it a
selling point of his philosophy on the grounds that it meant that 'there is
nothing fallow, sterile, or dead in the universe' (G VI 618/Mon §69), that is,
nothing without life.24 Which means, of course, that everything in the
universe has some degree of metaphysical perfection.
Physical perfection
I claimed at the start of this chapter that physical perfection is simply
pleasure and happiness. This was perhaps an oversimplification, for in the
Theodicy Leibniz denies that physical good lies solely in pleasure because it
can also lie in a 'middle state' such as health and 'all the sensations [that are]
not unpleasing to us, [and] all the exercises of our powers that do not
incommode us' (G VI 266/H281). Nevertheless, as Leibniz reserved most of
his remarks on physical perfection for pleasure and happiness, which he
considered to be much greater examples of this perfection than mere 'middle
states', the oversimplification was perhaps defensible. To understand physical
perfection, then, we need to grasp the relationship between pleasure and
happiness, a task for which few passages are better suited than this one, from a
paper entitled On Wisdom'.
Happiness is a state of permanent joy . . . Joy is a pleasure which the soul
feels in itself. Pleasure is the feeling of a perfection or an excellence, whether
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in ourselves or something else. (G VII 86/L425, cf. Gr588/SLT V.C.3, A
VI iv 2803/W568)
Thus the path to happiness starts with a feeling or perception of perfection,
and this very feeling is pleasure. But as Leibniz notes, pleasures are sometimes
mixed with pains since the mind is able to feel both at the same time, though
if the former outstrip the latter in intensity then the result is joy, which is little
more than a net balance of pleasure over pain (cf. A VI iv 2760).25 Hence:
JOY is the total pleasure that results from everything the soul feels at once. This is
why one can have joy in the midst of great pains, when the pleasures that
one feels at the same time are sufficiently great and capable of blotting the
pains out. (Gr582/SLT V.C.2, cf. Gr589/SLT V.C.3, A VI vi 166/NE166,
A VI vi 204/NE204)
Now properly speaking it is joy rather than happiness that minds aim at, i.e.
'something in the present' (A VI vi 90/NE90), though if a mind succeeds in
maintaining moments of joy over a prolonged period then it attains
happiness. In the above passage from On Wisdom Leibniz of course stipulates
that happiness is permanent joy, but this is seemingly not to be taken literally,
for in the same text he also writes 'the happy man does not, it is true, feel this
joy at every instant' (G VII 86/L425); in fact, as Leibniz carries on to
explain, the happy man's joy can be interrupted from time to time without
depriving him of his happiness. This accords with what he says elsewhere,
that joy need only be 'enduring' (A VI iv 1358/SLT VI.B.l, A VI iv 2842, A
VI 1993/L280), 'durable' (A VI iv 2761, A VI iv 2803/W568) or 'lasting'
(Gr582/SLT V.C.2, A VI vi 90/NE90) to qualify as happiness, which again is
presumably a slightly less stringent requirement than outright permanence.
Though how long joy must last to be called happiness, and how many
interruptions it can bear before happiness becomes an improper description of
it, are matters that so far as I know Leibniz left unresolved. These are minor
issues, however, and need not concern us here.
Returning to the concept of pleasure, then, we find that Leibniz considered
the recognition or appreciation of anything falling under one of the three
main categories of perfection (viz. metaphysical, physical and moral) to be
sufficient to bring about pleasure, and therefore (potentially) happiness.
Moreover, he considered the process to be proportional, i.e. the greater the
perfection perceived, the greater the pleasure gained from perceiving it.
According to Leibniz, however, not all pleasures should be sought for their
own sake, for not all are productive of happiness. He cautioned against
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indulging in the pleasures of the senses, for instance, referring to this type of
pleasure as 'the confused perception of some perfection'. The reason why one
should shun sensual pleasures is because they can be productive of 'greater
imperfections . . . as a fruit of pleasing taste and nice smell can conceal a
poison' (Gr579 80/SLT V.C.2/R83, cf. Gr582/SLT V.C.2, Gr589/SLT
V.C.3, G VI 267/H282). The risk of strychnine and other concealed
imperfections aside, Leibniz explains that pleasures of sense leave very little
by way of lasting impression on the mind, so the source of a sensual pleasure
must be returned to constantly. Therefore, he advises,
we must strive for those clear and pure pleasures, whose perfection lies not
only in the sense, but also in the intellect, and these we call the pleasures of
the mind, in which it is clear that evils cannot lie hidden. (Gr589/SLT
V.C.3)
The 'pleasures of the mind' referred to here are those that arise from
'knowledge of reasons' or 'universal and eternal truths' (Gr580/SLT V.C.2/
R83), which is to say those 'pleasures . . . which occur in the knowledge and
production of order and harmony' (A VI vi 194/NE194). Although it is not
immediately clear, what Leibniz is talking about here are the pleasures that
arise from knowledge of God. As God is supremely perfect in every way, and
consequently the greatest source of perfection there is (or can be), he is an
inexhaustible source of pleasure for finite minds (cf. G VI 282/H297, G VI
605/L641).26 However, as creatures 'only know him through his emanations'
(Gr580/SLT V.C.2/R84), it is these emanations, i.e. the things he has
created, that creatures need to study in order to secure knowledge of God.
Such study is not mere data-gathering either; it involves 'applying reasons to
facts'. That is, one must not just seek to know 'the wonders of nature' (Gr581/
SLT V.C.2/R84), but their reasons too:
By understanding the laws or the mechanisms of divine invention, we shall
perfect ourselves far more than by merely following the constructions
invented by men. For what greater master can we find than God, the
author of the universe? (A VI iv 1994/L280, cf. A VI iii 157/W62, Gr91)
Adopting the finest clothes of the natural theology movement, Leibniz argues
that one can even be assured of the existence of God through a simple
examination of a plant or animal, whose 'wonderful structure . . . shows that
the author of nature has taken care with it and adjusted it down to the least
parts' (A VI iv 2722/SLT V.B.I). And what is true of the smallest parts of
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nature is true of the greatest parts as well. In fact, the whole of nature and its
laws, Leibniz explains, are 'rays of the divine perfection' (Gr91), and contain
traces of God's greatness, goodness and wisdom, and so to not study them is
not just to remain in ignorance of God, but to neglect our own happiness also.
Leibniz continues to explain that our knowledge of God is further
enhanced by knowledge of eternal truths, which 'makes us return everything
to the final reason of things, that is to God, who is the source of our happiness'
(Gr583/SLT V.C.2, cf. Gr580/SLT V.C.2/R84). The eternal truths Leibniz
has in mind are those of 'numbers, shapes, good or evil, justice and injustice'
(Gr581/SLT V.C.2/R84). Unlike Descartes, Leibniz denied that God
produces these truths, i.e. that God makes them true by an act of will, but
he did hold that they are objects of God's understanding, and that his
existence is required if they are to be true at all:
For it is, in my opinion, the divine understanding which gives reality to the
eternal truths, although its will has no part in it. All reality must be
founded on something existent . . . without God, not only would there be
nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible. (G VI 226-7/H243,
cf. A VI iv 1617/LC307, A VI vi 447/NE447, G VI 614/Mon §§43-4)
The eternal truths are thus a window into the mind of God, and the more one
discovers about them, the more one discovers about their 'first source',
namely God (G VI 227/H243). But in order to gain any happiness from such
truths it is crucial that one recognize their source. As Leibniz acknowledged,
atheists can be just as good at geometry and logic as theists, i.e. they can
discover the 'divine truth' (A VI iv 695) without knowing God (cf. G VI 227/
H243). But because the latter relate this truth to its source (God) and the
former do not, theists presumably make much happier geometers and
logicians than do atheists.
In Leibniz's view, knowledge of God obtained via the discovery of eternal
truths opens up another pathway to happiness:
the more a mind desires to know the order, the reason, the beauty of things
that God has produced, and the more it is moved to imitate this order in
the things that God has left to its management, the more it will be happy.
(Gr581/SLT V.C.2/R84)
Therefore, in men, happiness can also arise from aiming 'at the good and at
perfection so far as is possible' and therefore 'imitat[ing] divinity, in so far as
human nature is capable' (R58, cf. G VI 432/H438). Consequently, another
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piece in the jigsaw of happiness is a life of virtue for 'virtue itself consists in a
pleasure of the mind' (A VI vi 162/NE162). The connection between virtue
and happiness will be investigated in the next part of this chapter; for now it is
sufficient for us to acknowledge Leibniz's view that happiness proceeds from
virtue, and that virtue proceeds from wisdom, i.e. knowing the true moral
laws (which number among the eternal truths). Consequently, discovering
the eternal truths does not just lead to knowledge of God by proxy, but also
enables creatures to act like him insofar as that is possible.
This gives us three possible routes to happiness — knowledge of facts and
their reasons, knowledge of eternal truths, and a life of virtue. Given that the
latter can only be achieved by knowing the true moral laws, it is clear that the
role of wisdom in the procurement of happiness is a vital one, for happiness
depends on the amount and quality of one's knowledge. And given that 'The
wiser one is the happier he is' (A VI iv 2805/W569), a life of science,
philosophy, theology and virtuous living is obviously a good choice for the
seeker of happiness. It is certainly Leibniz's recommendation.27 This prompts
him to remind us 'that we are the most perfect and happiest of all known
creatures, or at least that it only takes us to become so' (A VI iv 2240/L220).
This remark comes at the end of a short dialogue, after Polidore has been
convinced by Theophile (Leibniz's spokesman in the debate) that his
unhappiness is due to his not pursuing 'the knowledge of truths and . . . the
exercise of virtues' (A VI iv 2239/L219). The moral is that unhappiness,
where present, arises deservedly as a direct result of one's free choices, and the
remedy is simply to increase one's knowledge. Therefore 'we shall be happy in
it [the world] if we wish to be' (G VI 232/H248, cf. A VI iii 135-6) and
conversely, 'there is no misery unless someone wants it' (A VI iii 140). To
clinch the point, Leibniz baldly claimed that:
I know no one happier than I am, because God gave me this
understanding, as a result of which I envy no king; and I am certain
that God takes special care of me, that is, that he has destined my mind for
immense joys, in that he has opened to me such a certain and easy way of
happiness. (A VI iii 477/D31)
Since others can discover and reflect on truths, can perceive perfection and
exercise virtue, 'no one in the world need ever be wretched unless he wills it to
be ... All things are good for him who believes, who loves God, who trusts in
God' ( A V I iii 476/D29).
But is it really so clear-cut? In another short (and probably unfinished)
dialogue from the mid-1690s, Leibniz appears to tell a different story. After
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Leibniz's mouthpiece, Theophilus, has finished giving definitions of happiness
and joy, and explained that the path to happiness lies in the pleasures of the
intellect, Gharinus, his interlocutor, responds by saying 'I fear that your
definitions themselves show that happiness is outside of our power.' Charinus
then goes on to give a catalogue of ills which routinely affect men's ability to
attain happiness:
How many changes there are in the fortunes of men, how often men are
vexed by men, and even if you assume that savage enemies can be
appeased by wile to some extent, how often we experience nature herself as
unfriendly, indeed deaf and inexorable! How many men are seized by
public misfortune, swallowed by waters, or crushed by earthquake, not to
mention the seeds of perpetual sickness received from birth and external
attacks and other sources of personal evils! What use is the knowledge of
happiness to those who are deprived of the means of obtaining it? (Gr590/
SLT V.G.3, cf. G VI 419/H424-5)
Theophilus offers two responses. The first is that, Tf all our life, which we
pass in this arena, were contained in a brief space of years, there could be no
reply to your observation.' The implication, of course, is that Theophilus
feels that an adequate reply is available because our life is not confined to a
few years. The point is left undeveloped in the dialogue however, though it
crops up at some length elsewhere, and we shall address it in Chapter 7.
Theophilus's second response is to say that, through the Leibnizian rules for
happiness,
at least we shall come as close to happiness as will be allowed, and when we
are acquainted with the sources of joy, the greatest part of which is within
us, we shall draw from them as much joy as will be permitted to be set
against chance evils. (Gr590/SLT V.G.3)
Hence the route to happiness that Leibniz maps out is, by his own admission,
not a guarantee of happiness, as events may conspire to prevent us achieving
it, but it still ought to be followed as much as possible so that we may be as
happy as we can possibly be.
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Moral perfection
The final type of perfection identified by Leibniz is moral perfection.28 He
equates this with virtuousness, or piety, which he defines as 'the habit of
acting in accordance with wisdom' (Gr579/SLT V.C.2/R83, Gr581/SLT
V.C.2). Or rather, the habit of following the objective and eternal 'natural
law', of which Leibniz identifies three degrees: 'strict right in commutative
justice, equity (or charity in the narrower sense of the term) in distributive
justice, and finally piety (or probity) in universal justice' (G III 387/SLT
V.A. 1/L422). Only the third of these need concern us here,29 as Leibniz tells
us that 'Every moral virtue . . . is contained within universal justice, which is
absolute. These are perfect laws, prescribing every duty of virtue to man.'30
Unfortunately Leibniz does not provide a list of virtues, preferring instead
to subsume them all under 'wise charity', 'justice' or 'generosity', all of which
amount to a sort of very general friendship that Leibniz calls universal
benevolence (cf. G VII 549/SLT V.B.2). As one might expect, the man who
acts out of universal benevolence does all he can to increase the perfections of
others, i.e. their metaphysical, physical and moral perfections, and thereby
bring about as much good as he possibly can. With one qualification — he will
attempt to increase the perfection of others in strict proportion to their worth:
when one is inclined to justice, one tries to procure good for everyone,
insofar as one reasonably can, but in proportion to the needs and merits of
each person; and even if one is also sometimes obliged to punish the
wicked, it is for the general good. (Gr579/SLT V.C.2/R83)
In so doing, the virtuous man acts like God, who also aims to bring about as
much good as he can, and to distribute it proportionally according to desert
(cf. G III 388/SLT V.A.1/L422). And of course this is where wisdom enters
the equation (virtue, as we have just noted, is defined by Leibniz as the habit
of acting in accordance with wisdom). For the man who acts with an
indiscriminate benevolence is not acting wisely, like God, and is therefore not
as virtuous, in Leibniz's view, as the one who proportions his good actions in
favour of those most deserving. A reckless benevolence may in fact lead to
more harm than good, if it benefits those who do not deserve to be benefited.
So wisdom is required not only to know that true virtue involves the careful
targeting of benevolent acts, but also to put this targeting into practice, for it
is only when one knows the worth of others that one can give to each his due.
Not to mention, of course, that to successfully perpetrate many benevolent
acts itself requires a certain degree of wisdom, such as expertise in a particular
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field. The role of wisdom in the Leibnizian notion of virtue should therefore
not be under-stressed. In the matter of discerning the rules that a virtuous
man should follow, Leibniz is even prepared to state that wisdom is more
important than Scripture. He does say, of course, that 'the law of nature and
of the nations should follow the teachings of Christianity', i.e. that men should
follow 'the divine positive law contained in the sacred Scriptures' (R174). But
Leibniz quite often considers the dictates of revealed Mosaic law to be
necessary only for those who are incapable of reasoning effectively; in order to
determine the laws by which we should live 'it suffices to have good sense' (A
VI iv 2721/SLT V.B.I, cf. Grl39). Thus pagans are just as able to live
virtuously as the devout, if they are wise enough (cf. A VI vi 502/NE502,
Gr501). To clinch the point, he proposes a simple method by which all could
live virtuously: think carefully before acting:
How many of us have not heard these sayings a thousand times: why are you
doing this?, or consider the result, or watch what you are doing? And still, it is
certain that with one single such thought, perceived correctly and set
constantly in front of one and made inviolable as if by certain laws and
stern punishments, every single man as if in the blink of an eye, by an
instant metamorphosis, would become infallible, prudent and blessed —
beyond everything in the Stoic paradoxes of the wise man. (A VI iii 135,
cf. Gr581/SLT V.C.2, G IV 362/L388, A VI vi 196/NE196)
The reason why such reflection will be efficacious is due to our being born
(Leibniz thinks) with a small number of moral principles engraved in the
mind, from which all other ethical truths can be derived by a strict process of
deduction (cf. A VI vi 88 95/NE88-95). A careful use of one's insight and
reasoning will therefore furnish anyone with the rules by which they should
act. Leibniz acknowledged, however, that such an exhortation for careful
reflection will only strike a chord with those wise enough to realize its benefits,
so this tip for virtuous living will only find favour with those likely to be
virtuous anyway. Which only serves to underscore his point that to act
virtuously is to act wisely.
We should be careful, however, not to draw the conclusion that Leibniz
located virtue purely in actions, or even in their consequences. Although at
times he appears to come perilously close to saying this (e.g. Grl39), in his
more careful moments he advises that it is not enough simply to act in a
benevolent way or bring about good results; one must also do so for the right
reason. As he writes in The elements of true piety: 'I talk of piety, not merely of
moral virtues, because anyone is able to live rightly merely on account of
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human causes, such as education, custom, public peace, personal safety, and
good repute' (A VI iv 1357/SLT VI.B.I). Living rightly for these reasons
does not make one morally upright, a good person. To achieve that, and have
true moral perfection, one must will to do good for its own sake, and this
requires love. Moreover, Leibniz has a kind of self-love in mind as the
motivating force behind virtuous actions:
Self-love produces all the vices and all the moral virtues, according to
whether it is well or badly understood, and although it is true that men
never act without interests it is also true that there are respectable and
lasting interests. (A VI iv 2733)
So Leibniz does not recognize a truly Fenelonian kind of disinterested love,
which requires complete renunciation of oneself and one's own interests in
favour of those of the beloved. Instead, Leibniz holds that all love is
essentially self-love, or interested love, as men never act for any other reason
than their own interests. Nevertheless there are good and bad varieties of self-
love, according to Leibniz. The bad kind is what is normally understood by
the term selfishness, i.e. a man acting out of this kind of self-love will act only
to please himself and will not consider the interests of others at all. No virtue
resides in the one who acts on this kind of self-love. The second kind is dubbed
'pure love' by Leibniz and is characterized as 'being delighted by the
happiness of someone, or experiencing pleasure from the happiness of
another' (A VI iv 1357/SLT VI.B.I), and elsewhere as being 'disposed to
take pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of the object of one's
love' (A VI vi 163/NE163, cf. A VI iii 116, Gr579/SLT V.C.2/R83, G VII
546/SLT V.B.2). So the motive of an act performed out of pure love is both
selfless (because it benefits others deliberately rather than by accident) and
selfish (because the end result of it is very much in the virtuous man's
interest). By dint of the latter, pure love qualifies as self-love. But there is a
clear difference between a selfish act, which is directly in our interests, and
one performed out of pure love, which is only indirectly in our interests
(because it first has to benefit someone else before it can benefit us).
Moreover, the benefit one gets from an act of pure love 'only consists in the
pleasure which is given by the sight of the perfection and happiness of the
object loved, without considering any other good or profit which we can get
from it' (G VII 547/SLT V.B.2). So if person A were to enlighten person B,
his action would be virtuous if done for its own sake, i.e. if the only profit for A
is an increase in his happiness that derives from the recognition of B's
increased perfection, but non-virtuous if A's aim is to receive any other profit
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beyond that, e.g. monetary payment, career advancement, enhanced
reputation, etc. So although 'the happiness of the beloved is part of our
own happiness' (A VI iv 1357/SLT VI.B.l, cf. G VII 549/SLT V.B.2), the
one who acts out of pure love is driven to direct his efforts exclusively to bring
about an increase in the perfection of others, albeit in the knowledge that he
will benefit thereby; and this, in Leibniz's mind, is the mark of true virtue.
The relationship between virtue and happiness that I mentioned earlier is
now laid bare, as it follows from Leibniz's notion of virtue that acts performed
out of pure love will be rewarding for those that do them as well as those on
the receiving end of them. That is, if A performs a selfless act that increases,
say, the happiness or virtue of B, A will thereby increase B's own measure of
perfection, from which A may take pleasure. Consequently,
pleasure is essentially part of the notion of love, so that the one who truly
loves with a pure love places his pleasure in the good, happiness and
perfection of the other. Thus pure love can be detached from our
mercenary interests, but not from our good. (Gr208)
There are occasions when this connection between virtue and happiness fails,
however, for as Leibniz notes, 'even virtues are among the causes of future
unhappiness, not because anyone suffers on account of justice ... but in
general, i.e. adverse events arise that are no more from sin than from virtue'
(Gr373/SLT VI.C.2). Thus the recipe for virtuous living is no guarantee of
happiness; it is possible to be virtuous and unhappy, if unfavourable events
occur that turn a virtuous act into a source of unhappiness for the one who
performs it (which could simply involve being in the wrong place at the
wrong time). Nevertheless Leibniz does not retreat from his position that
virtue is its own reward, noting that God — because of his own perfect moral
goodness - will ultimately see to it that justice is served in the universe, with
the virtuous made happy and the wicked unhappy (cf. G III 389/SLT V.A.I/
L423).
In order to gain a proper understanding of the three kinds of perfection
identified by Leibniz, it is important to round off our discussion of them by
saying a few words about how they are all interrelated. For Leibniz evidently
didn't consider one type of perfection to be independent from the others. We
have already seen how he thought moral perfection relates to the physical
kind, and how wisdom (a metaphysical good) underlies them both. To briefly
recap, a creature boasting a high degree of wisdom will know (amongst other
things) many eternal truths, which will enable it to be happy and virtuous.
And by acting virtuously it is able to increase its happiness still further.
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Conversely, a creature with a relatively low degree of wisdom will struggle to
be happy (because it lacks knowledge of God) and virtuous (because it is
unlikely to know many of the true moral laws). We now need to consider how
the other metaphysical perfections of power and goodness relate to physical
and moral perfection. In the case of power, Leibniz remarks:
It is obvious that the happiness of mankind consists in two things - to have
the power, as far as is permitted, to do what it wills and to know what,
from the nature of things, ought to be willed. (A VI i 459/L131)
The more power a creature has, the more it is able to do, and more
importantly, the more it is able to achieve what it wills to do by overcoming
outside factors that would otherwise frustrate it. But the more a creature is
passive and not in control of its own fate, the less opportunity it will have to
act virtuously and thereby draw happiness from that. A lack of power will
also thwart a creature's desire for happiness in another way, by impacting on
its ability to engage in studies of nature. For Leibniz construes this as very
much an active process — armchair philosophizing might be able to furnish a
creature with the eternal truths, but not the truths of nature. Power is
therefore a requisite for physical and moral perfection no less than is wisdom.
Which leaves us with the metaphysical perfection of goodness. At first
glance this might appear to be the same thing as moral perfection, i.e. that
moral perfection just is the metaphysical perfection of goodness. But if we
remind ourselves that the latter is identified with the will, we will realize that
it cannot also be identified with moral perfection, which is 'a habit of acting
in accordance with wisdom' (Gr579/SLT V.G.2/R83, Gr581/SLT V.C.2).
Acting thus certainly requires good intentions, but it quite clearly requires
good actions as well (cf. A VI iv 2378/CWR35, Gr l l4) , which the will by
itself cannot bring about without the attribute of power (which is no more
than the ability to carry out the instructions or wishes of the will). Since the
will can supply the good intention to act but not the power to translate this
intention into action, a creature with a high degree of metaphysical goodness
will not necessarily have a high degree of moral perfection. So moral
perfection is, like physical perfection, a product of the combination of all
three metaphysical perfections - in this case, wisdom produces a good will,
the aims of which are realized by power. Therefore the metaphysical attribute
of goodness is nothing more than the propensity to obtain moral perfection,
rather than moral perfection itself.
From our brief discussion on the interconnections between the three kinds
of perfection, we can infer that metaphysical perfection is logically prior to
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the other two kinds, as creatures require some wisdom, power and goodness
(will) in order to attain any physical or moral perfection. Moreover, the
degrees of physical or moral perfection a creature can attain will depend
largely on the degree of metaphysical perfection it possesses (the other factor
being favourable or unfavourable events).
The richness of the Leibnizian universe
Now that we know what the three types of perfection are, it remains for us to
determine how prevalent Leibniz thinks they will be in the best of all possible
worlds. One might suppose that in the best world there will be as much of
each as there could possibly be, and at times Leibniz certainly seems to
promote such a view. For example, he writes in the Theodicy that 'God,
altogether good and wise, must have produced all the virtue, goodness,
happiness whereof the best plan of the universe is capable' (G VI 259-60/
H274). Later in the same work, Leibniz tells us that God 'has attained the
utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical, physical and
moral goods together' (G VI 264/H279). Passages such as these have
convinced some commentators, for example Parkinson, Brown, Blumenfeld
and Rutherford, that for Leibniz the best possible world contains the
maximum possible amounts of the three types of perfection or good.31 But a
close examination of the above passages will reveal that Leibniz falls some
way short of saying exactly that. The second passage, which says that God
'has attained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphy-
sical, physical and moral goods together', is remarkably short on detail and
says nothing about the amounts of each good that God has procured. What it
does say is that, taking these goods together, this world is superior to other
worlds. There is sufficient looseness in this claim for us to wonder if other
possible worlds might be inferior to the best overall, but contain a great deal
more of one or two of the goods than does ours. The first passage is no
different. In saying that our universe contains 'all the virtue, goodness,
happiness whereof the best plan of the universe is capable' Leibniz should not
be construed as saying that the universe actually contains the greatest possible
amounts of the three goods, only that it contains as much of them as the best
plan will permit. This is hardly a guarantee that all three kinds of perfection
are at an absolute maximum in the best possible world, because for all we
know at this stage the best plan does not involve this.
But intuitively we may feel that it should. And from what we know
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already, we can see how the simultaneous maximization of the three forms of
perfection could be achieved: all God need do is maximize metaphysical
perfection, and then, because of the interrelationships between metaphysical,
physical and moral perfection, this would result in the maximization of
physical and moral perfection also. But Leibniz's vision of the best possible
world is more complicated than this, and as will become apparent in the
following chapters, it does not obviously involve the maximization of any of
the three kinds of perfection. Instead we are informed that:
God chose the world that is the most perfect, i.e. the one that is
simultaneously the simplest in hypotheses and richest in phenomena. (A
VI iv 1538/DM §6)
And:
of all the possible ways to make the world, one has to be preferred to all the
others one which . . . in a word, is the simplest and the richest. (A VI iv
2231)
The task before us now is to understand what these statements mean.
Notes
1. In Gr371 he treats 'absolute' and 'limited' as opposites, which strengthens the
case for supposing that 'absolute' does indeed mean 'an expression without limit'.
2. This seems to be the view of G. H. R. Parkinson. See D132n4.
3. Also: 'An Essence is ... the aggregate of all attributes' (A VI iii 574/D95).
4. It is likely, of course, that Leibniz always intended 'positive' to mean unmodified
by limits and capable of an ultimate degree, as he would hardly have looked
kindly on the suggestion that he countenanced the identification of number as a
perfection. But to the best of my knowledge he did not make this dual
requirement explicit until the Discourse on Metaphysics. Prior to that, 'absolute',
'positive', affirmative', etc., were just employed in the sense of'not modified by
limits'.
5. For example it is not mentioned by Rutherford (1995), nor Adams (1994). The
latter in fact seems to take 'highest degree' to mean 'unlimited in degree' (1994, p.
121). It is highly questionable that the two expressions are identical however.
6. Adams (1994), p. 122.
7. Adams (1994), pp. 122-3.
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8. Adams (1994), p. 123.
9. The source of Adams' misinterpretation can be traced back to his construal of
Leibnizian positive attributes (i.e. perfections) as those 'that . . . involve no
negation at all' (Adams (1994), pp. 113 and 142). Leibniz would concur with
that analysis, so long as 'involve' is taken to mean 'contain' and not 'somehow
connected or associated with', which is how Adams takes it.
10. Of course in the passage from the Discourse on Metaphysics quoted above, Leibniz
mentions only omnipotence and omniscience in a discussion of God's perfections.
Although goodness is not mentioned explicitly as a perfection, Leibniz does
continue to remark that God 'acts in the most perfect manner not only in the
metaphysical sense, but also morally speaking' (A VI iv 1531/DM §1), a
statement in which God's perfect goodness is heavily implied.
11. For instance, when he remarks that God 'is absolutely ubiquitous, or
omnipresent; [and he] is absolutely enduring, i.e. eternal' (A VI iii 520/D79).
Leibniz does sometimes list justice among God's attributes as well, but 'since
justice, taken in its most general sense, is nothing but goodness conforming with
wisdom', it is clear that justice is analyzable into these two attributes (G VI 602/
L639).
12. For example in one text Leibniz singles out greatness and goodness as 'two
perfections' predicable of God. This is a curious view, as it turns out, for he
continues to explain that God's 'greatness can be considered under two main
headings, God's omnipotence and his omniscience' (G VI 439/S114). This would
suggest that power and knowledge are not perfections in themselves, but in
combination form the perfection of greatness.
13. Russell (1937), XVII.
14. And again, this time in a letter to Antoine Arnauld from 1687: 'For one may say
that created spirits differ from God only in degree, or as finite to infinite' (G II
125/L346).
15. In a penetrating study of Leibniz's early metaphysics, Christia Mercer claims
that Leibniz endorsed the Neo-Platonic creation doctrine from very early on in
his philosophical career. Much of the evidence she cites attempts to support this
claim indirectly by showing that, in his early theological writings, Leibniz
accepted much of the Neo-Platonic tradition, which would have likely entailed
his acceptance of the doctrine of creation. She finds further supporting evidence
in the fact that Leibniz's theological statements were consistent with the Neo-
Platonic account of creation, even though he makes no outright endorsement of it
(e.g. Mercer (2001), pp. 239, 428). Many of the passages cited by Mercer are
indeed consistent with the Neo-Platonic doctrine of creation though few,
considered in themselves, and without Mercer's guiding comments that often
say what Leibniz does not, offer direct proof that Leibniz endorsed the theory in
the formative stage of his philosophical career. The following is a good example of
how Mercer's commentary guides the reader to a position he or she might
otherwise not have reached:
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Leibniz writes 'The whole world is one vortex for God.' Within this context,
Leibniz's claim that the divine 'mind, like a soul, exists ... in the whole body
of the world,' suggests that the divine mind emanates its perfect vitality out of
which the individual creatures are made. (Mercer (2001), p. 416; the Leibniz
quotes are from A VI iii 480/D37 and A VI iii 474/D25.)
I am not convinced that either quote, even in context, unequivocally suggests
what Mercer says it does. In fact both appear to be quite pantheistic in tone. This
is not to suggest that Mercer is wrong to attribute the Neo-Platonic creation
doctrine to the young Leibniz, only that the evidence for that doctrine is scant,
and largely implied, in his early work. In fact it is not until April 1676 and the
short paper On the origin of things from forms (A VI iii 518-22/D75-83) that
conclusive evidence for his acceptance of that doctrine starts to mount.
16. Leibniz also sometimes refers to God as the principle of all other creatures, e.g. A
VI iii 392/D45, A VI iv 1402/LC251. Compare Plotinus (1991), V.2.1.
17. In one text, however, Leibniz informs us that, 'In God alone there is
understanding, willing, having power. In us there is intellect and will, but no
power' (A VI iv 1461/LC263). Such a view follows from his denial of transeunt
causation (i.e. inter-substance causation), each substance or creature instead
bringing about its own changes according to an internal blueprint of
development that he calls 'appetite'. As the rejection of transeunt causation is
not strictly part of his notion of the best of all possible worlds I shall opt not to
discuss it further.
18. Leibniz is not to be understood here as suggesting that creatures actually possess
the attribute of omniscience. He explains elsewhere that none of God's attributes
are strictly communicable in themselves (cf. Gr425), so by 'a participation in
divine omniscience and omnipotence' he means only that creatures have some
knowledge and power (or 'some vestige of omniscience and omnipotence' as he
puts it at A VI iv 1618/LC309). The issue is blurred somewhat by his insistence
that 'Each soul knows the infinite, knows everything, but confusedly' (G VI 604/
L640). The doctrine of confused omniscience stems from his conviction that there
is a sympathy between all parts of the universe, with each thing having an effect
on everything else (cf. A VI iii 524/D85). All these effects register in every mind,
though almost all of them are registered unconsciously. Hence each thing knows
of everything else in the universe, but each thing knows of most other things only
confusedly, whereas God knows everything distinctly.
19. Even a thinker like Descartes, who was less inclined towards Neo-Platonism than
Leibniz was, saw things in much the same way. He wrote T am, as it were,
something intermediate between God and nothingness, or between supreme
being and non-being.' Descartes (1984), p. 38.
20. This appears to be how Dennis Plaistead interprets the matter, as he writes that
the formation of things from God and nothingness is 'much like in binary
arithmetic where all numbers are formed by combinations of 1's and O's'.
Plaistead (2003), p. 331.
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21. Adams (2001), p. 10.
22. A description favoured by Neo-Platonists, cf. Henry More's assertion that 'every
thing [is] a picture, shadow, or footstep of the Divinity'. More (1966), p. 703.
23. See, for example, Augustine (1961), VII.12; Augustine (1963), XIV.13, XV.21;
Aquinas (1967), Iq48al; Aquinas (1956), III.4-9.
24. Leibniz makes a similar claim in a dialogue on continuity and motion: 'the
supreme creator of things . . . has bequeathed us nothing sterile, nothing fallow,
nothing unadorned' (A VI iii 566/LC211, cf. A VI vi 72/NE72, G II 126/L348,
GM III 565/AG171).
25. Leibniz sometimes forgets this and claims that 'Joy consists in the sensing of
perfections' (Gr667/SLT V.B.3), which is too close to the definition of'pleasure'
for comfort.
26. In The Philosopher's Confession Leibniz even goes so far as to state that God is the
only source of pleasure for minds (A VI iii 116-117).
27. In advocating a life of science, philosophy, theology and virtue, Leibniz's recipe
for happiness might seem very similar to Aristotle's prescription for eudaemonia,
which is also primarily centred around the 'eternal' truths of logic and
mathematics and virtuous actions (cf. Aristotle (1984), 1178a9-12). The
important difference between them is that while Aristotle identifies the
contemplation of eternal truths as the greatest single source of happiness, Leibniz
instead stresses the joys of discovering truths. It is true that he does suggest in
several texts that happiness can arise from contemplation (cf. A VI iii 117, Gr92,
G VII 86/L425), but there are many more in which truth discovery is promoted
at the expense of contemplation: 'Thus our happiness will never consist, and
ought not to consist, in a complete joy, in which there would no longer be
anything to desire, and which would make our mind stupid, but in a perpetual
progress to new pleasures and new perfections' (G VI 606/L641, cf. A VI vi 490/
NE490).
28. In at least one text Leibniz identifies omnipresence as another of God's
perfections and suggests that created things possess it in some measure 'when they
are said to be somewhere' (A VI iii 519/D79, cf. A VI iii 520/D81). However, this
claim was rarely repeated.
29. For good accounts of Leibniz's theories of justice, equity and charity see
Rutherford (1995), pp. 54-62, and Riley (1996), especially chs. 4 and 5.
30. Quoted in Riley (1996), p. 200, cf. R60, G III 389/L423.
31. E.g. Parkinson (1965), pp. 114-15; Brown (1988), p. 590f; Blumenfeld (1995),
p. 404f; Rutherford (1995), pp. 15 and 46ff.
4The Perfection of Worlds I: Richness
A brief history of plenitude and continuity
Leibniz does not provide a great deal of argument when identifying the
features that go to make up a rich universe. What we find instead are
statements that are accompanied by only the briefest of supporting arguments
or, more often, none at all. The reason for this was that there was no pressing
need for him to do so: in identifying richness as a merit-conferring property of
the world, Leibniz was saying nothing his contemporaries had not heard
before. The idea of worldly richness, which generally traded under the name
of plenitude, was in fact ancient even in Leibniz's time, having been introduced
by Plato by way of Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists and preserved, with
minimal amendment, by Abelard and Aquinas amongst others. The upshot of
this is that a proper understanding of this aspect of Leibniz's thought cannot
adequately be derived from a consideration of his writings alone, but requires
at least a glance at the philosophical landscape of preceding ages.
The roots of the idea are to be found in the Timaeus, where Plato writes of
God, 'He was good, and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever
arise. So, being without jealousy, he desired that all things should come as
near as possible to being like himself,1 that is, he wished 'that all things
should be good and, so far as might be, nothing imperfect'.2 To achieve this
end the demiurge (Plato's craftsman-God) used as his template for creation
the perfect world of Forms or Ideas, which in Plato's philosophy represent
every possible type of thing. It was necessary for the demiurge to make
mundane copies of every single Form in order that his work was not marred
by incompleteness. Hence the Platonic demiurge made the world 'whole
and complete' so that there was 'nothing .. . left over, out of which such
another might come into being'.3 This was taken to mean, by those whose
voices were destined to be heard in the centuries that followed, that the
creator would fail to be perfect if he did not create all the types of thing that
it was possible to create. These voices of course belonged to the Neo-
Platonists, and the interpretation they bequeathed was this: if God failed to
produce a particular type of thing he would not necessarily be jealous of
that thing by denying it the privilege of existence, but rather of the perfect
complete whole of which that thing was a necessary part. Therefore, as a
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non-jealous God could not reasonably deny existence to any kind of thing,
all of the ideas in the World of Forms were copied into the temporal realm.
Developing this point, Plotinus argued that, to the power of the supreme
being
we cannot impute any halt, any limit of jealous grudging; it must move for
ever outward until the universe stands accomplished to the ultimate
possibility. All, thus, is produced by an inexhaustible power giving its gift
to the universe, no part of which it can endure to see without some share in
its being.4
The consequence, as Plotinus observed, was that 'this universe holds
everything'.5 It was this very idea of the world containing not just every
kind of thing but everything it possibly could that gave the doctrine of
plenitude its name. Almost one millennium later the concept of plenitude had
become tightly woven into the fabric of everyday philosophical thought,
largely due to the influence of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists that followed
him. In the work of Abelard it is even still possible to detect traces of its
Platonic roots:
Could God make more than He does, or better things than He does, or
cease in any way from doing what He does? . . . to say that God could take
these various courses we imply detriment to His goodness. To say that he is
able to take these courses, but does not do so, is to hint at His being jealous
or unjust.6
Both Plotinus and Abelard took Plato's doctrine to its ultimate conclusion,
that worldly plenitude arose as a direct and inevitable result of the nature of
the most perfect being. For both, the production of everything possible was
bound up so intimately with divine goodness, it was inconceivable that God
could do anything other than produce everything he could. This led both to
abandon the notion of creation and all that it entails, e.g. intelligent choice,
which is clearly expressed in the Timaeus. The means of production was
instead taken to be emanation, where God's goodness 'overflows', via necessity
not will, to continually produce reality and perfection. Not that this was a
view shared by all, however. Augustine insisted that God freely chose to
create, while Aquinas put forward a novel synthesis of the two extremes,
arguing that God freely chose to emanate.7 Or perhaps 'freely decided to
communicate' would be more accurate, since for Aquinas God's aim in
creating was to impart his own likeness to the world in the most befitting
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manner available to him. Despite the different premises, Aquinas found
himself in full agreement with the conclusion of those Neo-Platonists who
made explicit what Plato had only implied - that if every type of possible
thing had been actualized then the world must exemplify maximal variety in
its parts. Thus while Plotinus observed that creation 'bring[s] about
differentiation to the uttermost degree',8 St Thomas was also happy to
affirm 'manyness in things',9 as it arose as a direct result of God's desire to
communicate his goodness to created things: 'it must be said that no created
nature, since it is finite, represents the divine goodness as perfectly as a
multitude of nature does . . . consequently there ought to be many natures in
the universe'.10 The upshot of this was that, as 'God made things manifest his
own goodness in their various levels, he instituted as many levels of being as
nature could carry'.11
A clear drawback to this idea, as many of its proponents realized, is that,
by itself, it could easily imply a messy and disorganized creation, an
indiscriminate granting of existence to things that had no relation to each
other and in fact seemed to get in each other's way. In short, it could imply
something unworthy of God, and hardly a fitting representation of his own
perfect nature. This concern was raised by Plotinus:
The animals devour each other: men attack each other: all is war without
rest, without truce: this gives new force to the question how Reason can be
author of the plan and how all can be declared well done.12
What the doctrine of plenitude needed, and eventually got, was some way of
making sense of the infinite variety that had been produced. It was Aristotle
who unwittingly brought order to possible chaos via the principle of
continuity, introduced in his Metaphysics. He writes there, T call things
"continuous" when their limits touch and become one and the same and are
contained in each other.'13 While Aristotle did not suggest there to be any
inherent continuity in nature (for him continuity belonged in mathematics)
his principle naturally fitted into the idea of plenitude,14 for if the world
contains the maximum variety of things, and this variety was limitless, then
between any two types of thing there must be found some intermediate type
of thing, and so on ad infinitum.
As a result of this, the clothes in which the notion of plenitude were usually
dressed were those of the scala naturae, or ladder of being, which held a
respected position in the paradigm of seventeenth-century metaphysical
thought, as it had for some centuries beforehand. The scala naturae was, as its
name suggests, essentially a hierarchy of being, with all the various kinds of
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things forming part of a graded and graduated scale from the least perfect up
to the most perfect. Plotinus has a strong claim to be identified as the source of
this hierarchical vision of reality.10 He writes:
The Universe is a thing of variety, and how could there be an inferior
without a superior or a superior without an inferior? . . . where there is
variety and not identity there must be primals, secondaries, tertiaries, and
every grade downward.16
However it was only midway through the first millennium AD, when Neo-
Platonic thinkers, writing after Plotinus, tangled the concept of plenitude
with Aristotle's writings on the principle of continuity, that the notion of the
scale, and its embodying order through the relative value of its parts, emerged
fully formed. It would be unwise to give Aristotle all the credit for providing
the finishing touch to the great chain, however, for Aquinas, at least, was
happy to find confirmation for the view that nature expressed an ordered
hierarchy in a source even more palatable to orthodox Christians than
Aristotle: 'the Apostle says in Romans XIII [1]: "The things which are from
God are ordered."'17 Aquinas, like Plotinus and others, therefore held that
the multitude of things God had created possessed a determinate order,
whereby all member species were ranked in relation to each other so that the
position any given species of thing occupied in the scale was a measure of its
relative perfection. The value attached to each point in the scale allowed one,
it was thought, to proceed through the scale by infinite degrees from the
lowest member to the highest. Aquinas brings this out nicely:
the diversity of forms requires different grades of perfection. This is quite
clear to one who observes the natures of things. He will find, in fact, if he
makes a careful consideration, that the diversity of things is accomplished
by means of gradations. Indeed, he will find plants above inanimate
bodies, and above plants irrational animals, and above these intellectual
substances. And among individuals of these types he will find a diversity
based on the fact that some are more perfect than others, inasmuch as the
highest members of a lower genus seem quite close to the next higher
genus; and the converse is also true, thus, immovable animals are like
plants . . . Hence, it is apparent that the diversity of things requires that not
all be equal, but that there be an order and gradation among things.18
So while the general thrust of the doctrine of plenitude was that the world was
complete, on account of it containing as much as it possibly could, and as
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many kinds of things as it possibly could, to many this entailed a continuous
ordering of the infinite variety of species or kinds that this completeness
demanded.
Leibniz and plenitude
The doctrine of plenitude continued to prove attractive to many thinkers
throughout the Middle Ages, Renaissance and into the Enlightenment.
Among its many advocates were Palingenius, Fontenelle, Locke and
Giordano Bruno, and to this chorus praising the hymn of plenitude, Leibniz
added his voice.19 But as we shall see, he didn't sing from quite the same
hymn sheet as everyone else. However, on the question of how much God had
created, Leibniz took the orthodox line that he had produced as much as
possible, so that 'the greatest possible number of things exist' (A VI iv 1442/
SLT I.A.I, cf. A VI iv 1364/SLT VLB. 1, A VI iv 2231, A II i 478/L211, G II
98/AG87). Moreover, Leibniz was able to claim that the number of things
remained stable throughout the history of the world, thanks to his adherence
to the then-vogue theory of preformationism. Following Leeuwenhoek, who
was the first to observe sperm cells under a microscope, Leibniz held that all
animals (men included) that were to develop throughout the course of the
universe began as spermatic animalcules, that is, miniature versions of the
animals they were to become, that were present in the semen of all previous
generations of animals. It is, he stated, 'doubtful that an entirely new animal
is ever produced but that living animals as well as plants exist in miniature in
the seeds before conception' (G VI 543/L589). Moreover, Leibniz held that
death was simply this process in reverse, and that animals never truly die in
the sense that they are wholly extinguished. Hence 'an animal . . . does not
end naturally; thus death ... will be nothing other than an involution and
diminution of the animal, when it returns from the state of a large animal to
the state of an animalcule' (G VII 330/SLT II.A.4). As Leibniz applied this
hypothesis to every kind of creature and not just animals (cf. G VI 517), he
was able to draw the conclusion that no creature is ever lost - those created at
the start of the world remain in it, in one form or another, throughout its
history. As nature has been formulated in such a way as to preserve the
number of things in it, God is relieved of the need for a series of fresh creations
to keep the number of things topped up. Consequently Leibniz was decidedly
lukewarm about the doctrine of emanation - which was typically taken to be
an ongoing process - and favoured instead a straightforwardly Augustinian
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creatio ex nihilo^0 arguing that everything had been produced freely by God
rather than flowing necessarily from him.21
God, then, creates only once, and in that single act he produced as much
(i.e. as many things) as was possible. This inspired Leibniz to draw a
conclusion that many of his predecessors had not - that if God had produced
as much as he could, then the universe must be a plenum, because any empty
spaces could potentially be filled with something (cf. A VI iii 473/D23).22 He
reached the same conclusion via the principle of sufficient reason too, arguing
that if God had left a space — a vacuum — then there must have been a reason
why he did so. But since it was better to fill all spare space rather than leave it
empty (since any created thing would have some perfection and an empty
space would have none) he could have had no reason to leave any spaces, and
consequently the universe must have been created at the limit of its
capacity:23
let us fancy a space wholly empty. God could have placed some matter in
it without derogating in any respect from all other things; therefore he has
actually placed some matter in that space; therefore there is no space
wholly empty; therefore all is full. (G VII 378/L691)
As to the point of this supreme abundance, Leibniz was in perfect agreement
with Aquinas, arguing that God merely desired to express his perfect nature:
God, in designing the world, purposed solely to manifest and communicate
his perfections in the way that was most efficacious, and most worthy of his
greatness, his wisdom and his goodness. (G VI 144/H164, cf. G VI 253/
H269)
And in keeping with the good doctor's prescription for creation, Leibniz
argued that the best way for God to communicate himself was to fill the world
with diverse things:24
perfection is not to be located in matter alone, that is, in something filling
time and space, whose quantity would in any way have been the same;
rather, it is to be located in form or variety. So it follows that matter is not
everywhere alike, but is rendered dissimilar by its forms; otherwise it would
not obtain as much variety as it can. (G VII 290/P146)
And so, ever keen to follow the well-trodden paths of the ancients, Leibniz
accepted one of the chief corollaries of the doctrine of plenitude, and endorsed
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infinite diversity in the universe (cf. G III 403/W483). But diversity of what,
exactly? Individuals, species, or both? There is no doubt that Leibniz would
have accepted that the world contains the greatest possible diversity of
individual things because 'there cannot be in nature two individual things different in
number alone' (A VI iv 1645/SLT I.B.5/P88, cf. G8/P133, G IV 514/L506). For
according to his celebrated principle of the identity of indiscernibles, if two
things have precisely the same properties or predicates (i.e. they are
indiscernible), then they are in fact one and the same thing (i.e. they are
identical). So if God creates the greatest number of things possible, then he
must thereby also bring about the greatest diversity of things possible.
Yet this does not seem to be what Leibniz means when he wrote, in the
passage cited above, that 'matter . . . is rendered dissimilar by its forms;
otherwise it would not obtain as much variety as it can', as he was certainly
enough of a Platonist to take 'forms' as meaning 'sorts' or 'types' of things
rather than individual things. This also seems to be his meaning when he
broaches the subject of variety in the Theodicy.
Midas found himself less rich when he had only gold. And besides, wisdom
must vary. To multiply only the same thing, however noble it may be,25
would be superfluity, and poverty too: to have a thousand well-bound
Virgils in one's library, to sing always the airs from the opera of Cadmus
and Hermione, to break all the china in order only to have cups of gold, to
have only diamond buttons, to eat nothing but partridges, to drink only
Hungarian or Shiraz wine, would one call that reason? (G VI 179/H198)
Although Leibniz initially appears to be advocating a variety of things, by
suggesting that it is superfluous to multiply the same thing, he quickly moves
on to advocating a variety of types or sorts of thing, and ultimately argues
that the principle being defended - that variety is good in itself- accounts for
the existence of'animals, plants, inanimate bodies', i.e. various kinds of thing
(G VI 179/H198). Leibniz also seems to mean the variety of kinds of thing in
On the ultimate origination of things, where he refers to 'the variety of forms' (G
VII 303/SLT I.A.3/P138). In fact Leibniz generally reserves the term
'variety' for kinds of thing rather than individual things, though as I have
already noted he also believed the best world contains the greatest possible
number of individual things, no two of which are the same, which entails a
commitment to the greatest possible variety of individual things too.26
Leibniz thus affirms both that there is the greatest number (and hence
variety) of individual things, and that there is the greatest variety of kinds of
thing, i.e. species. Later in this chapter we shall address the question of
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whether Leibniz believed there to be a link between the greatest number of
things and the greatest variety of species, but for now we need to understand
a little more about the latter claim.
We have seen that Plotinus and St Thomas, not to mention numerous
thinkers that followed them, held the view that within the great diversity of
species that God had realized there was a hierarchical ordering, and the order
inherent within this scheme was sufficient to absolve God from the charge of
bringing about a chaotic mess. The extent to which Leibniz was happy to
follow this line of thinkers in adopting the notion of the scala naturae is brought
out nicely in a letter to Varignon, which is worth quoting at some length:
I have good reasons for believing that all the different classes of beings
whose assemblage forms the universe are, in the ideas of God who knows
essentially their essential gradations, only like so many ordinates of the
same curve whose unity does not allow us to place some other ordinates
between two of them because that would be a mark of disorder and
imperfection ... Now the Law of Continuity demands that when the essential
determinations of one being approximate those of another, as a consequence, all the
properties of the former should also gradually approximate those of the latter. Hence
it is necessary that all the orders of natural beings form but a single chain
in which different kinds like so many links clasp one another so firmly that
it is impossible for the senses and imagination to fix the exact point where
one begins or ends; all the species which border on or dwell, so to speak, in
regions of inflection or singularity are bound to be ambiguous and
endowed with characters related equally well to neighbouring species.
Thus, for example, the existence of Zoophytes, or as Buddaeus calls them
Plant-Animals, is nothing freakish, but it is even befitting the order of nature
that there should be such. So great is the force of the Principle of
Continuity in my philosophy, that I should not be surprised to learn that
creatures might be discovered which in respect to several properties, for
example, nutrition or reproduction, could pass for either vegetables or
animals. (BC II 558-9/W187-8)27
Although Leibniz's remarks here are restricted to the continuity of what
would nowadays be termed kingdoms (animal, plant, etc.), elsewhere he
asserted the 'gradual connection of species' also:
although in some other world there may be species intermediate between
man and beast . . . and although in all likelihood there are rational
animals, somewhere, which surpass us, nature has seen fit to keep these at a
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distance from us ... I speak of intermediate species, and I would not want
to handle this matter in terms of human individuals who resemble brutes,
because it is likely that what they suffer from is not a lack of faculty [of
reason] but an impediment to its being exercised. So I believe that the
stupidest man . . . is incomparably more rational and teachable than the
most intellectual of the beasts. (A VI vi 473/NE473)
Although Leibniz undeniably accepted the continuity of species or forms, it is
not yet clear what he meant when he used the term 'species' in this context.
In the New Essays he identified two possible ways of defining species,
mathematically and physically, though he expressed dissatisfaction with both
methods. With the mathematical method, 'the tiniest difference which stops
two things from being alike in all respects makes them of different species' (A
VI vi 308/NE308). According to Leibniz's celebrated principle of the identity
of indiscernibles, however, there cannot be two things alike in all respects. So
if species were defined in this mathematical sense, there would be as many of
them as there are non-identical individuals and 'species' would, for him,
simply be another way of saying 'individual'. This was unacceptable: 'since I
believe that no two individuals ever resemble each other perfectly, I should
have to say that no two individuals belong to the same species, which would
not be accurate' (G IV 566/L581). The second way of defining species, the
physical method, is nothing more than a human taxonomic enterprise, where
men group creatures together on the basis of appearance, generation or
pedigree. Leibniz found that this produced unsatisfying results also, because
these attributes 'only determine the name' and at best allow only a
'provisional and conjectural'judgement about species (A VI vi 324/NE324).
The chief problem with men's attempts to determine species, he argued, was
that they only judge on what they see, and this is not necessarily reflective of
what is really integral to a species: 'It is true that we cannot judge accurately,
for lack of knowledge of the inner nature of things' (A VI vi 325/NE325).
This suggests that a third definition of 'species' was in play; one, moreover,
that Leibniz accepted, and which I shall call the metaphysical definition.
This definition clearly turns on the inner nature of things, so that what is
essential to a species, what it is that marks it out as that species distinct from
all others, is something internal, not how it looks or how it is generated.
Developing this line, Leibniz claimed that an increase in our acuity would
lead us to find 'for each species a fixed set of attributes which [a] re common to
all the individuals of that species and which a simple living organism always
retain[s] no matter what changes or metamorphoses it might go through' (A
VI vi 310/NE310). Thus the species-defining inner nature is 'unchanging'
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and is 'varied only by the addition of accidents' (A VI vi 325/NE325). He
conceded that in the case of most species we do not know much, if anything,
about their unchanging inner nature, and so do not truly know what
differentiates them from other species. The one exception to our almost
universal ignorance of inner natures is that pertaining to ourselves:
as we know the inner essence of man, namely reason, which resides in the
individual man and is present in all men, and as we find among us no fixed
inner feature which generates a subdivision, we have no grounds for
thinking that the truth about their inner natures implies that there is any
essential specific difference among men. (A VI vi 326/NE326)
Mankind, then, is a distinct species, one of an infinity defined as such by their
inner natures of which, on the whole, very little can be known. It is
worthwhile to note that Leibniz's admitted ignorance of where the species
boundaries lay did not in any way interfere with his belief that they formed a
continuous series in the world.28' 29
The law of continuity
Leibniz rather shamelessly claimed the credit for being the first to formulate
the law of continuity (e.g. FC227/SLT IV.B.3, G IV 568/L583, G VI 321/
H333), conveniently forgetting in the process that Aristotle had beaten him to
the punch by more than 2,000 years. But Leibniz's formulation was
undoubtedly a little sharper than that given by the Greek, continuity
demanding (in his view) that 'any change from small to large, or vice versa,
passes through something which is, in respects of degrees as well as parts, in
between' (A VI vi 56/NE56). Or more precisely:
when the difference of two cases can be diminished below any magnitude given in the
data or in what is posited, it must also be found diminished below any magnitude given
in what is sought or in what results from it, or to speak more familiarly: when the
cases (or data), continually approach each other and one finally merges into the other,
then the results or outcomes (or what is required) must do likewise. (G III 52/SLT
IV.B.1/L351, cf. G IV 375/L397-398)
Despite these solid definitions, Leibniz often summed up the law of continuity
rather pithily as 'nature never makes leaps', or something similar (e.g.
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ML320, FC227/SLT IV.B.3, GM VI 248/L447, G II 168/L515), though this
was not on account of any lack of esteem for it; on the contrary, like many of
his predecessors, he saw the usefulness in not confining continuity to
mathematics:
The universality of this principle in geometry soon informed me that it
could not fail to apply also to physics, since I see that in order for there to
be any regularity and order in Nature, the physical must be constantly in
harmony with the geometrical. (BG II 556/W185)
Leibniz enjoyed considerable success by utilizing the law of continuity in
physics. He famously demonstrated that Descartes's laws of the collision of
bodies were false because they permitted discontinous changes in the behaviour
of bodies and therefore a hiatus in nature, which was at odds with common
experience (cf. G III 53/SLT IV.B.1/L352, G IV 382/L412). Buoyed by this,
Leibniz started to find continuity elsewhere in nature, which inspired him to
famously claim that God was a divine geometrician who employed
mathematical principles to construct the world in an orderly way (cf. A VI
iv 1536/DM §5, A VI iv 1616-17/LC305). The fact that the law of continuity
seemed to be adhered to everywhere ('it lurks in every process in Nature*, GM VII
25/W211), gave him the confidence to apply it beyond mathematics and
physics into the realm of metaphysics. Corresponding to these extensions of
application, Bertrand Russell and others have correctly identified three forms
of the law of continuity in Leibniz's thought — spatio-temporal continuity,
continuity of forms and continuity of cases,30 though only the first two are of
interest to us here (the third belongs to mathematics). Spatio-temporal
continuity involves the continuity of space and time themselves and also of that
which is in space and time. This entails, inter alia, that all changes, whether
from state to state or place to place, happen smoothly and via all intermediate
points (cf. G II 168 9/L515 16), and that there will never be a gap or vacuum
in space, which would leave 'sterile and uncultivated places, places in which
something additional could have been produced' (GM III 565/AG171). One
consequence of spatio-temporal continuity, then, is that nature will forever
preserve the plenum that God established in the beginning, i.e. every part of
space will always be filled with something (cf. G VI 598/L636). We have
already seen what Leibniz understood by the continuity of forms, or rather
species (i.e. that between any two species there is always an intermediate
species), so it is not necessary for us to dwell on it again here.
Leibniz's wide use of the law of continuity has seemed to a number of
commentators to carry with it the view that it applies as much to individual
54 Leibniz Reinterpreted
things as it does to species, so that it is not just all orders of species that are
actualized but all possible degrees of perfection. Laurence Carlin claims that:
Where the Neoplatonic and Christian Aristotelian tradition held merely
that there is a 'top to bottom' ordering of types of being (species), Leibniz
claimed that in addition there is an ordering among individual substances
such that each degree of perfection is instantiated by exactly one
substance.31
This position is also attributed to Leibniz in commentaries by Bertrand
Russell, Nicholas Rescher and Donald Rutherford.32 The latter argues, for
instance:
By observing the principle of continuity in his creation of the world, God is
able to realize the most complete series of beings possible: one in which
there are no gaps between successive degrees of perfection. As a result, God
is able to create both the greatest variety of beings and the greatest total
perfection or 'quantity of essence'. The principle of continuity thus
functions in a transparent way as a principle of optimal order: It suggests
how to order created beings relative to one another such that the greatest
total variety can be realized in a world. The design solution God favors is
to actualize as many beings as can be accommodated according to a
continuous ordering of degrees of perfection — an ordering to which
nothing further can be added.33
Rutherford identifies two theses which he believes give rise to this view: that
each individual possesses 'different degrees of perfection' and that each degree
of perfection 'can only be instantiated once in the world'.34 There is little
doubt that Leibniz endorsed both:
nature is fundamentally uniform, although there is variety in the greater
and the lesser and in degrees of perfection. (G III 343/LNS221, cf. G III
340/LNS205-6, A VI vi 71/NE71, A VI vi 490/NE490, GW46)
The essences of things are like numbers. Just as two numbers are not
equal to each other, so no two essences are equally perfect. (A VI iv 1352)
Rutherford then argues that the two theses taken together 'commit Leibniz to
the position that any two numerically non-identical individuals must be
distinguished by their degrees of perfection'.35 I think this is right. However it
does not seem to entail, as Rutherford supposes it does, that there is one existing
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creature per possible degree of perfection. After all, every creature could still
differ in perfection even if between them they did not exhaust all possible
degrees of it. So the fact that no two creatures are equally perfect cannot be
taken as evidence that individuals are continuously ordered according to the
degrees of perfection they possess. Nevertheless Rutherford ploughs on to argue
that God recognizes 'the principle of continuity as a principle of general order
... [and] orders the degrees of perfection in accordance with it'.36 Oddly
enough, to support this claim, Rutherford quotes a portion from the letter to
Varignon that we have already cited in this chapter:
I have good reasons for believing that all the different classes of beings
whose assemblage forms the universe are, in the ideas of God who knows
essentially their essential gradations, only like so many ordinates of the
same curve whose unity does not allow us to place some other ordinates
between two of them because that would be a mark of disorder and
imperfection. (BC II 558/W186-7)
It seems somewhat unnecessary to point out that Leibniz is here referring to
'classes of beings', i.e. kingdoms, rather than individuals!37 Bertrand Russell
makes precisely the same mistake; in a discussion on Leibniz's use of the law of
continuity, he mysteriously moves from discussing continuity of forms to
continuity of individual things, asserting that continuity 'is held by Leibniz to
apply also in the passage from one substance to another'.38 The only textual
evidence he provides for this view is the very same passage from the letter to
Varignon also quoted by Rutherford, in which Leibniz clearly states that he is
talking about 'classes of beings' rather than individual creatures. The same
passage is cited also by Nicholas Rescher, though bizarrely when quoting it
he replaces 'classes of beings' with 'monads'!39 How he would propose to
justify this I cannot even guess.
Laurence Carlin reaches precisely the same conclusion as Rutherford,
Russell and Rescher - that all possible degrees of perfection are instantiated
in the Leibnizian universe - but by a different route. He takes the conclusion
to be entailed by the following two theses: '(a) no two substances possess the
same degree of perfection; (b) there is no vacuum of perfection'.40 We have
seen already that Leibniz accepted (a), and Garlin argues that there is
evidence he accepted (b) in a letter to Wagner from 1710:
those who deny souls to brutes and all perception and organism to other
parts of matter, do not sufficiently recognize divine majesty, introducing
something unworthy of God and uncultivated, namely a vacuum of
56 Leibniz Reinterpreted
perfections or ['seu' = that is] forms, which you may call a metaphysical
vacuum and which must be rejected no less than a vacuum of matter or a
physical vacuum. (G VII 531/W508)
Now Carlin evidently takes the claim that there is no 'vacuum of perfections'
to mean that, for any given degree of perfection, there will be something in
this world that possesses it. This is prima facie a plausible reading of the above
passage, but is also one that will not stand up to scrutiny. To understand
what Leibniz does mean by there being no vacuum of perfections, we need to
recall a point made in the last chapter, that for Leibniz everything that exists
is organic or alive and contains some measure of the divine perfections.
Bearing this in mind, it seems to me that Leibniz's point to Wagner is that, if
it were denied that some parts of matter are organic, then some things would
exist that have no perfection at all, as creaturely perfection is defined in terms
of power, knowledge and will, and only organic beings can have such
attributes. Consequently the 'vacuum of perfections' to which Leibniz refers is
simply the existence of things without any power, knowledge or will at all. In
the above passage Leibniz merely observes that it would be as senseless for
God to produce such things as it would be for him to create a physical
vacuum, since in both cases a thing with some measure of perfection could
have been created to replace either the perfection-less thing or the physical
gap (since both would class as 'uncultivated' parts in his favoured sense of
being 'fallow, sterile, dead'). So there is no vacuum of perfections in the
Leibnizian universe only in the sense that everything in it is organic and
contains a degree of the divine attributes, that is, some degree of perfection;
but this of course does not entail that for any given degree of perfection, there
will be something in this world that possesses it.41
So far as I know, there are no texts in which Leibniz claims that all degrees
of perfection are instantiated in the world, or that the law of continuity
somehow preserves this arrangement. No doubt a world featuring every
possible degree of perfection would be an impressive achievement on God's
part, and much more impressive than one featuring just a continuous
ordering of species. But Leibniz apparently only committed himself to the
latter, and it should become clear over the course of the next three chapters
exactly why it was not open to him to accept the former.
So far, the picture we have painted of Leibniz's vision of plenitude and the
scala naturae is scarcely different from that conceived by a multitude of other
thinkers both before and after him. But as we will now see, a clear difference
emerges when we canvass his opinion on the completeness of both the
universe and the scale.
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Compossibility and incompossibility
Historically, of course, the ladder of being, springing as it did from the
doctrine of plenitude, was always considered as something complete, featuring
everything it possibly could, so that there were no unactualized species.
Although Leibniz's abhorrence of vacua equalled that traditionally attributed
to nature (there could, he wrote, be 'a vacuum of forms existing no more than
a vacuum of bodies' (G II 125/L347)), this was not a position he was prepared
to accept. Where Leibniz deviated from the common vision of the scala naturae
was in his belief that, although the chain of being had no missing links,
nevertheless not every possible species was represented in it. What drew him to
this view was his conviction that not all possible species could be actualized in
the same world, that is, some of them were incompossible with others:
Able philosophers have addressed themselves to this question of whether
there is a vacuum among forms, that is, whether there are possible species
which do not actually exist, so that nature might seem to have overlooked
them. I have reasons for believing that not all possible species are
compossible in the universe, great as it is; not only with regard to things
existing at the same time, but also with regard to the whole succession of
things. My view, in other words, is that there must be species which never
did and never will exist, since they are not compatible with that succession
of creatures which God has chosen. But I believe that the universe contains
everything that its perfect harmony could admit. It is agreeable to this
harmony that between creatures which are far removed from one another
there should be intermediate creatures, though not always on a single
planet or in a single planetary system. (A VI vi 307/NE307)
In a series of personal notes Leibniz defined 'compossible' as 'that which does
not imply contradiction with another' (A VI iv 867), which makes it plausible
to suppose that 'incompossible' refers to that which does imply a contradiction
with another (the term clearly refers to things both possible yet somehow
incompatible, as the above passage makes clear). Accepting that not all
species could coexist in the same world, the obvious question to ask is this: if
there is no vacuum formarum, and hence no gaps between the species of this
universe, where could the omitted incompossible species have fitted? Leibniz
provided the following intriguing answer: 'The Law of Continuity states that
nature leaves no gaps in the orderings which she follows, but not every form
or species belongs to each ordering' (A VI vi 307/NE307). What Leibniz
suggests here is that there is not a single great chain of being, as other
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champions of plenitude argued, but many different possible chains, each
comprising a selection of species that 'belong' to it.42 As Leibniz nowhere
gives any indication that two or more of the possible orderings are realizable
in the same universe, it seems reasonable to impute to him the view that only
one of the various possible orderings has been realized (and we know that it
must be the fullest possible ordering of species that has been realized, given
Leibniz's view that the best world contains the greatest variety of species). So
we should understand Leibniz's claim that the chain or ordering realized in
our world is free from gaps as meaning that every species proper to it is
present and correct here, and all unactualized species do not belong to this
ordering but to other possible orderings, other 'great chains'.43 The ordering
in our world can therefore be said to be complete in itself, in that every species
belonging to it is realized, despite not being absolutely complete. And there is
presumably no ordering that is absolutely complete since 'not all possible
species are compossible in the universe'.
However it is not just at the species level that incompossibility emerges — in
Leibniz's view, there is incompossibility among individual creatures too. As
he saw it, the fact that any two given species are compossible does not entail
that all possible creatures from those species are also compossible. Mankind,
for instance, as a species is obviously corrrpossible with all the other species of
this world. According to Leibniz, however, not all possible humans will
feature in this world because some are simply not compossible with other
things found within it. His favourite examples were of the fictional characters
and events related in novels, which qualify as genuinely possible by virtue of
being conceivable and free from contradiction, but are nevertheless
incompatible with everything else in this world (cf. A VI iv 1663—4/
AG100, G III 572/L661). As far as I can tell, Leibniz seems not to have
thought that humans were unique in this, and he almost certainly held that
some members of other existing species were also incompossible with the order
of things chosen by God. The matter of why some things are incompossible
with others is an interesting one, and a proper discussion of it shall be deferred
until Chapter 6; for our purposes now, it is sufficient simply to note Leibniz's
view that some things are incompossible with others.
The number of things and the variety of kinds of thing
Bearing all this in mind, we ought to get clear about what exactly Leibniz
meant by the 'richness' of the universe. We know already Leibniz's claim that
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God produces 'the richest composite', but we also know that this does not
involve the actualization of all possible species, or even of all possible
individuals from those species that are actualized. What it does seem to
involve, however, is the actualization of all relevant species from one of the
various possible 'great chains', and as many individual things from those
species as are compossible. Leibniz's modification to the doctrine of plenitude,
then, was to view the richest world not as containing the actualized form of
every single possible and type of possible, but as comprising that set of
possibles which, actualized together, produced more than did any other set;
that is, a world in which 'the maximum production of possibles takes place'
(G VII 304/SLT I.A.3/P139). Or as he put it in a late letter to Bourguet: 'the
universe is only a collection of a certain order of compossibles, and the actual
universe is the collection of all the existing possibles, that is to say, of those
which form the richest composite' (G III 573/L662). The richest universe is
therefore very far from being complete, as many possibles and types of
possibles just could not fit in it, though it can be said to be complete in the
restricted sense that it is full and holds as much as any world can. We find in
this a marked shift from other expressions of plenitude, for Leibniz was happy
to concede that 'there are many possible universes, each collection of
compossibles making up one of them' (G III 573/L662). And what he meant
by this, of course, was that none of the infinity of things and types of thing
comprising this plethora of other universes was to be found in our world, for if
anything else could have been included then it would have been. Therefore
our world contains an infinitesimal fraction of what is possible per se. The
Leibnizian universe may well be rich, but it is now clear that it is a rather
poor cousin to the universes of Abelard and Plotinus, which literally hold
everything.
Nevertheless it does contain the greatest number of compossible things and
greatest variety of compossible species (kinds of thing). But what is the
connection between the two? David Blumenfeld suggests that by 'the greatest
number of things' Leibniz might in fact have meant 'the greatest number of
types of things', though he makes this suggestion seemingly on the grounds
that it is more convenient for the Leibniz commentator to suppose that
Leibniz was talking about one thing rather than two.44 But there is absolutely
no reason to suppose that Leibniz did take 'the greatest number of things' to
mean 'the greatest number of types of things', and the two are not obviously
alternative expressions that capture the same idea, in fact quite the opposite.
Because of this I think we can safely dismiss Blumenfeld's suggestion that the
relationship between the number of things and the variety of species is one of
identity. How, then, does Leibniz come to affirm the greatest of both? One
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possibility is that there is no connection at all between the number of things
and the variety of species, and it is just a coincidence that the greatest number
of things is realizable alongside the greatest variety of species. But fortuitous
coincidences like this do not generally feature in Leibniz's philosophy, and I
find it wholly implausible to suppose that he would have countenanced the
idea that the greatest number of things just happens to be realizable along with
the greatest variety of species, or vice versa. Assuming, then, that Leibniz did
think of the two as somehow connected, what is the connection between
them? Or why should he suppose that the best world could contain both the
greatest number of things and the greatest variety of species?
Although Leibniz does not address this question directly, so far as I know,
it seems likely that he would have identified some entailment relation
between 'the greatest number of things' and 'the greatest variety of species'.
This relation would be one of the following:
(1) The greatest number of things entails the greatest variety of species.
(2) The greatest variety of species entails the greatest number of things.
(3) The greatest number of things and the greatest variety of species entail
each other.
If one of these does capture Leibniz's belief on the matter then it would
certainly explain why he thought that both were realizable in the best world,
as he clearly did, without invoking the most un-Leibnizian idea of a fortuitous
coincidence. But what evidence is there that Leibniz actually held one of the
above three entailments? There is no direct evidence, unfortunately, but there
is some indirect evidence that he accepted option (2) above. To see it, we
should first of all note that Leibniz generally does not assert the existence of
the greatest number of things in the same place as he asserts the existence of
the greatest variety of species. Instead, when giving his formulation of the best
world he tends to assert one or the other, e.g. the greatest number of things at
A VI iv 1364/SLT VI.B.l, A VI iv 1442/SLT I.A.I, A II i 478/L211, A VI iv
2232, G VII 304/SLT I.A.3/P139, and the (greatest) variety of things at A
VI iv 1537/DM §5, G VII 290/P146, G VII 303/SLT I.A.3/P138, G VI 179/
HI98, G VI 603/L639. Moreover, the texts in which Leibniz refers to the
greatest number of things nearly all date from 1677—80 (the one exception
being a text from 1697), while those in which he refers to the greatest variety
of things all date from 1686-1714. Although this might initially suggest that
Leibniz abandoned one claim in favour of the other, this interpretation is
ruled out by the fact that Leibniz continued to affirm, albeit indirectly in
most cases,45 the existence of the greatest number of things in many texts after
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1680.46 Why, then, did he stop referring to the greatest number of things and
start referring to the greatest variety of species (i.e. kinds of thing)? I suggest
that it may well be because he came to believe that the greatest variety of
species entailed the greatest number of things. In making this suggestion I cite
a previous precedent. We will recall from the last chapter that in formulating
his definition of perfection for things Leibniz often gave positiveness as the
only requirement, and generally neglected to mention that he believed
simplicity (i.e. non-analyzability) was a requirement too. I noted there that
Leibniz tended to omit the criterion of simplicity because he thought it was
entailed by positiveness, so that as the criterion of positiveness included (by
entailment) the criterion of simplicity, the latter did not need to be stated
separately. Given that we have a prior incidence of Leibniz modifying a
formulation of perfection to remove a criterion that was entailed by another
criterion, it seems not implausible to suppose that much the same happened
in the case under discussion, with Leibniz deciding somewhen between 1680
and 1686 that the greatest number of things was entailed by the greatest
variety of species, thus obviating the need for him to include both criteria in
his definition of worldly perfection. Although I accept that the evidence
presented does not conclusively show that Leibniz did believe that the
greatest number of things was entailed by the greatest variety of species, I
recommend that interpretation on the basis that it explains why he thought
both were jointly achievable. In Chapter 6 I shall show how this
interpretation fits neatly within another aspect of Leibniz's optimism.
We are now, I believe, in a position to say that the chief feature of the
richest world is that it holds the greatest number of compossible things (and
by extension, the greatest variety of compossible things), which in Leibniz's
view must be arranged to fill the universe so that it has no scope for further
additions. In order to achieve this, God selects the fullest chain of being, i.e.
the one offering the greatest possible variety of (continuously ordered) species.
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20. For more information on creation in Leibniz see Cook (forthcoming).
21. However, in several texts Leibniz does appear to support emanationism, for
example when he remarks that 'we would only know him [God] through his
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The Perfection of Worlds I: Richness 65
continuity of species or the view just detailed, that everything in the universe is
organic and therefore a bearer of perfection.
42. Laurence Carlin advances a completely different interpretation, arguing that in
the passage in question Leibniz is referring to orderings such as speech capability
(so his point would be that not all species belong to that ordering). It is possible
that this is Leibniz's meaning, but if so it must be said that it's an entirely
irrelevant point for him to be making during a discussion on the incompossibility
of species. Moreover, it's also doubtful that Leibniz would have recognized the
law of continuity as applying to apparently arbitrary orderings such as that of
speech capability. If he did, then he would presumably have had to accept
continuity of swimming ability, jumping ability, body size, number of legs, and
many other orderings too ludicrous to mention (most of which are not obviously
governed by the law of continuity at all). See Carlin (2000a), p. 145.
43. Although Lovejoy correctly notes Leibniz's claim that not all species are
compossible, he curiously overlooks Leibniz's novel suggestion that there are
many possible chains of being. This leads him to argue - erroneously - that
Leibniz 'had affirmed the reality of a vacuum formarum\ Lovejoy (1936), p. 181.
44. Blumenfeld (1973), p. 164.
45. The exception being G VII 304/SLT LA.3/P139, from November 1697.
46. He does so via his claim that the universe has been varied as many times as
possible through the different perspectives of its constituent parts, a claim made,
amongst other places, at G VI 538/L559-60, from 1702, and G VI 616/Mon §58,
from 1714. As I pointed out in note 26 above, each perspective or mirroring is
taken by Leibniz to belong to one thing and one thing alone, so if the universe has
been varied as many times as is possible through representation then that implies
that the universe contains as many things as are possible.
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5The Perfection of Worlds II: Simplicity
Simplicity of means
Now we will recall that richness of phenomena was only one of the elements
in Leibniz's characterization of the most perfect world, the other being
simplicity, or simplicity of hypotheses. By identifying simplicity as a criterion
of worldly perfection Leibniz appropriated another idea already in
circulation, this time incurring a debt to his contemporary Nicolas
Malebranche; for the doctrine is present in many of Malebranche's works,
from the sprawling Search after Truth (1674) onwards, though it was in that
work that Leibniz apparently first came upon it.1
Interestingly, Malebranche touted the idea of simplicity for precisely the
same reason that some earlier thinkers had promoted the idea of plenitude: it
was the best way for a completely perfect being to express itself. In
Malebranche's view, God 'acts only for His glory', and is therefore
'determined to will that work which could be produced and conserved in
those ways which, combined with that work, would honor Him more than
any other work produced in any other way'. Therefore, 'He formed the plan
which would better convey the character of His attributes, which would
express more exactly the qualities He possesses and glories in possessing.'2 The
qualities Malebranche had in mind were omniscience and omnipotence. As
he saw it, these qualities would be displayed in God's work more so through
its workings than through what or how many things he chose to include in it.
With God thus seeking to reveal his infinite wisdom and power principally
through the operation of the world, Malebranche argued that he would act
through laws of nature (general wills) rather than caprice or whim
(particular wills). The former would better bear the character of an infinitely
wise and powerful being than the latter since 'An excellent workman should
proportion his action to his work; he does not accomplish by quite complex
means that which he can execute by simpler ones.'3 Or to put it another way,
as 'the simplest ways are the wisest, he always follows them in the carrying out
of his plans'.4 And what this actually meant, in Malebranche's view, was that
God would act economically, because 'Simplicity consists in employing only
very few means in order to carry out what it is one wants to do.'5 So an
infinitely wise and powerful being would certainly instantiate laws of nature,
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but would not use more laws than is absolutely necessary to produce the
desired effect. Consequently God 'brings about an infinity of marvels through
a very small number of wills'.6 In order to achieve this nomic frugality, such a
being would fashion laws that are 'constant and immutable' and are thus
'general for all times and for all places'.7 Or in other words, he would fashion
laws that are universal, i.e. that apply everywhere, and uniform, i.e. that
apply always.8 Moreover, the sort of laws that would appeal to God would
possess two further characteristics, according to Malebranche: they would be
'extremely simple',9 yet 'fecund'10 or 'fertile',11 i.e. capable of producing a
great variety of effects despite being of great simplicity themselves. So God
always acts in ways that are 'simple, uniform, constant and general, and in a
word, worthy of his Wisdom and his other attributes'.12
On this matter Malebranche found in Leibniz a staunch ally, who was
happy to put forward a very similar account of the simplicity of God's ways.
In the Theodicy he bluntly declared, 'I agree with Father Malebranche that
God does things in the way most worthy of him' (G VI 240/H256). And like
Malebranche, Leibniz understood this to mean that God would act in a way
that best expresses his perfect nature:
There is no doubt that when God resolved to act outside himself, he made
choice of a manner of action which should be worthy of the sovereignly
perfect Being, that is, which should be infinitely simple and uniform, and
yet of an infinite fecundity. (G VI 238/H254-5)
By acting uniformly God reflects his own regular or orderly nature. In a late
letter to Wolff, Leibniz explains that 'Nothing is more regular than the divine
intellect, which is the source of all rules, and produces the most regular, that
is, the most perfect system of the world' (GW171/AG233, cf. G VI 241/
H257). But God looks to reflect in his ways not only his own regularity, of
course, but his supreme wisdom too (cf. Gr492—3), and hence he acts in an
'infinitely simple' way. Leibniz takes this to mean that God makes as few
expenditures as possible, for 'where wisdom is concerned, decrees or
hypotheses are comparable to expenditures' and 'reason demands that we
avoid multiplying hypotheses or principles' (A VI iv 1537/DM §5).
Consequently God will make the fewest number of decrees he can get away
with, and as 'everything that is done on the basis of wisdom is done on the
basis of general laws, that is to say, by rules or principles', he will achieve this
by establishing laws of nature (ML202—3). But in order to minimize the
number of decrees he makes, God will not establish any superfluous laws.
Hence there are, claims Leibniz, 'only a few free primitive decrees that
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regulate the course of things, decrees that can be called laws of the universe'
and hence only a 'few hypotheses to explain phenomena' (G II 40/AG71).
Consequently 'nature usually does as many things as possible with the
smallest possible number of assumptions, that is, it operates in the simplest
ways' (A VI iv 158/P2).13 And to achieve this, Leibniz urged, God must of
necessity opt for those rules that do not, within themselves, have exceptions.
That is, rules that are truly universal and uniform,14 for this removes the need
for any laws beyond whatever number of them is absolutely necessary; if there
were exceptions to a law then another law would be required to govern the
gaps left by the first. Hence in Leibniz's view 'The wise mind always acts
according to principles] always according to rules, and never according to exceptions ...
there are never any original exceptions' (G VI 315/H328, cf. ML202-3).15
Another feature of these laws is that they are simple (cf. A VI iv 1782). But
what does it mean for a law to be simple? One possibility, and perhaps the
most obvious one, is that a law is simple when it is mathematically
uncomplicated, i.e. involves very few terms. However Donald Rutherford has
argued against this interpretation, stating that 'There is little reason to think
that he [Leibniz] associates this simplicity with the mathematical form of the
laws of nature, for example with their being simpler in algebraic degree.'16
But this interpretation is difficult to square with the texts. Consider the
following passage:
Just as there is no line freely drawn by hand, however irregular it may
appear, which cannot be reduced to a rule or definition, likewise the whole
series of God's actions makes up a certain completely regular disposition,
without any exception. And what is more . . . it is the most perfect one
possible, or the most simple, just as of all the lines which can pass through
the same points, one is the most simple. (A VI iv 2657)
In addition to universality, Leibniz is obviously thinking here of mathematical
simplicity as a property of the laws of nature, as he surely is when he also
suggests that 'God chooses those [rules] which are . . . easiest to explain' (G VI
241/H257).17 It is undoubtedly unhelpful that Leibniz refers to both God's
ways and his laws as being simple (as did Malebranche in fact), but I think it is
clear enough that he means, in the first case, that God establishes the smallest
possible number of laws, each of which is uniform, universal and simple, and
in the second that the laws are mathematically the simplest ones possible, and
hence the easiest ones for a rational being to fathom. Unfortunately this
distinction has been overlooked by just about every commentator who has
written on this aspect of Leibniz's thought. Most Leibniz scholars construe
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'simplicity' to apply to laws rather than God's ways, even though the majority
of Leibniz's remarks on simplicity take it to be a feature of God's ways, or a
characteristic of God's actions. This has led to some rather peculiar mistakes.18
Given the obvious potential for confusion, it is important that we carefully
distinguish between the two senses of simplicity. But although the distinction is
clear enough in itself, we still need a way to refer to the product of God's simple
ways, as to say that his simple ways just give rise to simple laws is obviously
inaccurate. So how should we refer to the laws that God produces? A remark
in the Theodicy offers a helpful suggestion; Leibniz writes there that 'the laws
God established were the most excellent that could be established' (G VI 328/
H340). Following this passage, then, and what we know about these laws, I
shall term a law 'excellent' if it is (a) universal, (b) uniform and (c) simple. So
to say that God acts in the simplest ways is to say that God creates the smallest
possible number of excellent laws. As we shall shortly see, however, for Leibniz
it actually means a little more than this.
Definition of perfection for worlds
We should remind ourselves of the definition of worldly perfection that
triggered off the discussions on richness and simplicity over the last two
chapters: 'God chose the world that is the most perfect, i.e. the one that is
simultaneously the simplest in hypotheses and richest in phenomena' (A VI iv
1538/DM §6). We now have to consider what is meant here.
One of the more influential interpretations of this passage in recent years
has been that proposed by Nicholas Rescher, who takes Leibniz to be
adopting a 'two-factor criterion of variety and richness of phenomena on the
one hand and lawfulness or order on the other'.19 On the basis of the passage
from the Discourse on Metaphysics above Rescher determines that it must be in
fact 'a conflict-admitting two-factor criterion', and argues for that interpretation as
follows:20
The immediately striking feature of [the variety/simplicity] criterion is
that the two factors are opposed to one another and pull in opposite
directions. On the one hand, a world whose only metal is (say) copper, or
whose only form of animal life is the amoeba, will obviously have a simpler
structure of laws because of this impoverishment. On the other hand, a
world whose laws are more complex than the rules of the astrologers
demands a wider variety of occurrences for their exemplification. Clearly,
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the less variety a world contains - the more monotonous and homogeneous
it is — the simpler its laws will be; and the more complex its laws, the
greater the variety of its phenomena must be to realize them. Too simple
laws produce monotony; too varied phenomena produces chaos.21
On the basis of this apparent opposition of the principles of richness (which
Rescher interprets rather narrowly as variety) and simplicity (which Rescher
interprets, again rather narrowly, as simplicity of laws), Rescher argues that
the best world is that which embodies the most ideal trade-off between the
two, a position illustrated in Figure 5.1.22 God, then, is faced with a multitude
of worlds, each bearing simplicity and richness in differing degrees, and it is
his task to weigh each world to determine which has the optimal trade-off of
these two opposing goods.
A slightly different interpretation has been put forward by George Gale.
Although Gale accepts much of Rescher's analysis, such as the opposition of
the principles of simplicity and richness, he instead argues that the best world
is that which exemplifies the optimal ratio of one to the other, i.e.
'Perfection = richness of phenomena
simplicity of laws'23
One benefit of this interpretation, Gale argues, is that it fits well with
Leibniz's many statements that God is a mathematician. The 'complex
dimension' of ratios is more suited to a divine mathematician than merely
trying to pack as many things in to a world as is possible.24
The accounts given by Rescher and Gale of this definition of perfection are
both fatally flawed however. For one thing, by 'simplicity of hypotheses'
Leibniz does not mean 'simplicity of laws', as both suppose. A brief glance at
the Discourse on Metaphysics (from where the disputed definition of worldly
perfection comes) reveals that this is so, for he there identifies 'hypotheses'
with God's decrees. This entails that 'simplicity of hypotheses' means
'simplicity of decrees' (which, as we know, means that God will make the
smallest number of decrees); this interpretation is further confirmed by the
fact that §§5-6 of the Discourse are concerned with the simplicity of God's
ways, not laws. Now even if we give Rescher and Gale the benefit of the
doubt, and assume that they intended to say 'means' or 'ways' rather than
'laws', we find that their accounts of worldly perfection are still fatally flawed.
We have already seen passages in which Leibniz states that our world is the
richest one possible, and now we ought to consider these, which affirm that
the means adopted by God are also the simplest available:
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Figure 5.1
God always produce[s] his effect by the simplest and most determinate
ways. (A VI iv 1563-4/DM §21)
The ways of God are those most simple and uniform. (G VI 241/H257)
It would seem, then, that both maximal simplicity and richness are jointly
realizable. Indeed, even in the passage from the Discourse on Metaphysics (A VI
iv 1538/DM §6) that both Rescher and Gale use to develop their respective
accounts, it is clearly and unequivocally stated that the most perfect world is
'the one that is simultaneously the simplest in hypotheses and richest in
phenomena' (emphasis mine). Leibniz's choice of language can therefore only
support the interpretation that both occur together and there is no competition
between the two at all. This passage seems to have misled Andrew Carlson
also, for he argues that, 'Doubtless, there are many cases where simplicity and
diversity do make . . . conflicting claims',25 even though their simultaneous
realization unequivocally rules out any suggestion of conflict or opposition
between the two.
Catherine Wilson has argued that this simultaneous realization of the
simplest ways and phenomenological richness in the most perfect world must
be considered some kind of cosmic fluke, a strange quirk of things where the
simplest ways (which she also takes to be physical laws) just happen to be
compatible with the richest phenomena. She argues that, 'it would seem a
kind of accidental good fortune if this maximum set [of phenomena]
happened to entail precisely the set of physical laws which optimism
requires'.26 In fact, Leibniz argued that the entailment was the other way
around - it was the simplicity of God's ways that entailed the richest
composite:
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the wisest being chooses the simplest means to achieve the greatest results.
(AVI iii 466/D13)
A necessary being acts through the simplest means. For out of the
infinitely many possible means, some are the simplest; but the simplest are
those which provide the most. (A VI iii 587/D113, cf. A VI iv 2232, G VI
241/H257, G VI 603/L639)
This is an aspect of his thought that has so far escaped adequate treatment in
the literature.27 Which is perhaps not surprising, given that Leibniz was more
disposed to state that the simplest ways/means were maximally productive
than actually explain why they were so. Nevertheless I think we can shed
some light on the connection between simplicity of ways and maximal
richness.
The Malebranchian fecundity of the laws of motion
It makes sense to begin by returning once again to Malebranche. Although
he didn't make quite the same grandiose claim about the ways of God
entailing maximal richness that Leibniz did, he did nevertheless assert that
the laws of God's choosing werefe'cond: 'I am fully convinced that God makes
and conserves everything, and that his ways are very simple and very fecund,
that by constantly following very few laws he produces an infinity of
admirable works.'28 There were two laws that Malebranche identified as both
simple and fecund:
the first, that moved bodies tend to continue their motion in a straight line;
the second, that when two bodies collide, their motion is distributed in
both in proportion to their size, such that they must afterwards move at an
equal speed.
According to Malebranche, from these two laws comes 'all the motions which
cause that variety of forms which we admire in nature'.29 In order for this to
happen, he argued, the theory of preformationism must be true, and 'we must
believe that the seed of a plant contains in miniature the plant which it
engenders, and that in its womb an animal contains the animal which should
come from it'. And so on, right back to the first generation. By having plants
and animals contained within each other like Russian dolls, the laws of
motion alone 'are sufficient to cause all those wonderful works, all of which
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God formed in the first days of the creation of the world, to grow insensibly
and appear in due time'.30 Thus, according to Malebranche, the variety of
creatures that we see around us is a direct consequence not of miracles or
constant interventions by God, but only of the general laws of motion, which
make things already preformed grow and develop. In this way, the laws of
motion can be said to be fe'cond, as their normal operation gives rise to the
'infinite number' of forms in the world.31
Proving what a good student of Malebranche he was, Leibniz offered a
remarkably similar analysis, disagreeing only on a few points of detail. For
instance, although he accepted that bodies tend to continue their motion in a
straight line (e.g. G II 252/L531), he rejected, as we already know from the
last chapter, the Cartesian law of collision that Malebranche favoured, which
states that the quantity of motion is always conserved. In its place, Leibniz
substituted a number of other laws:
There is conserved the same quantity of total and absolute force or of action,
also the same quantity of relative force or of reaction, and finally, the same
quantity of directive force. (G VI 603/L639, cf. G IV 505-6/L499)
Moreover, although Leibniz endorsed much the same preformationist theory
as Malebranche, he argued that if males were to retain their eminence over
females the preformed animal could not be contained in the seeds or eggs, as
Malebranche supposed, but must be found in the sperm (cf. A VI vi 317/
NE317). But Leibniz deemed neither of these disagreements to be sufficient to
prevent him from viewing the laws of motion as the cause of the variety of
plants and animals that we see around us:
As for the motions of the celestial bodies and even the formation of plants
and animals, there is nothing in them that looks like a miracle except for
their beginning. The organism of animals is a mechanism which supposes a
divine preformation. What follows upon it is purely natural and entirely
mechanical. (G VII 417-18/L715, cf. G VI 543/L589, G VI 152/H172)
Although it is not fully explicit, Leibniz's point seems to be the same as
Malebranche's, namely that the creatures that exist now, together with those
that have existed and will exist, are the product of the laws of motion acting
on preformed creatures. If this is right, and I cannot see how else the above
passage could be interpreted, then Leibniz could term his laws of motion
'productive' in precisely the same way Malebranche did. But unlike
Malebranche, Leibniz was not content for the simplicity of God's ways to
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be merely productive; as we have seen, he stressed also that they were
maximally productive, in that they bring about the richest composite. So if we
assume that by 'ways' or 'means' Leibniz was referring to the laws of motion
that God establishes, why did he think that these laws were not justfe'cond, but
maximally so?
Perhaps the most obvious answer is that, in Leibniz's philosophy, God has
created the maximum number of things. This seems to follow, because the
laws of motion are only productive, in the Malebranchian sense of
productive, in that they bring about the unfolding of creatures already
preformed, so the larger the number of creatures to be unfolded the more
productive the laws of motion can be said to be. Perhaps, then, the reason
why Malebranche did not claim his laws of motion to be maximally
productive was because he did not believe that God had created the
maximum number of things, and the reason why Leibniz deemed his laws as
more productive than Malebranche's was simply because they had more
things to work on. This interpretation seems plausible enough on the surface,
though it does have one rather unfortunate drawback: there is no text, so far
as I am aware, in which Leibniz actually says that the laws of motion are
maximally productive simply because they work on, or unfold, the maximum
number of already pre-existing things. However he does claim, as we have
seen, that there are only a 'few hypotheses to explain phenomena' (G II 40/
AG71), and also that God employs 'a simple, fecund, regular plan' (G VI
244/H260). The latter remark comes from the Theodicy, during Leibniz's
defence of Malebranche against Bayle, and his use of Malebranchian terms
suggests that Leibniz did indeed consider the laws of motion to be productive
in the way that Malebranche did.
Metaphysical mechanics
However, other texts hint at an entirely different way of understanding the
idea of maximal productivity. Consider, for example, the following passage
from a letter to Malebranche (1679):
We must also say that God makes the most things he can, and what obliges
him to seek simple laws is precisely the necessity to find a place for as many
things as can be put together; if he made use of other laws, it would be like
trying to make a building with round stones, which make us lose more
space than they occupy. (A II i 478/L211)
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Now this passage is notable for several reasons. First, it is the only time, so far
as I know, that Leibniz refers to simple laws being maximally productive.
Most of the time he takes the simplicity of God's ways to be maximally
productive instead. I suppose it is possible that his reference to 'laws' is just a
slip of the pen, and he intended to write 'ways' (or 'means' or 'hypotheses' or
'decrees'); not only would this be more in keeping with all the other references
to simple ways being maximally productive, but immediately prior to the
passage quoted above he had been discussing 'the simplicity of God's decrees'
(A II i 477/L210). As we cannot be certain what Leibniz's intention was, I
shall, for the time being, leave it an open question as to whether he intended
to say that God's simple ways or simple laws were maximally productive. The
second notable point about the above passage is the suggestion that simple
laws/ways enable God 'to find a place for as many things as can be put
together'. This is certainly a different sense of 'maximally productive' than
that which we were working with earlier. Here it is suggested that simplicity
of laws/ways is to the key to finding a place for the maximum number of
things, whereas before, building on Malebranche's notion of'fecund laws', we
had supposed that laws were productive in the sense that through their
normal operation they unfold things from a preformed state. So the task
before us now is to determine how God is able to fit together the maximum
number of things just by using simple ways/laws. A possible answer emerges
from On the ultimate origination of things:
the situation is like that in certain games where all the spaces on the board
are to be filled according to certain rules, and where, unless you use some
skill, you will in the end be excluded from certain spaces and forced to
leave more spaces empty than you could have or wished to. But there is a
definite rule through which the maximum number of spaces is most easily
fil led.. . . [Ojnce it is assumed that being prevails over non—being, i.e. that
there is a reason why something should exist rather than nothing, or that
there is to be a transition from possibility to actuality, it follows that even if
nothing further is determined, there exists as much as is possible in
accordance with the capacity of time and space (or of the order of possible
existence); in short it is just like tiles that are arranged so that as many as
possible occupy a given area. From these considerations it is now
wonderfully evident how a certain divine mathematics or metaphysical
mechanics is employed in the very origination of things, and how a
determination of the maximum holds good. (G VII 303—4/SLT I.A.3/
PI 38-9)
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Figure 5.2
Here Leibniz certainly seems to be describing how 'to find place for as many
things as can be put together', i.e. how to fit possible things together in such a
way as to ensure that they can all be accommodated, which suggests he is
developing the idea mentioned in the Malebranche letter. Unfortunately he
does not say much about the 'definite rule' for fitting these things together,
but he says enough for it to be clear that he has in mind some kind of strategy
or algorithm that God adopts for arranging them. To shed some light on this,
we ought to examine the board game that Leibniz uses as an analogy for
world-creation. It seems likely that the game he has in mind is something like
pentominoes, which involves the player having to fit twelve different five-
block shapes into a grid of a certain size (see Figure 5.2). Each piece can be
rotated and flipped as one sees fit, but can only be used once. The object of
the game is to fit every piece into the grid without leaving any space.
Therefore this game is similar to the one described by Leibniz in that 'unless
you use some skill, you will in the end be excluded from certain spaces and
forced to leave more spaces empty than you could have or wished to'. To put
it another way, a poor arrangement of the pieces will result in one or more of
them being unable to fit into the specified grid. In the example above, where
the grid is 6 x 10, there are 2,339 ways of placing the pieces together so that
they all fit. One of these ways is shown in Figure 5.3.
However if a grid of 3 x 20 is used, there are only two ways of arranging
the pieces so that they are all accommodated. Now there are simple computer
programs, little more than scripts, that can generate solutions to pentomino
problems from scratch, even for pentomino problems given in three
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Figure 5.3
dimensions rather than two. Most of these employ a backtracking algorithm,
which is little more than a trial-and-error procedure, though it is possible to
write an algorithm that maps out the steps to one of the available solutions by
a more direct route (i.e. one involving just 12 steps, where each step involves
placing a piece on the grid in the correct place). Even though pentominoes is
too modern a game for it to be the one Leibniz used as an analogy for world-
creation, it is similar enough to the one that he does describe for us to be
confident that the latter is as susceptible to an algorithmic solution as the
former. The principal difference between the two cases, it seems to me, is that
the game Leibniz describes has but one 'definite rule through which the
maximum number of spaces is most easily filled', while pentominoes has
many such rules (taking 'rule' in the sense of'formula'). To illustrate this let
us first define a few terms. A 'solution', let us say, is a correct arrangement,
however obtained, of all the pieces in either pentominoes or the board game
described by Leibniz. The 'easiest solution', on the other hand, is a correct
arrangement of the pieces obtained by using the fewest possible number of
steps (and by 'step' I mean the placement of one piece on the grid). In
pentominoes there are, as I have noted, 2,339 different solutions, that is, ways
of arranging the pieces together in a 6 x 10 grid so that they all fit. Now each
of these solutions can be reached easily, in just 12 steps, or in a more
complicated way, in which more than 12 steps are used.32 A 12-step solution
involves each one of the 12 shapes being placed on the grid in the right place
from the outset, while a solution using more than 12 steps involves one or
more of the 12 shapes being initially placed incorrectly, with further moves
then required to correct this mistake before the solution is reached. However
the game described by Leibniz appears to have just one solution, and
therefore only one easiest solution, though in saying that 'there is a definite
rule through which the maximum number of spaces is most easily filled' he
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seems to acknowledge that there will be many more ways of reaching the
solution in a more complicated way, i.e. by initially placing some of the pieces
on the board wrongly, and then correcting these mistakes in later steps. So
although Leibniz does not actually give the formula or rule for the easiest
solution, we can at least suppose that the algorithm that gives it will use the
fewest number of steps possible. Let us call this kind of algorithm, the kind
that uses the fewest number of steps possible to reach the solution, an 'efficient
algorithm', and let us call the kind that uses more than the fewest number of
steps to reach the solution an 'inefficient algorithm' (so an inefficient
algorithm is by and large the same as the efficient algorithm, but with an
additional number of redundant steps). Those algorithms that do not lead to
a solution at all we shall term 'bad algorithms'.
Now according to Leibniz, world-creation is very much like solving the
sort of board game we have been discussing, for in the best world 'there
exists as much as is possible in accordance with the capacity of time and
space . . . in short it is just like tiles that are arranged so that as many as
possible occupy a given area'. It seems clear from this that he is thinking of
an efficient algorithm for fitting together compossible things; his reference in
the same text to a 'definite rule' suggests that he is not thinking of a
backtracking algorithm, but rather one that gives specific instructions as to
how these things should be arranged, and his characterization of this rule
suggests that it cannot be an inefficient or bad algorithm either. Could this
efficient algorithm be the way 'to find place for as many things as can be put
together' referred to in the letter to Malebranche? It certainly seems to be
so, though we must remember that, in the letter to Malebranche, Leibniz
claimed that God is obliged to make use of simple laws in order to fit things
together. Yet the efficient algorithm outlined above seems to be more
accurately described as a rule than a law. Does this not undermine the
analysis I have given thus far? I am not convinced that it does, for it is
worthwhile to bear in mind that Leibniz often treated 'law' and 'rule' as
synonymous terms,33 so the fact that an algorithm would be termed more of
a rule than a law in modern English does not mean that Leibniz would not
have thought of it as a law.
Assuming, then, that Leibniz was thinking of an efficient algorithm in both
the letter to Malebranche and On the ultimate origination of things, what else can
we say about the role of this algorithm in the process of world-creation? As
with the board game he describes, Leibniz seems to hold that there is only one
way to fit the maximum number of compossible things into the available
space, and therefore only one easiest solution. In the case of world-creation,
however, he appears to deny that there are more complicated routes to the
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same solution, because he tells Malebranche that other algorithms would 'lose
more space than they occupy'. So of all the possible algorithms that there are
for arranging the maximum number of compossible things, only one leads to
the solution while all the rest lead to failure because the procedures they offer
result in one or more possible things failing to fit in the available space. In
other words, there is only one efficient algorithm and an unspecified number
of bad algorithms. But by following the efficient algorithm God is able to fit
together the maximum number of compossible things in such a way as to fill
the world to its capacity.34
But, we might ask, what does Leibniz mean when he refers to the capacity
of the world? Why should he even think that the world has a particular
capacity, given that God could presumably make it as large as he likes? The
answer, I think, is much the same as we would get if we asked why a
pentomino grid has the capacity that it does. In this case, it is the fact that the
12 pieces use up 60 blocks between them that defines the grid-capacity at 60
blocks (6 x 10, 3x20). To define the grid capacity at, say, 400 blocks (e.g.
20 x 20), would be wholly arbitrary. With the world, it is the fact that the
maximum number of things can fit into a certain smallest amount of space
that defines the capacity for that world, since space, or place, is cited by
Leibniz as one of the expenditures in creation. Thus 'the world is made by
God in the most perfect way; and a maximum outlay is achieved with
minimum expenditure of place, time, and matter' (A VI iv 1395/LG239, cf. G
VII 303/SLT I.A.3/P138). As God must keep his expenditures to a bare
minimum — which is one of the hallmarks of acting wisely — we can surmise
that the least amount of space into which the maximum number of
compossible things can fit becomes eo ipso the capacity of the best world.
Possible worlds with a smaller number of things would presumably have a
lesser capacity because their contents can be accommodated in less space.
Now it seems to me that the thrust of Leibniz's argument is that even
though the best possible world (like all possible worlds) has a certain
capacity, determined by the number of things it contains, this in itself does
not necessarily mean that its designated contents have to be arranged so as to
fit it. Just like the pentominoes player, God could arrange things badly and
end up with some things not being able to fit, and also some unused space. If
he had done this, he would have taken the ingredients for the best world and
ended up with a world that is less than the best, by failing to fit the greatest
number of compossible things into the available space. That God has not
done this is confirmed in many of Leibniz's texts, though few are so clear as
this passage, which is from a short text entitled Metaphysical definitions and
reflections, written between 1678 and 1681:
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the world is made by God in the most perfect way; and a maximum outlay
is achieved with minimum expenditure of place, time, and matter. And of
the various ways of forming things, those are preferred which exclude the
fewest things from existing, in the same way that a wise architect joins
stones in such a way that they take up no more space than they fill, lest
they take away space for others. (A VI iv 1395/LC239)35
This passage confirms that in the creation process God employs what I have
dubbed the efficient algorithm. There is no suggestion at all that Leibniz is
thinking of the laws of nature as somehow involved in finding 'a place for as
many things as can be put together', nor is there any reason to suppose that
he has in mind any other kind of rule or law here.36 So when he spoke of
'simple laws' to Malebranche, he did not mean simple laws of nature, i.e. the
laws of motion, but a formula or algorithm that could fit the greatest number
of compossible things into the available space (or rather formulae or
algorithms, since he referred to simple laws in the plural, though for the sake
of simplicity - no pun intended - I shall continue to refer to it in the singular).
What is not yet clear, however, is why Leibniz thinks that the efficient
algorithm is simpler than any of the bad algorithms. Prima facie this might
seem like an odd claim, since the bad algorithms presumably do not contain
instructions relating to the placement of every member of the largest set of
compossibles. Rather, because the bad algorithms only find a place for some
members of this set, it seems likely that they would only contain instructions
about how to arrange these members. The efficient algorithm, meanwhile,
would appear to contain instructions about how all members of this set are to
be arranged, since it alone succeeds in placing them all within the capacity of
the best world. This would suggest that the efficient algorithm involves more
terms or steps than the bad algorithms, and if this is so then it is surely less
simple.
This need not be the case, however. If we were to consider an algorithm for
getting from a car park to a shopping centre, for instance, it might contain 50
instructions to 'walk forward one step' then an instruction to 'turn right',
followed by another 50 instructions to 'walk forward one step'. Such an
algorithm would have 101 steps. Yet these could easily be condensed into
three 'walk forward 50 steps', 'turn right', 'walk forward 50 steps'. The
latter algorithm would qualify as simpler than the former on Leibniz's own
terms (i.e. because it is algebraically simpler), even though its instructions are
no clearer than those of the former. The point to draw from this is that the
execution of one instruction from an algorithm can lead to the same result as
the execution of multiple instructions from a different algorithm. In the case
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of world-creation, it is therefore possible that the efficient algorithm employed
by God does not literally contain instructions to 'place object A in location B',
'place object C in location D' etc., but a series of instructions, each of which
finds a place for more things than one. Unfortunately Leibniz does not
provide any detail as to why the efficient algorithm is able to be simpler than
its bad counterparts, but as he does draw an analogy with 'a geometric line
whose construction would be easy but whose properties and effects would be
very remarkable and of a wide reach' it seems likely that he thought it would
work more like the three-step algorithm described above than the 101-step (A
VI iv 1538/DM§6).
Now even if we accept that the efficient algorithm is what Leibniz had in
mind when he wrote of simple laws being maximally productive, we surely
have only part of the story. For the process we have described seems to have a
kind of timeless aspect to it, with God just fitting together as many possible
things as can fit in the available space without any regard to how this
combination will form a world in which things will undergo change.
Thinking back to our example of pentominoes, the one dimension which this
analogy likewise did not capture was time, since the aim was merely to
arrange the shapes into the grid so that they all fit. But God's aim in creation
is not simply to pack the greatest number of things together and then leave
them frozen in one timeless instant, like the pieces in a pentomino puzzle.
Instead his aim is to pack the greatest number of things together into a world
in which these things will take up more space at one time than they will at
another, due to their augmentations and diminishments. Are all of these
evolutions and involutions factored in to the efficient algorithm? It seems
likely that they are, given Leibniz's belief that in the best world preformed
creatures are contained within the bodies of other creatures, which is an
arrangement that the efficient algorithm would no doubt have been
responsible for (since preformation enables a large number of things to be
packed into a very small space, which is precisely what the efficient algorithm
seeks to do). But while the algorithm produces a world in which countless
creatures are enfolded with the bodies of others, does it also bring about the
unfolding of these creatures? None of Leibniz's writings on this issue lead me
to suspect that it does; this algorithm or formula seems to dictate how things
should happen in the best world, but it does not actually make them happen.
But clearly something must unfold these creatures given that they were not
included in the best world merely to remain in their preformed state.37 So
evidently God must look beyond the efficient algorithm if he is to fully execute
his plan for the best world. How, then, does he ensure that the arrangement of
things specified by the efficient algorithm is not just followed at the first
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instant, i.e. at the moment of creation, but at every instant thereafter? He
could, of course, intervene at each moment to ensure that everything happens
precisely as the efficient algorithm says it should, but this would clearly
involve a great many interventions, each of which would presumably count as
a decree. The 'constant intervention' option would thus not satisfy Leibniz's
insistence that God should act with great wisdom and minimize the number
of decrees used. Given that 'everything that is done on the basis of wisdom is
done on the basis of general laws, that is to say, by rules or principles', a more
likely scenario is that God establishes laws that will carry out the plan
contained in the efficient algorithm (ML202-3). But in keeping with
Leibniz's insistence that a supremely wise being will make as few expenditures
as possible, we know that God will instantiate only the smallest number of
laws to bring about the desired effect.38 And we also know that, to achieve
this, God will instantiate what we have termed excellent laws, i.e. those that
are universal, uniform and simple. And hence we come back to the
Malebranchian notion of productivity.
If we look back at some of the passages considered throughout this chapter,
Leibniz's meaning should now be clear. When he refers to 'simple laws' in the
letter to Malebranche from 1679, he is thinking not of the laws of nature but
what we have called the efficient algorithm, which dictates how to pack the
greatest number of compossible things into the smallest space. This is also
what he is thinking of in On the ultimate origination of things and Metaphysical
definitions and reflections. However, it is only part of what he is thinking of when
he claimed that 'the wisest being chooses the simplest means to achieve the
greatest results' (A VI iii 466/D13), and that God employs 'a simple, fecund,
regular plan' (G VI 244/H260). What Leibniz primarily understands by
these statements is that God will employ the fewest possible number of decrees
in order to execute the best plan, and these include the decree to find a place
for the greatest number of compossible things using the efficient algorithm,
and further decrees to establish excellent laws of nature which unfold these
compossibles from the preformed state in which they were originally created.
Hence with just a handful of decrees, God is able to establish not just a rich
but static arrangement of compossibles, but a rich world - the best of all
possible worlds.
A summing up is in order. We will recall Leibniz's claim that worldly
perfection is determined by the simplicity of hypotheses and richness of
phenomena. It should hopefully now be clear from the foregoing discussion
what this means, namely that the perfection of the best world is not merely
defined by the fact that it contains the richest composite, but also by how God
brings this richest composite about. And as we have seen, he brings it about
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by using the smallest number of decrees. Consequently, the 'simplicity'
referred to in the definition of worldly perfection is not the simplicity of the
laws of nature, but of the ways or means God employs to bring about the
richest composite. This is nicely confirmed in Leibniz's last letter to
Malebranche (January 1712) in which he declares:
In fact, when I consider the work of God, I consider his ways as a part of
the work, and the simplicity of the ways joined with fecundity form a part
of the excellence of the work. (G I 360)
So again, it is the simplicity of God's ways, the very fact that he uses the fewest
number of decrees, that counts towards the perfection of the best world, not
the simplicity of the laws of nature.
Alternative definition of perfection for worlds
In what seems to have been a deliberate attempt to complicate matters for his
future commentators, Leibniz frequently offered another definition of worldly
perfection: 'perfection is being insofar as it is understood to differ from
nonbeing, or as I should prefer to define it, perfection is degree or quantity of
reality or essence' (A II i 363/L177, cf. A VI iv 1358/SLT VI.B.l, A VI iv
1395/LC239, A VI iv 1429-1430, G VII 303/SLT I.A.3/P138), and similarly,
'The more perfect is that which has more of reality or of positive entity' (A VI
iv 867). These are variations on a theme rather than two separate definitions,
with reality, essence and entity being synonymous terms.
Now we will recall from Chapter 3 that 'essence' is nothing more than a
combination of qualities or attributes, with perfections being the divine
attributes of power, wisdom and goodness (or will). So it might seem at first
glance that 'perfection is degree of reality/essence/entity' is simply Leibniz's
definition of perfection as applied to things rather than worlds, since Tn
things which have limits, that is, in finite things, . . . perfection has to be
strictly interpreted as the quantity of positive reality within their given limits'
(G VI 613/Mon §41). But the following remark shows that Leibniz did not
take this definition of perfection to be restricted to individual things, but
applicable to worlds as well:
Hence it is very clearly understood that out of the infinite combinations of
possibles, and possible series, there exists one through which the greatest
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amount of essence or possibility is brought into existence. (G VII 303/SLT
I.A.3/P138, cf. A VI iv 1359/SLT VI.B.l)
Let us call this definition of worldly perfection P2, and that equating worldly
perfection with maximal richness and simplicity PI.
Interestingly, P2 has sometimes been ignored or sidelined by some
Leibnizian scholars; Nicholas Rescher, for instance, argues that it is
misleading to suppose that worldly perfection refers to 'a single quantity'.39
And George Gale dismisses it outright, remarking that in passages where
Leibniz is clearly and unequivocally stating 'perfection is nothing but
quantity of essence' he is 'either confused, inconsistent or sloppy'.40 But
Leibniz stated P2 often enough for it to be clear that he took it very
seriously. And it should not be overlooked that he was hawking P2 as early
as 1677 (A II i 363/L177). So Leibniz was happy to equate worldly
perfection with reality/essence/entity around the same time that he became
convinced that simplicity was also a feature of worldly perfection, as well as
afterwards. Now unless we suppose that Leibniz had two completely
different ways of determining a world's perfection, which seems a little
unlikely, we are led to the conclusion that PI and P2 are strongly linked.
And the way in which they are linked should be obvious from what we have
learned over the last two chapters. For we know that God aims to grant
existence to as many different things as he can so that 'the most things
possible exist' (A VI iv 1364/SLT VI.B.l), i.e. so that the world contains as
many different bearers of perfection as possible. This maximizes reality/
essence/entity, in other words richness (P2). And the way to maximize the
world's richness is for God to act in the simplest ways (P I ) . And in a
summary that nicely brings out the link between PI and P2, Leibniz tells us
that God will choose 'the simplest or most beautiful way to make the
universe', i.e. the way
through which the most things or the more perfect things succeed, or
through which the most essence and the most perfection is obtained that it
is possible to obtain together; for the most beautiful and the simplest is that
which yields the most with the least difficulty. (A VI iv 2232)
Given that P2 was used more frequently as a definition for worldly perfection
even after PI had been formulated, we ought to suppose that P2 was Leibniz's
primary definition of worldly perfection, i.e. it expressed in a more
fundamental way what he thought the perfection of a world consists in. So
Leibniz held that the most perfect world was that featuring the greatest
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amount of reality/essence/entity, and from 1675 onwards he held that the
means to achieve this was through the simplest ways.
Happiness and virtue: two missing goods
However, we have not, as yet, got the complete picture of the best of all
possible worlds, at least as Leibniz understood it, for we have not yet
considered how the perfections of happiness and virtue fit into the best plan, if
indeed they do at all. It is the view of George Gale, for instance, that Leibniz
just defined the best possible world by richness and simplicity alone, with no
account taken of moral or physical perfection.41 It is true that Leibniz often
defined worldly perfection only in terms of richness and simplicity, or more
often in terms of quantity of reality/essence/entity, but we have seen other
passages (at the end of Chapter 3) in which Leibniz makes specific reference
to the best possible plan for the universe as containing happiness and virtue as
well. There are plenty of passages like this around too, e.g.:
It follows from the supreme perfection of God that he has chosen the best
possible plan in producing the universe, in which there is the greatest
variety together with the greatest order: the best arranged situation, place,
and time: the greatest effect produced by the simplest ways; the most
power, the most knowledge, the most happiness and goodness in creatures
which the universe could allow. (G VI 603/L639)42
It is clear from this that richness and simplicity are not the only criteria for
worldly goodness. But the structure of this passage is quite revealing,
because Leibniz initially seems to be giving the definition of worldly
perfection we have already examined. The statements 'the greatest variety
together with the greatest order', 'the best arranged situation, place, and
time' and 'the greatest effect produced by the simplest ways', all separated
by colons, appear to be merely alternative ways of expressing the same
underlying idea. However, the statement made after the semicolon ('the
most power, the most knowledge, the most happiness and goodness in
creatures which the universe could allow') appears to be an entirely
different idea, and not just another way of rendering the first. If we take this
statement by itself, and Leibniz's punctuation suggests we should, then it
seems to be saying that the best world contains the most happiness and
goodness (virtue) not in an unqualified sense as meaning 'unsurpassable',
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but in the sense as meaning 'the best that could be obtained in the
circumstances'. On the basis of this, and what we know thus far of Leibniz's
concept of the best possible world, we perhaps ought to take as our working
hypothesis the idea that there is in the best world only as much physical and
moral perfection as is consistent with the greatest amount of reality/essence/
entity (i.e. as is consistent with maximal richness and simplicity).43 We shall
follow up on this later.
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gratuitous assumptions. Whoever acts differently by this very fact accuses nature,
or rather God, its author, of an unfitting superfluity.' He then goes on to apply
the razor first in defence of nominalism, and then to the laws governing celestial
motion, arguing in the latter case that the hypothesis with the 'fewest
presuppositions' is to be preferred to the one which 'needs many orbs intertwined
to explain the heavens' (A VI ii 428/L128). His target here is presumably
Ptolemy. So far as I know, however, the suggestion that God should exclusively
establish laws that are also uniform and universal was not explicitly made until
after he had read Malebranche. It could be argued that, since uniformity and
universality are strictly derivable from non-superfluity, Leibniz would have
eventually attained his notion of simplicity even without Malebranche's help. But
this is speculation.
15. This is not to say that there are no exceptions at all, only that those that do arise
do so on account of conflict with other laws: 'wisdom always acts through
principles, that is, through rules, and never through exceptions, except when
rules interfere with one another, and one rule limits another' (GW167/AG231).
16. Rutherford (1995), p. 27.
17. Leibniz also contrasts his idea of simplicity with 'more intricate processes' (G VI
241/H257), which strongly suggests that for a law to be simple it must itself be
uncomplicated.
18. E.g. Rutherford (1995), p. 27, claims that 'Leibniz equates the simplicity of laws
with their degree of universality, or freedom from exceptions'. As we have seen,
however, he does no such thing. It is the fact that God acts in simple ways that
leads him to establish universal laws. Meanwhile, Blumenfeld (1995), p. 383,
identifies 'simplicity of hypotheses' with 'simplicity of laws'. However, Leibniz's
remarks from A VI ii 428/L128, discussed in note 14 above, clearly show that this
is not an identification he would be prepared to accept.
19. Rescher (1981), p. 4, cf. (1979), p. 33.
20. Rescher (1981), p. 10.
21. Rescher (1981), p. 11.
22. Rescher in fact illustrates his position with two different graphs, one in (1969), p.
167, the other in (1981), p. 9. My graphical representation of Rescher's position is
closer to the latter than the former.
23. Gale (1976), p. 72. This interpretation is endorsed by Brown (1987), p. 197f.
24. Gale (1976), p. 81.
25. Carlson (2001), p. 84. Nicholas Jolley makes precisely the same mistake. He
writes:
The Perfection of Worlds II: Simplicity 89
the best possible world is the one that achieves the optimal balance between
these conflicting criteria [of richness and simplicity]. Other possible worlds are
richer in phenomena than ours - for instance, there are worlds which contain
an even greater number of species of insects - but they pay a steep price for
such richness in terms of the simplicity of their laws: the laws in such a world
are extremely complicated and inelegant. Conversely, there are other possible
worlds which are governed by simpler laws than ours - laws that are
comprehensible to even the meanest of intelligences - but they pay a steep
price for such simplicity in terms of variety of phenomena: such worlds are, as
it were, much more boring and monotonous than our own (Jolley 2005,
pp. 165-6).
Jolley's evidence for this view is the heading of §5 of the Discourse on Metaphysics,
which he gives as: 'the simplicity of means is balanced against the richness of
ends'. Given that the French reads 'la simplicite des voyes est en balance avec
la richesse des effects' a more accurate translation would be 'the simplicity of
ways is in balance with the richness of effects' (A VI iv 1536/DM §5). And
given that in §§5-6 of the Discourse Leibniz goes on to explain what he means by
these two factors being 'in balance', i.e. that they are simultaneously
maximized, it seems odd to construe him as meaning in the heading to §5
that they are in conflict.
26. Wilson (1983), pp. 775-6.
27. For instance, discussions on this area of Leibniz's thought can be found in
Rescher (1967, 1979, 1981), Wilson (1983, 1989), Brown (1987), Roncaglia
(1990), Adams (1994), Nadler (1994), Rutherford (1995) and Blumenfeld
(1995), though all construe Leibnizian simplicity to mean simplicity of laws,
rather than means, and therefore they all miss the subtlety of his position.
28. Malebranche (1967), VII.XXI.
29. Malebranche (1992), I.XV, cf. (1967), VII.VIII.
30. Malebranche (1997), X.III. cf. X.VII, XI.II.
31. Malebranche (1997), X.V. It is likely that Malebranche did hold that there
were an infinity of forms, even though on occasion he seemed to employ
'infinite' in the sense of 'a very large number', e.g. 'Irrigating the fields as a
consequence of the laws of nature and with an element as simple as water,
yields an infinity of plants and trees of different natures from the ground'
(1997, X.VII). Other passages suggest that he used 'infinite' in its normal sense
at least some of the time however, e.g. those at 1992, I.XVII, 1997, X.VII,
X.V.
32. Technically, of course, there are many ways of rendering the easiest solution, as it
is of no importance at all which piece should be placed first or second, etc. But in
order to simplify the ensuing discussion I have elected to overlook this and
suppose that there is only one form that the easiest solution can take.
33. For instance, see G VI 241/H257 where he uses 'rules' and 'laws' as
interchangeable terms.
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34. It is interesting to note that the efficient algorithm is not only the means to the
realization of the maximum number of compossible things, but also gives rise to
the plenum. As I noted in the last chapter, the plenum is an aspect of Leibniz's
understanding of richness.
35. See also the Discourse on Metaphysics, where Leibniz tells us that God is like 'a
learned author who includes the greatest number of realities in the smallest
possible volume' (A VI iv 1536/DM §5).
36. Donald Rutherford has suggested that when Leibniz refers to the productivity of
'simple laws' in the letter to Malebranche, he is referring to the law of
continuity:
By observing the principle of continuity in his creation of the world, God is
able to realize the most complete series of beings possible: one in which there
are no gaps between successive degrees of perfection. As a result, God is able
to create both the greatest variety of beings and the greatest total perfection
. . . The principle of continuity thus functions in a transparent way as a
principle of optimal order: It suggests how to order created beings relative to
one another such that the greatest total variety can be realized in a world.
The design solution God favors is to actualize as many beings as can be
accommodated according to a continuous ordering of degrees of perfection —
an ordering to which nothing further can be added. (1995, p. 30)
Although this is an interesting suggestion, it is almost certainly false. First, it is
anachronistic - Leibniz 'discovered' the law of continuity in the mid-1680s,
several years after his letter to Malebranche about 'simple laws'. Second, Leibniz
nowhere suggests that the law of continuity has a role in the origin of the world.
Third, as we saw in the last chapter, Leibniz nowhere claims, or even suggests
that there is 'a continuous ordering of degrees of perfection' in the world, 'an
ordering to which nothing further can be added'. Rutherford's only evidence for
this, as we saw in the last chapter, was a passage in which Leibniz claimed that
'classes of beings' are ordered.
37. Leibniz does allow that some creatures might never develop from their seed
state (e.g. G III 558-9), but he seems to hold that the vast majority do so
develop.
38. Leibniz seems to hold that each law requires one decree, since 'general laws . . .
are the decrees of the divine will' (A VI iv 1367). Evidently, then, multiple laws
require multiple decrees, and God cannot establish several laws just with one
decree.
39. Rescher (1981), p. 11.
40. Gale (1976), p. 81.
41. Gale (1976), pp. 81-2.
42. For the sake of accuracy I have modified Loemker's translation slightly, and have
strictly adhered to Leibniz's use of colons and semicolons (which Loemker does
not do). The original French reads: 'II suit de la Perfection Supreme de Dieu,
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qu'en produissant 1'Univers il a choisi le meilleur Plan possible, ou il y ait la plus
grande variete, avec le plus grand ordre: le terrain, le lieu, le temps, les mieux
menages: le plus 1'efFect produit par les voyes les plus simples; le plus de puissance,
le plus de connoissance, le plus de bonheur et de bonte dans les creatures, que
1'Univers en pouvoit admettre' (G VI 603).
43. This seems to be the position of Rescher (1967), p. 141, and Wilson (1983),
p. 776. Russell (1937), p. 199, also hints at it.
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6The Harmony of Things
Harmony and the best world
Over the course of the last few chapters we have encountered one or two
passages in which Leibniz refers to the notion of harmony. Given that it
appears in only a tiny fraction of the passages we have cited, it might seem
that harmony was not a particularly important feature of his notion of the
best possible world. But this is not in fact the case, as the following two
passages demonstrate. The first is from a letter to Wedderkopf from May
1671, the second from a series of personal notes made in February 1676:
God wills the things which he understands to be best and most harmonious
and selects them, as it were, from an infinite number of all possibilities. (A
II i 117/L146)
After due consideration I take as a principle the harmony of things: that
is, that the greatest amount of essence that can exist, does exist. (A VI iii
472/D21)
Both reveal that harmony is at the heart of Leibniz's notion of the best
possible world. The first even suggests that the best world just is the most
harmonious world, while the second identifies 'the harmony of things' with
Leibniz's chief definition of worldly perfection (i.e. that 'perfection is nothing
but quantity of essence'). We might therefore hope that an understanding of
what Leibniz meant by harmony will contribute to an understanding of his
notion of the best possible world.
The varieties of harmony
Leibniz put forward a number of definitions of harmony, such as 'diversity
compensated by identity' (A VI i 484, A VI ii 283, A II i 174/L150, A VI iii
116), 'unity in multiplicity' (A VI iii 122), 'unity in variety' (A VI iv 1358/
SLT VI.B.l), 'simplicity in multiplicity' (A VI iii 588/D113) and 'unity in
plurality' (G VII 87/L426). So far as one can tell, however, the differing
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locutions do not represent different concepts of harmony, but are merely
alternative modes of expression.1 In the absence of any reason to do
otherwise, I shall therefore treat 'diversity', 'variety' and 'multiplicity' as
synonymous terms, and likewise 'identity', 'unity' and 'simplicity'.
According to Leibniz, harmony abounds in the universe. For as 'it is of the
essence of God's wisdom that all should be harmonious in his works' (G VI
152/H172), the world 'is as harmonious as possible' (GW171/AG233), which
probably ought to be taken to mean that in all those features of the world
where there could be harmony God has ensured that there is harmony. This
certainly fits in with Leibniz's assertions that God has instantiated 'infinite
harmonies' (GW171/AG233) and 'the most perfect of harmonies' (G VI 44/
H68). So although there is only one concept or 'kind' of harmony, it applies
(in Leibniz's view) to many different aspects of the world. Of these various
applications, though, which is the one intimately bound up with Leibniz's
notion of the best possible world, referred to in the texts from 1671 and 1676 I
quoted earlier? One possibility is that it is what Leibniz generally calls the
pre-established harmony, which holds that soul and body do not causally
interact but follow their own laws that lead to mutually corresponding states.
Although Leibniz certainly held that the pre-established harmony was a
feature of the best world, it is unlikely to be the 'harmony of things' referred
to in the letter to Wedderkopf, as the theory of pre-established harmony had
not been developed by May 1671, the time that letter was written.2 However,
there are other ways in which harmony can be realized, according to Leibniz,
and one of these he calls universal harmony. This involves a connection or
sympathy between all parts of the universe, such that what happens in one
part ripples through to affect the whole (the effect diminishing with distance).
Although an early form of universal harmony appears in a text from 1669/
1670 (cf. A VI i 438), Leibniz elsewhere stated that it is a feature of every
possible world, not just the best, so we need not pursue it here (cf. G VI 107/
HI 28, G VI 148/H168). Another example of harmony identified by Leibniz is
that of'the realm of grace with the realm of nature' (G VI 446/S124). Again,
though, this does not seem to be what we are looking for, as we are looking for
a harmony of things which is somehow connected to the realization of the
greatest amount of essence.
Now if we combine these clues with elements of our survey of Leibnizian
optimism thus far, we are led to an intriguing possibility: perhaps the
harmony of things in the Leibnizian best possible world is nothing more than
God's own essence diversely manifested in the creatures of this world. This
characterization squarely satisfies the requirement for 'unity in variety', for as
we will recall, Leibniz adopted the (Neo-) Platonic view that, in creating and
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populating the world, God diffuses a finite portion of his essence to all created
things. Thus every created thing possesses a certain degree of this 'God stuff,
and nothing else besides (we will recall that Leibniz stated the only difference
between God and created beings is one of magnitude, God being infinite and
creatures being finite). If the essence of God, diversely manifested, is
ultimately all there really is in the world then this obviously entitles Leibniz
to identify a unity, or basic sameness, in all things.3 And if, as Leibniz
maintained, no two creatures possess the same essence, i.e. the same degree of
perfection, then the world will exemplify the variety that, together with its
underlying unity, gives rise to harmony. So far as I know, the only other
commentators to construe harmony this way are Donald Rutherford and
Christia Mercer.4 However, the former construes it as just one harmony
among many, and does not accord it any special status within Leibniz's
optimism, while the latter calls this doctrine 'emanative harmony', which is
perhaps an unfortunate name given Leibniz's aversion to the idea of
emanation (at least as it was understood by the Neo-Platonists).5 I shall
instead choose to follow Leibniz's lead and simply call it 'the harmony of
things'.6
Now the fact that this conception of harmony seems to fit in with (and
indeed follow from) other aspects of his philosophy does not necessarily mean,
of course, that Leibniz accepted it, or that it was what he had in mind when
he spoke of the harmony of things. To be certain that we have hit upon a
conception of harmony that Leibniz actually did hold, we need some textual
evidence. And fortunately he left some; at the end of an oft-neglected text
called On man, beatitude, God and Christ he wrote: 'All things are returned to
one, i.e. to God; this is to conceive the harmony of things' (Gr98). Now the
Latin term 'referre', which I have here translated as 'returned', can also be
translated as 'brought back' or 'traced back'. This suggests that Leibniz's
point in this passage is that to conceive the harmony of things is to understand
that all things have the same underlying unity, i.e. they are all composed of
'God stuff. And all things, as we know, vary in their degree of perfection, i.e.
in the amount of this 'God stuff that they possess. If we unpack the passage
thus, we are led to the following conclusion: the great diversity of things in the
world has as its underlying unity God, and thus forms a harmonious whole of
'diversity compensated by identity'. This remark cannot be explained by any
of the other harmonies identified by Leibniz; other passages too (e.g. A VI iv
2804/W568) only make sense if the doctrine of the harmony of things, as I
have outlined it above, is assumed. This conception of harmony, then, is
certainly not a commentator's fiction or a fanciful interpretation of Leibniz's
thought it is something he clearly accepted.
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Now the way in which this kind of harmony is related to the realization of
the greatest amount of essence should already be clear, but it is worth taking a
few moments to work through Leibniz's thinking here. In the Elements of natural
law Leibniz makes the point that something can be more or less harmonious:
'Harmony is greater when diversity is greater, which is nevertheless reduced to
identity. (For there cannot be degrees in identity, but in variety)' (A VI i 479,
cf. A VI iv 1359/SLT VI.B.l, GW171/AG233). Thus harmony comes in
degrees, the more unified variety there is in something, the more harmonious it
is. In the kind of harmony we are considering, what this amounts to is that the
more variety there is in a world, the more harmonious it is. For as Leibniz
claims elsewhere, no matter which possible world God had chosen to actualize,
the basic constituent of its contents, namely the divine essence, would have
been the same: 'There is the same variety in any kind of world, and this is
nothing other than the same essence related in various ways' (A VI hi 523/
D83). As all possible worlds can boast the same underlying unity, these worlds
will be more or less harmonious depending on how much variety they contain
(that is, the harmony of a world is a function of the number of non-identical
things in it). And as the best possible world contains the greatest number of
non-identical things, that is, the greatest possible variety of things, then this will
entail that 'the most perfect system of the world . . . is as harmonious as possible'
(GW171/AG233). Consequently the most perfect world could only be made
more harmonious if God could squeeze a few more things into it that differ
from the rest of its contents. What prevents him from doing so, of course, is
the fact that many possible things are not compossible, i.e. jointly realizable
in the same universe. As this incompossibility clearly puts an upper limit to
how much harmony and perfection the best possible world can admit, it
would be helpful if we could determine what exactly brings it about.
The compossibility of things
Our study of compossibility begins, as most do, with the following passage
from 1680, in which, it is often claimed, Leibniz expresses despair of finding a
basis for the incompossibility of things:
But it is as yet unknown to men, whence arises the incompossibility of
diverse things, or how it can happen that diverse essences are opposed to
each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be mutually
compatible. (A VI iv 1443/SLT I.A.I)
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Before we examine this passage, we ought to note that the first part of it has
quite often been erroneously rendered as 'But it is as yet unknown to me
.. .'. This seems quite a puzzling error, given that the Latin 'hominibus'
('to men') cannot obviously be mistaken for 'mihi' ('to me'). Quite likely it
is a typesetting error, the 'n' of 'men' being omitted by accident (though it
is odd that the same error has turned up in the work of so many
commentators).7 Now even those not hamstrung by wayward printers
construe Leibniz as saying here that compossibility is a mystery to him.8
But I don't think it is too much of a strained reading to interpret him as
saying something completely different, namely that compossibility is a
mystery to others.9 Indeed it would be odd indeed if Leibniz was himself
mystified by it in 1680, given that he had drawn on the idea of
incompossibility in a number of texts written prior to 1680 (such as A VI
iii 128, from 1672/1673, and A VI iii 581/D105, from December 1676). So
to construe the above passage as Leibniz expressing his own mystification
about the source of incompossibility, is tantamount to saying that Leibniz
had beforehand freely made use of an idea without having any clue
whether there was any basis for it or not. I am not convinced that this
would be a plausible claim to make. I will assume, then, that Leibniz knew
precisely what he meant when he claimed that certain things and types of
things were incompossible.
Now in the above passage Leibniz claims that 'all purely positive terms',
i.e. the attributes or perfections of God, are 'mutually compatible'. Strictly
speaking this is the only position open to him as a theist; if it were denied,
then God, understood as an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good
being, would be rendered impossible on the grounds that he would have
incompatible attributes. The upshot of this, however, is that any two
creaturely essences, and consequently any combination of creaturely essences,
must be compatible (that is, compossible) if they are considered solely in
themselves. That is, the source of the incompossibility of some of these
essences must lie outside the essences themselves. If that is so, then God could
clearly choose to realize all possibles in the same world, if he wanted to.10 So
why would he not want to? I think it is plausible to suppose that it is because
God 'cares about the harmonies' and wants to make everything as
harmonious as possible (GW172/AG234, cf. A II i 117/L146, G VI 446/
SI24, GW171/AG233). If this is right, then the source of incompossibility
among things is the harmony of things, or rather God's choice to instantiate a
harmony of things. There is evidence that this is indeed the case. Consider, for
instance, the following passage from The Philosopher's Confession:
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Therefore, if the essence of a thing can be conceived clearly and distinctly
(for example, a species of animals with an odd number of feet, also an
immortal animal) then surely it must be considered possible, and its
contrary will not be necessary although, perhaps, it will be contrary to the
existing harmony of things . . . and by consequence it will never have a
place in the world. (A VI iii 128)
Now Leibniz is not merely saying here that unactualized possibles are
incompatible with the existing series of things, or with certain members of the
existing series of things, but with the harmony of things. This suggests that it is
not the things of this world per se, but the fact that they form a harmonious
series, that renders unactualized possibles incompossible with them. A similar
point is made in the New Essays; during one of Leibniz's rare forays into the
murky world of incompossibility, he states: T believe that the universe
contains everything that its perfect harmony could admit' (A VI vi 307/
NE307). Let us suppose, then, that incompossibility is somehow bound up
with the harmony of things. That is, because God has a preference for a
harmonious world, and is unwilling to violate this harmony, incompossibility
arises as a result of that.
Now I accept that there initially seems to be an absence of plausibility in
this suggestion. That is, it might explain why God does not instantiate
multiple copies of the same thing, but not why he omitted things which are
not obviously mere duplicates of existing things. For instance, according to
Leibniz, 'King Arthur of Britain, Amadis of Gaul, and Dietrich von Bern' are
all unactualized possibles (A VI iv 1654/P106). Moreover, they are all
apparently different to the possibles that have been actualized in this world.
So if King Arthur, for instance, were added to this world, then it seems that
the harmony of the world would not be spoiled at all, but rather increased,
since the variety of things in the world would be increased. How, then, could
harmony, or rather God's preference for harmony, be the source of
incompossibility? To find the answer to this question we need to recall how
the things of this world are varied:
nature is fundamentally uniform, although there is variety in the greater
and the lesser and in the degrees of perfection. (G III 343/LNS221)
all things everywhere . . . vary only in their degree of magnitude and
perfection. (GW46, cf. G III 340/LNS205-6, A VI vi 71/NE71, A VI vi
490/NE490)
So the variety that constitutes the world's harmony lies in the degrees of
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perfection that things possess, not in a mere nominal or numerical difference
between things. In order for the world to be as harmonious as possible, then,
everything in the world must possess a different degree of perfection to
everything else ('the harmony of things does not allow all minds to be equally
perfect', A VI iv 2804/W568). It is worthwhile to note that whenever Leibniz
stated that things differ in their degree of perfection, he was speaking of how
things are in this universe, and therefore referring to things that exist rather
than non-existent merely possible things. Yet it is quite clear from a number
of texts that he was comfortable with the idea that some possibles would
possess identical degrees of perfection if actualized (e.g. A VI iv 1442/SLT
I.A.I, A VI iv 2231, G VI 425/H430, G VII 374/L688-9). So we can surmise
that in the realm of possibility, God finds a number of things that would be of
the same perfection if actualized. Yet he knows that the harmony of the world
would be impaired, no matter how slightly, if it contained two things of an
identical degree of perfection.11 Given God's unswerving commitment to
harmony, any two possibles that are equally good can be said to be
incompossible as neither could be actualized together.
So far so good. But this analysis, while promising, is a little simplistic as it
stands, since it ignores Leibniz's view that things change in perfection
throughout the course of their existence. Generation, for instance, increases
the perfection of a thing, while death reduces it (cf. G VII 530/W506). But
Leibniz did not think that changes in perfection are caused solely by
generation and death; in the New Essays he even goes so far as to say of
creatures that 'Their changes of state never are and never were anything but
changes . . . from more perfect to less perfect, or the reverse' (A VI iv 58/
NE58). So creatures do not just change degrees of perfection from time to
time, but all the time.
In light of this, there seems to me to be two ways to construe Leibniz's
belief that creatures form a harmony of things. The first is to say that if the
best world is perfectly harmonious, then it must be harmonious at every
moment of its existence. This means that God must choose and arrange
creatures in such a way as to ensure that no two of them ever possess the same
degree of perfection at the same time. The second way is to say that the
changes in perfection that creatures undergo throughout their lives are
irrelevant so far as the harmony of things is concerned, and what matters is
that each creature has a sum total of perfection (calculated over the entire
course of its existence) that differs from the sum total possessed by every other
creature. So on the first account the harmony of things is realized temporally,
while on the second it is realized atemporally (as the harmony would only be
apparent to a being that could 'see', in an instant, the sum total of every
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creature's perfection).12 It is possible, of course, and even perhaps quite
plausible, that Leibniz would have accepted both accounts and insisted that
the best world must be perfectly harmonious both temporally and
atemporally. I take it that he endorses the first when he writes 'two men
similar to each in all respects cannot exist at the same time' (A VI iv 1349), as
this says, in effect, that there cannot be two equally perfect men existing at the
same time (which implies that two men can possess the same degree of
perfection, so long as it is at different times). But if only the temporal kind of
harmony is realized, then although the world will be harmonious at every
moment of time, it could still be atemporally disharmonious. This does not
seem to sit easily with Leibniz's claim that the best world is 'the most
harmonious it is possible to conceive' (G VI 137/H157). As I have already
suggested, such a claim ought to be construed as saying that if there is an
aspect of the universe that has the scope to be made harmonious, then God
has ensured that it has been made so. Therefore in what follows I shall assume
that Leibniz's best world is harmonious in both the temporal and atemporal
senses described above.
Coming back to incompossibility, then, we can see that if God desires a
harmonious universe then he will be restricted to actualizing those creatures
whose degrees of perfection do not clash, whether temporally or otherwise. So
if there are two or more possible creatures that would possess an overall
identical degree of perfection if actualized, then only one of them can be
actualized. Likewise, if there are two or more creatures that would possess an
identical degree of perfection at the same time, only one can be actualized. So
given God's overriding wish that a perfect harmony be established, possible
creatures that would, either temporally or atemporally, be of an identical
degree of perfection if actualized, can be considered incompossible.
The compossibility of species
Now we will remember from Chapter 4 that Leibniz held there to be
incompossibility not only among possible individuals but among possible
species too. Is it plausible to suppose that our account of individual
incompossibility might also be extended to account for species incompossi-
bility? I believe it is. Early indications are promising, as it is clear that Leibniz
thought of the ordering of species as a kind of harmony: 'it is agreeable to this
harmony that between creatures which are far removed from one another
there should be intermediate creatures, though not always on a single planet
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or in a single [planetary] system' (A VI vi 307/NE307).13' 14 For more direct
evidence, consider the following passage from the appendix to the Theodicy
about Archbishop King's The Origin of Evil. Leibniz describes the following as
'my principles':
God is indifferent to the choice between men of equal perfection, or
between equally perfect species of rational creatures . . . and as species that
are of equal perfection harmonize more or less with others, God will choose
those that agree best together. (G VI 425/H430)
The obvious way to read this, it seems to me, is as saying that individuals and
species of equal perfection are not realized together, but are in competition for
existence (for God would only be indifferent to the claims of equally perfect
things or types of things if he has to choose between them). And when God does
come across possible individuals and species that are equally perfect (or would
be if actualized), he plumps for whichever fits best with other things, i.e.
whichever forms part of the most varied set of things (individuals/species).
But what could Leibniz possibly have meant by species being of equal
perfection? We already know that the individuals of a species change their
degree of perfection throughout their lives, so it hardly seems likely that Leibniz
could have held that possible species have 'a' degree of perfection as such. More
plausible is that every possible species has a set of essential characteristics (the
'unchanging inner nature') that defines the limits of perfection for individual
members of that species. Leibniz appears to say as much in the Theodicy, for
although 'the laws of motion do not prevent man from being more perfect . . .
the place assigned to man in space and in time limits the perfections he was
able to receive' (G VI 317/H330). I take it that Leibniz's point here is that men
are not prevented from attaining the sort of perfection normally associated with
higher beings like angels by anything external to them, but by their own inner
(human) natures.10 If this is right, then individuals vary in perfection within
strict boundaries defined by the species to which they belong.16 It would thus
be true to say that the inner natures that define species determine the spread of
perfection proper to any given species, rather than a single degree of perfection
that all individual members of that species must possess.
We can say, then, that just as with individuals, if God finds two or more
species of equal perfection (in the sense just outlined), then because of his
desire for a harmonious ordering of species, he is restricted to actualizing only
one of them. Such species can thus be said to be incompossible for precisely
the same reason that I suggested individuals are incompossible.
It is worthwhile to pause here for a moment in order to highlight some
102 Leibniz Reinterpreted
consequences of this position. First, it is interesting to note the doubling-up of
harmonies, as Leibniz's best world will contain a harmony of individual
things embedded within a harmony of species. This fits in nicely with his
comments about there being multiple harmonies, which we met at the start of
this chapter. Second, and in a sense following on from the first, it should now
be clear why Leibniz believed — as I suggested he did in Chapter 4 — that the
greatest number of compossible things is entailed by the greatest variety of
species. To illustrate, let us suppose a simplified example involving two
possible orderings of species, two great chains. The first ordering contains ten
species, the second contains five. Now as we have said, possible individuals
vary in perfection within strict boundaries defined by the species to which
they belong. Let us represent these boundaries by numbers. If we take the
ordering of ten species, we shall say that every possible member of the first
species varies in perfection between zero and one (these numbers representing
the limits of perfection), while every possible member of the second species
varies between one and two, every possible member of the third species varies
between two and three, etc. (see Figure 6.1). Hence each species from the
ordering has limits in perfection, beyond which the individual members of
that species cannot cross. For the sake of simplicity I have assumed that the
limits of species perfection do not overlap, so that the best possible individual
from species 3, for instance, will always be worse than the worst possible
individual from species 4. I have also assumed that the boundaries of
perfection are the same size for each species. Now let us turn to our second
ordering, which contains five species. Although each one of these species is
different from all of those from the first ordering, they nevertheless have
identical spreads of perfection to some of those in the first ordering, and
because of this the two orderings are incompossible. We can represent the
second ordering as in Figure 6.2. Now if we suppose that God wants to create
the most harmonious ordering of individual things, that is, the greatest
number of possible things that never possess the same degree of perfection as
anything else, then clearly he is going to have to use ordering 1 rather than
ordering 2. That is, the way to achieve the most harmonious ordering of
Species 1
> 0 but < 1
Species 6
> 5 but < 6
Species 2
> 1 but < 2
Species 7
> 6 but < 7
Species 3
>2 but <3
Species 8
> 7 but < 8
Species 4
> 3 but < 4
Species 9
> 8 but < 9
Species 5
> 4 but < 5
Species 10
>9 but <10
Figure 6.1: Ordering 1
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Species 1
>0 but <1
Species 2
> 1 but < 2
Species 3
> 2 but < 3
Species 4
>3 but <4
Species 5
>4 but <5
Figure 6.2: Ordering 2
individual things, and hence the greatest number of compossible things, is to
select the fullest chain of being, i.e. the one with the greatest variety of species.
Now certain aspects of this example may not, of course, tally with what
Leibniz actually believed. For instance, he may have accepted that the limits
of species perfection do overlap (although this seems to conflict with the basic
idea of the great chain and the rigid separation of species whose members can
approach the limits of other species but not cross them), and he may well have
held that some species are denned by a much narrower band of perfection
than others. But it has to be said that he does not give us much to go on in this
regard, so it is hard to tell if he would have considered the above example
excessively oversimplistic, or a good illustration of the way things work. Yet
even if he did think it excessively oversimplistic, the general principle behind
it, i.e. the greater the overall range of perfection from which individual things
are drawn, the more compossible individuals can be realized, still holds good.
Thus we can see that God is able to achieve the greatest harmony of things
(i.e. the greatest number of compossible things) simply by making his selection
of individuals from the most harmonious ordering of species (i.e. the fullest
chain of being, featuring the greatest variety of species).
It should be clear from all this that incompossibility is entirely preventable
all God need do is remove the condition that the universe be harmonious,
and more species and individual things, in short more essence and perfection,
could be included in it.17 Although the desire for as much harmony as possible
explains why God does not actualize everything despite being able to, it also
gives rise to a further question: why does God want a harmonious world that
omits an enormous number of things rather than a non-harmonious world
that contains everything? Or to put in another way, why does he value
harmony so highly that he is willing to let it restrict the number of things and
kinds of things that a world can hold?
The value of harmony
Throughout history, of course, harmony has typically been prized as an
aesthetic good. Indeed, definitions of harmony identical or near identical to
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Leibniz's own are to be found in the aesthetic writings of many great thinkers
prior to Leibniz. In fact, the concept of harmony he endorses derives from the
Pythagoreans, who also regarded harmony as a property of a whole or system
containing parts that were arranged in an orderly way. Augustine also
attached great importance to harmony, defining it as the tendency 'to
equality and unity either by the similarity of equal parts or by the gradation
of unequal parts'.18 Augustine's view was that when parts are properly
related, harmony, order and unity are the results, which in combination
comprise the beautiful. Aquinas likewise prized harmony, identifying it as one
of the three elements of beauty (the other two being integrity and clarity).19
Leibniz, however, located all beauty in harmony. For instance, in one text,
immediately after offering a definition of harmony ('unity in plurality'), he
claimed that 'there flows from this harmony the order from which beauty
arises' (G VII 87/L426, cf. A VI iii 588/D113). In order that we might grasp
the direction of Leibniz's thought here we shall examine further his
understanding of beauty.
As Leibniz derived much of his aesthetics from the Pythagoreans (by way
of Plato and his followers), it is no surprise that he conceived beauty
mathematically. Hence:
Music charms us, although its beauty consists only in the agreement of
numbers and in the counting, which we do not perceive but which the soul
nevertheless continues to carry out, of the beats and vibrations of sounding
bodies which coincide at certain intervals. The pleasure which the eye
finds in proportions are of the same nature, and those caused by other
senses amount to something similar, although we may not be able to
explain them so distinctly. (G VI 605-6/L641)
Elsewhere he calls such agreement 'order'; for example:
Everything that emits a sound contains a vibration or a transverse motion
such as we see in strings; thus everything that emits sounds gives off
invisible impulses. When these are not confused, but proceed together in
order but with a certain vibration, they are pleasing . . . Drum beats, the
beat and cadence of the dance, and other motions of this kind in measure
and rule derive their pleasurableness from their order, for all order is an
aid to the emotions. (G VII 86-7/L425-6)
Consequently beauty is to be found in systems or wholes, not individual
things (unless these are themselves systems or comprised of parts). Single
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sounds or sense impressions can be said to be devoid of beauty, for if they have
no relation to any other sounds or sense impressions they cannot be in
agreement with anything outside themselves. This follows from Leibniz's
assertion that beauty arises from order, as order is a property of multiple
things rather than individuals considered by themselves. But what does
Leibniz mean by order? He tells us that
order is the relation of several things, through which any one of them can
be distinguished from any other. (BH124)
order is simply a distinctive relation of several things; confusion is where
several things are present, but there is no way of distinguishing one from
another. (G VII 290/P146, cf. A VI iv 866, A VI iv 868, BH70)
Order, then, is present in a system of parts where each part is distinguishable
or distinctly conceivable. Where all parts are distinguishable, there is
maximal order, which gives rise to maximal intelligibility; that is, all parts
can be identified by a thinking being. It thus follows from the fact that the
existing world is the most harmonious world that 'that series has prevailed
through which there arises the greatest amount of what is distinctly
thinkable'. In Leibniz's view, then, the most beautiful world is also the most
intelligible world, for 'Distinct cogitability gives order to a thing and beauty
to a thinker' (G VII 290/P146).
This gives us two possible explanations for why God prefers a harmonious
world that contains some possibles over a non-harmonious world that
contains them all, i.e. because the former is (a) much more beautiful and (b)
much more intelligible than the latter. From these, a third explanation arises,
as Leibniz notes that the order that gives rise to beauty and intelligibility is in
some sense a prerequisite for happiness in that it 'delights perception, makes it
easier, and extricates it from confusion' (GW171/AG233). In other words, in
order to derive any pleasure from perceiving the perfection of a thing (which
is, we will recall, the first step on the road to happiness), a creature first has to
be able to distinguish that thing from other things. And this requires a
harmony of things. But curiously enough, creaturely happiness does not seem
to be the motivating factor behind God's choice of a harmonious world.
Instead, Leibniz explains that:
Since God is the most perfect mind . . . it is impossible for him not to be
affected by the most perfect harmony. (A II i 117/L146)
everything is regulated in things once for all with as much order and
agreement as possible, since the supreme wisdom and goodness can only
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act with a perfect harmony. (G VI 604/L640, cf. A VI iii 146, G VI 142/
H162)
Why is it that God can only act harmoniously (i.e. to produce harmony)? In a
series of ethical notes from the early 1700s, Leibniz elaborates:
The end or aim of God is his own joy or love of himself. God created
creatures, and especially those endowed with mind, for his own glory or
from love of himself. God created all things in accordance with the greatest
harmony or beauty possible. (A VI iv 2804/W568)
It is notable that in this passage Leibniz appears to take the creation of
harmony and beauty to follow from God's aim of acting for his own glory.
The reason for this emerges in a discussion on why God chose to make
rational creatures:
If God had no rational creatures in the world, he would still have the same
harmony, but simply without an echo, and the same beauty but simply
without reflection and refraction or multiplication. (A VI i 438)
To understand Leibniz's thinking here, we need to delve a little into the Neo-
Platonic assumptions that underlie it.
The idea that God is himself harmonious was a staple of Neo-Platonist
thought. Many medieval thinkers believed that, although God was perfectly
simple, he contained within himself all possible ideas or essences. This idea
was embraced by the Schools and summed up in the popular Scholastic
dictum 'quicquid est in Deus, est Deus' ('whatsoever is in God, is God').20 Or
as Henry More put it, God is 'all things, yet but one'.21 The belief behind this
was the Aristotelian view that if a mind thinks of a thing, then that thing is in
some sense contained in the thinking mind.22 Hence as God thinks of all
things (i.e. as all things reside in his understanding), he can be said to contain
ideally all the forms or possibles within his own being. And as his very being
was itself perfectly simple and unified, God was, in this sense, a unity in
variety, that is, harmonious. Leibniz, too, often equated the harmony of
things with God; indeed on occasion he actually called God 'the harmony of
things' (e.g. A VI i 499, A VI iii 129, 134).23 In so doing, he apparently had
precisely the same idea in mind as the Scholastics and others, namely that the
'possibilities or ideas of things coincide . . . with God' (A II i 117/L146), that
is, 'All things are in God' (Gr356, cf. A VI ii 283).24 Or as he put it elsewhere,
'the divine mind consists of the ideas of all things . . . In God there are infinite,
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really diverse substances, yet God is indivisible' (A VI i 511-12/L118, cf. G
VII 305/SLT I.A.3/P140, G VII 566).25
Another staple of Neo-Platonist thought was that, in the act of creation,
God seeks to reflect or imitate himself in the world. Following Plato's
insistence that the creator 'desired that all things should come as near as
possible to being like himself,26 it became a popular belief that God's aim in
creation was to communicate himself by producing, as far as was possible, a
mirror image of himself. This idea should be familiar from Chapter 4, as
should the fact that Leibniz accepted it. Now if God is harmonious and
beautiful, and wishes to create an echo of himself in the world, to make the
world reflect his own nature, then the resulting world will also be harmonious
and beautiful. In creating a harmony of things, then, God's aim was not to
create the conditions conducive to creaturely happiness, strictly speaking, nor
to create beauty or intelligibility per se, but to create the best possible echo or
reflection of himself in the world.
The harmony of things
This answers our question as to why Leibniz's God values a harmonious
universe over a universe that contains everything, but it does so apparently at
the cost of undermining our explanation of incompossibility. That is, if all
things subsist in God, and there is no disharmony in God (a reasonable
assumption to make, as Leibniz was hardly likely to have confirmed the
opposite), then presumably there is no disharmony among things either. Yet
we have argued that, for Leibniz, it is the disharmony among things that
gives rise to their incompossibility. Thus if our analysis is not to result in
attributing to Leibniz a rather obvious inconsistency, we need to explain how
he could hold that all possibles subsist harmoniously within God, but yet
when God comes to create a world he can only create a harmony by
actualizing some of these possibles rather than all of them. First of all we need
to be clear about what Leibniz means by saying that God is harmonious on
account of his containing all things. Recall a passage we met back in Chapter
4: 'The essences of things are like numbers. Just as two numbers are not equal
to each other, so no two essences are equally perfect' (A VI iv 1352). The
crucial notion involved here is that of essence. For Leibniz, an essence is an
aggregation of attributes or predicates (cf. A VI i 271/L89, A VI ii 499, A VI
iii 574/D95), or, in short, that without which a thing would not be that thing.
In Leibniz's view, all possibilia have essences, not just existing things (cf. A VI
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iv 1362/SLT VI.B.l, A VI iv 1443/SLT I.A.I, A VI iv 1445/AG19, Gr390).
So King Arthur has an essence as much as does, say, Socrates. Thus when
Leibniz states that 'no two essences are equally perfect' he should be
understood as saying that no two possible things are equally perfect.27 Now as
these essences subsist in the mind of God, it should be reasonably clear that in
saying that no two of them are equally perfect Leibniz means this in an
atemporal sense. A modern analogy will help make this clear. Consider an
individual creature as a motion picture, a complete film, all plotted out in its
entirety. To keep the analogy close to Leibniz's concept of a possible creature,
further consider that every advance of the film's story, every twist of the plot,
has a value attached to it and makes the film better or worse than it was
before. Now suppose that God thinks of this film; on account of his
omniscience, clearly these advances and twists will not play out in God's mind
in real time. Rather what God sees in his own understanding is something
akin to a delayed exposure snapshot of the whole film, a photograph that
somehow captures the entire contents of the film if you will. From this
snapshot God can see not only every detail of the film, but also how good it is
on the whole, i.e. by considering everything that happens in it at once. And this is
precisely how God 'views' possible creatures too — all the changes they
undergo if actualized, all their increases and decreases in perfection, are
present to God in one instant, like a delayed exposure snapshot. For God
'penetrates all things at one stroke' and so 'he has no need of time for seeing
the connexion of things' (G VI 230/H247). But essences are not just seen by
God as atemporal snapshots, they are also contained in him in the same way.
Indeed it could not be otherwise, for in Leibniz's view there is no time and
space in God at all, and so possible essences no more move about in God than
they do change (cf. G VII 402-3/L705). Thus when Leibniz claims that 'no
two essences are equally perfect', he can only mean that each of these essences
has a different overall degree of perfection, summed up in these divine
snapshots. And as all these essences differ in their overall degree of perfection,
it should be fairly clear that, in God, all these essences form what we have
termed an atemporal harmony.
This, then, is how Leibniz understood the idea of God's own harmony.
And it is clear that we were right to suppose that, for Leibniz, there is no
disharmony in God at all. What we need to explain now is why all these
possibles, which subsist in God to form the most perfect possible harmony,
cannot simply be translated into existence to form a world that is just as
harmonious as God. Or to put it another way, from where does the
disharmony among possibles arise? And I should think that the answer to this
question is now apparent: although all possibilia form a perfect harmony in
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God because they subsist timelessly in him, these possibles will not be
actualized as God sees them or contains them - with all their states captured
in one timeless snapshot — but as beings that change in time and over time. So if
God is to create a temporal harmony of things he must consider all possibles
not in the way that they subsist in him, but in the way they would exist in a
world that allows their changes to play out ('all things are present to God as it
were, and he embraces everything in himself. Nevertheless the execution
requires time', A VI iv 1642/SLT VLB.2). And this is the crux of the matter.
We will recall that a perfect harmony of things emerges when all individual
beings have differing degrees of perfection. So a perfect atemporal harmony
requires all individuals to have different overall degrees of perfection, while a
perfect temporal harmony requires that all individual things never have the
same degree of perfection at the same time. But the fact that any two given
possibles have differing overall (atemporal) degrees of perfection does not in
itself entail that if both are actualized together they will not have the same
degree of perfection at a particular moment (or moments) of their temporal
existence. If they do, then although the two possibles are atemporally
harmonious, they will be temporally disharmonious, and if God seeks to
establish a harmony of things that is temporal as well as atemporal, then these
two possibles will be incompossible. Thus to form a harmony in God, all
possibles need only be atemporally harmonious, but to form a perfect
harmony in the world they have to be temporally harmonious as well. And as
we have seen, Leibniz did not believe that all possibles were temporally
harmonious.
So the fact that God looks to echo or mirror his own perfect harmony in
the world does not conflict with our assertion that incompossibility emerges
because of God's desire for a harmonious world. However, we do now know
that things cannot be incompossible because of any atemporal disharmony
among them, for, as we have just seen, it was Leibniz's view that every
possible essence has a different overall degree of perfection from all the others,
and on that account all possible essences are atemporally harmonious. Thus it
is the fact that some of the possible essences would be temporally
disharmonious, if actualized, that explains their incompossibility.
The relationship between harmony and richness
Before leaving the subject of harmony we should say a few words about how
harmony relates to richness. We know from Chapter 4 that the best world
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features the richest composite on account of it containing the greatest number
of compossible things and the greatest variety of compossible species. And we
now know that compossibility is determined by God's demand for harmony,
that is, God's stipulation that no two possible things with the same (temporal)
degree of perfection can coexist in the same world. This link between richness
and harmony allows us to deduce that the richest composite must also be the
most harmonious composite. This is so because harmony determines what is
and is not compossible; in fact 'compossible' just means 'is harmonious with'.
So if A is compossible with B, then A is harmonious with B. As a result of this,
every set of compossible things must be harmonious (since things and species
are only compossible if they are harmonious). But this does not mean that all
sets of compossibles are equally harmonious; in fact it follows that the richer a
set of compossible things is, the more harmony it contains. So the richest set of
things will also be the set that offers the greatest harmony of things, since it
contains the greatest number of compossible things, i.e. things that are
harmonious with each other. Hence if God chooses the richest set, i.e. the one
containing the maximum number/variety of compossible things/species, he
thereby brings about the greatest possible harmony of things too. And the fact
that Leibniz insists that the best world is both as harmonious and as rich as
possible confirms that the two goods are simultaneously realizable.
We should not forget, of course, that worldly richness does not just require
the greatest number of compossible things, etc.; it also requires these things to
be arranged in a particular way, i.e. in a plenum. How does this aspect of
richness relate to God's drive for harmony? On the surface it would seem that
it doesn't, since the most harmonious set of things would still be the most
harmonious set whether they are arranged in a plenum or not. Likewise, a
plenum would still be a plenum even if its parts were not harmoniously
ordered. Leibniz appears to agree with this analysis, telling us that 'the
plenitude of the universe is consistent with the harmony of things' (A VI iii
467/D13). As I have noted previously,28 Leibniz identified 'plenitude' with
the plenum, and so what he is saying here is that the plenum is consistent with
the harmony of things. So this aspect of richness neither contributes to nor
detracts from the world's harmony, though it is obviously required if God is
achieve the richest world possible as well as the most harmonious world
possible.
It should be clear that our study thus far has revealed that Leibniz's notion
of the best possible world is primarily defined in terms of harmony and
richness. As we have seen, these are manifested at all times — the best world is
always maximally harmonious and always maximally rich. It seems to follow
from this that the best world is just as excellent at one time as it is at another,
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as no increases in harmony or richness are possible. Yet there does seem to be
scope for improvement, not in harmony or richness, of course, but in one or
more of the three kinds of perfection. For although the best possible world
contains the greatest number of compossible things, these things, as we know,
continually change in their degrees of perfection. This appears to leave room
for the possibility that, taken as a whole, the best world might contain more
perfection as time goes on, while still being perfectly harmonious and rich.
We thus turn to an issue that is sorely neglected in the Leibniz literature:
whether the best possible world increases in perfection.
Notes
1. A view shared by Laurence Carlin (2000b), p. 101.
2. The standard view is that Leibniz did not develop the theory of pre-established
harmony until the 1680s or thereabouts. This has been challenged in recent years
by Christia Mercer, who argues that the doctrine is present in Leibniz's philosophy
in 1671, though she offers a number of answers as to when in 1671 it was developed.
She argues, for instance, that Leibniz invented the pre-established harmony
'Sometime between May and November 1671' (2001, p. 300), 'by the second half
of 1671' (2001, p. 344) and 'by the end of 1671' (2001, p. 300). Elsewhere she
makes a different claim, 'that Leibniz had invented all the sub-theses of
Preestablished Harmony by the summer and autumn of 1671' (2001, p. 341).
Now to say that all of the sub-theses of the doctrine were in place by the summer of
1671 is not the same as saying that the doctrine itself was in place at that time.
Although the theses that Leibniz was committed to in May 1671 may have
committed him to what he would later call pre-established harmony, the question
is whether he realized that at the time. And Mercer's evidence for that is
inconclusive, as she seems to concede (cf. pp. 340, 344). In any case, Leibniz did
not consistently apply the term 'harmony' to this doctrine until the phrase 'pre-
established harmony' was coined in 1696. Prior to that he generally spoke of a
'concomitance', 'correspondence' or 'conspiration' between the states of body and
soul.
3. The identification of what constitutes the unity in things has stumped Laurence
Carlin, amongst others. At the end of his long examination of Leibniz's concept of
harmony he admits to finding 'perplexing' Leibniz's talk 'of harmony as
involving a unity of a collection of entities' given that 'certain collections of
entities do not obviously constitute one object or thing'. Carlin (2000b), p. 125.
4. Rutherford (1995), p. 32; Mercer (2001), p. 213f.
5. See Chapter 4, note 21.
6. I should point out that Leibniz did not always consistently refer to the doctrines I
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have called 'the harmony of things' and 'universal harmony' by the names I have
given them. In at least one text, for instance, he apparently uses the expression
'universal harmony' to refer to the doctrine I have called 'the harmony of things'
(A VI iv 1586/DM §36). More often than not, however, Leibniz simply wrote
about 'harmony' without specifying which type he had in mind.
7. E.g. D'Agostino (1976), p. 128; M. Wilson (1999), p. 445; Cover and O'Leary-
Hawthorne (1999), p. 138.
8. E.g. Lovejoy (1936), p. 171; Hacking (1982), p. 192; Rutherford (1995), p. 182.
9. Hide Ishiguro translates the first part of the passage as 'Until now nobody has
known where the incompossibility of different terms comes from' (Ishiguro (1972),
p. 47). Although this translation appears to remove the ambiguity inherent in the
Latin as to whether Leibniz is saying that compossibility is a mystery to him or
everyone but him, Ishiguro nevertheless interprets it as saying the former.
10. This conclusion is drawn by Broad (1975), p. 162.
11. If this sounds implausible, suppose that God actualizes a harmonious world
containing 1,000 things, all different from each other but featuring an underlying
unity, and then adds to this 1,000 identical copies of one of the things already in
the world. In this example, it is clear that adding so many non-varied things to a
system that was previously perfectly varied does impact on the original harmony
of that system. As the original harmony of the system would also be spoiled if God
only added, say, 100 identical copies of a thing already present within it, or 50, it
must be the case that the addition of any number of identical things would
negatively affect the harmony of the system (though the negative effects will be
less noticeable if a small number of identical things is added than they would be if
a large number was added).
12. As God is apparently able to do, cf. G VI 230/H247.
13. Interestingly, Donald Rutherford construes this passage as saying that 'there will
be a continuous ordering of degrees of perfection, from the lowest "brute"
monads to the most elevated rational minds' (1995, p. 200). Yet further on in the
New Essays, when Leibniz harks back to the passage in question, he makes it quite
clear that he was referring to the ' "gradual connection" of species' (A VI vi 473/
NE473).
14. Other thinkers with Platonist leanings held the universe to be harmonious in
precisely this sense, that it contained a harmonious ordering of species. For instance,
Ralph Cudworth stated in The True Intellectual System of the Universe that 'were there
but one kind of thing, (the Best) thus made; there could have been no Musick nor
Harmony at all, in the World for want of Variety.'' Cudworth (1964), p. 881.
15. Animals appear to have their limits too: 'the stupidest man ... is incomparably
more rational and teachable than the most intellectual of all the beasts' (A VI vi
473/NE473).
16. It could be that Leibniz envisioned the inner nature or essential characteristics of
a species as only defining an upper limit of perfection for each species and not a
lower limit, although the passage cited in note 15 above does suggest a lower
limit, at least for humans.
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17. It should be noted that this conception of Leibnizian incompossibility is
completely different from both of the two competing explanations of it that
dominate the literature on this topic, which are critically examined in a nice
article by Margaret Wilson (1999), pp. 442-54. It would take too long to assess
the respective merits of each account here, and I refer the interested reader to
Wilson's paper because she notes that neither of the two popular explanations of
incompossibility is without its problems. What she overlooks, however, is that
both of the popular accounts of incompossibility focus solely on how individual
things could be incompossible. Neither account addresses species incompossibility,
an issue that appears to have been completely ignored in the literature, and
neither account seems to me to be equipped to explain it.
18. Augustine (1953), p. 252.
19. Aquinas (1967), Iq39a8.
20. Cited as a 'Scholastick notion' by Cudworth (1964), p. 563.
21. More (1969), p. 77.
22. Aristotle (1984), p. 431a-b.
23. And just to make matters more confusing, Leibniz sometimes referred to God as
'universal harmony' too! (A II i 174/L150, A VI iii 117).
24. See also Leibniz's critical notes on Spinoza from 1707: 'The essences of things are
coeternal with God, and the very essence of God comprehends all other essences,
to the extent that God cannot perfectly be conceived without them' (FB22/
AG273).
25. Christia Mercer notes that Leibniz's university professor, Jacob Thomasius, held
God to be harmonious in this sense too (cf. Mercer (2001), p. 213).
26. Cornford (1935), p. 33 (Timaeus 29e).
27. Cf. G VII 303/SLT I.A.3/P137, where he identifies 'possible things' as 'things
expressing an essence or possible reality'.
28. See Chapter 4, note 22.
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Does the World Increase in Perfection?
Three models of worldly perfection
In a letter to Louis Bourguet written on 5 August 1715, a little over a year
before his death, Leibniz suggested that, on the question of the world's
perfection, 'Two hypotheses can be formed, one that nature is always equally
perfect, the other that it always increases in perfection' (G III 582/SLT
VI.B.5/L664). He then proceeded to split the second option into two further
hypotheses, first that the world has been increasing in perfection since its
inception at a first moment, and second that it has been increasing in
perfection from all eternity. He illustrated these alternatives by means of the
diagrams below (see Figure 7.1) (G III 582/SLT VI.B.5/L665).
Here, rectangle A corresponds to the hypothesis that the world remains
equally perfect at all moments of its (eternal) existence, hyperbola B to the
hypothesis that the world has been increasing in perfection from eternity, and
triangle C to the hypothesis that the world had a beginning and has increased
in perfection since then.
Before we attempt to ascertain which of the three hypotheses got Leibniz's
support, we need to be clear about what he meant by saying that the world
increases in perfection. I would concur with George Gale's analysis that the
total perfection of the world at any given moment is the sum of the perfection
of every substance in that world at that moment.1 From this it is easy to see
that an increase in the world's perfection would manifest as it having a larger
total for this sum at one time than it did at a previous time. But what, exactly,
could bring this about? As I see it, there are two ways in which the perfection
of the world could be increased in a Leibnizian universe. The first is that there
Figure 7.1
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are more creatures at time t than there were at a time before t. The second is that
there are better, i.e. more perfect creatures at time t than there were at a time
before t. The first option is ruled out by Leibniz's insistence that the total
number of creatures remains the same over time, which is entailed by the
following two theses: (1) that God created the maximum number of creatures
that he could, leaving no spaces into which others could be added, and (2) that
every creature always has a physical presence in the universe, even before birth
and after death. So if there is going to be an increase in the perfection of the
Leibnizian universe then it will have to come from the fixed number of
individual creatures themselves becoming more perfect over time. This can
happen in one of three ways: firstly, by some or all creatures increasing in
perfection over time and none actually decreasing; secondly, by some creatures
increasing in perfection and others decreasing, where these changes always lead
overall to a net increase in perfection (i.e. the increases are consistently greater
than the decreases); and thirdly by a reculer pour mieux sauter, where there would
be periods of time when the total perfection of the world actually decreases, and
others when it increases, with the increases outweighing the decreases over the
course of time (though this third option appears to conflict with the triangle
and hyperbola hypotheses, both of which seem to call for a smooth continuous
increase in perfection without any retrograde steps).
The hypothesis of the rectangle
Returning, then, to the matter at hand, that of whether Leibniz accepted or
rejected the notion of a universe increasing in perfection, we discover that
immediately after laying out the competing hypotheses of the triangle,
rectangle and hyperbola, Leibniz went on to inform Bourguet that he could
'not see a way of showing demonstratively by pure reason which of these we
should choose' (G III 582/SLT VI.B.5/L664). The matter remained under
discussion throughout the rest of their communication of 1715-16, though
most of Leibniz's subsequent remarks were just concerned with clearing up
some of Bourguet's misunderstandings. However, in another of these
exchanges, after putting Bourguet right on the question of whether the
hyperbola hypothesis entails the necessary existence of the world, Leibniz
reiterated his stated view that 'it is not that easy to decide between the three
hypotheses, and we must still engage in a lot of meditation in order to come to
any conclusion about them' (G III 589/SLT VLB.6). We find similar doubts
expressed in the Theodicy, written between 1707 and 1710:
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It might be therefore that the universe became even better and better, if
the natures of things were such that it was not permitted to attain the best
all at once. But these are problems of which it is difficult for us to judge. (G
VI 237/H253-4)
Interestingly, however, Leibniz did express a preference elsewhere, for the
rectangle hypothesis in fact. In an early letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (1671)
he explained that, 'whatever has happened, is happening, or will happen is
best' (A II i 117/L147). Now by applying the term 'best' to the past, present
and future, Leibniz was saying more than that the series as a whole is best,
taken over its entire history. In fact he was suggesting that the universe is as
perfect as it can be at every moment of its being, and passes from one moment to
the next under the burden of being unimprovable. For clearly 'whatever has
happened' would not be best on either of the two meliorist hypotheses (the
triangle and the hyperbola), as on those models the world increases in
perfection over time, each state of the universe being better than the previous
one. Thus Leibniz's statement about things having always been the best
would sit uneasily with either the triangle and hyperbola hypotheses, and
must be considered as approval for what he would later call the rectangle
hypothesis.
There is further evidence for this view. In a short, oft-neglected paper
entitled Whether the world increases in perfection, dated by Gaston Grua to 1694-
96, the opening words are these:
The question is whether the whole world increases or decreases in
perfection, or whether in fact it always preserves the same perfection, as I
rather think, even if the different parts variously exchange perfection
between themselves, so that it is mutually transferred. (Gr95/SLT
VI.B.3)
The words 'as I rather think', while not exactly a ringing endorsement of the
hypothesis of the rectangle, nevertheless suggest that, even during his mature
period, Leibniz viewed the hypothesis favourably.2 Despite the recent
resurgence of interest in his theodicy, this paper seems to have gone largely
unnoticed by Leibniz scholars,3 and consequently also the fact that he leans
towards the rectangle hypothesis in it.
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A change of heart: Leibniz's melioristic phase
On the basis of the passages considered thus far we might want to tentatively
argue that Leibniz favoured a statically perfect world until becoming uncertain
on the matter by around 1710 at the latest (possibly three years earlier, since
the Theodicy was begun in 1707). What upsets this hypothesis are a number of
passages in which Leibniz clearly rules in favour of cosmic melioration. The
first of these comes from a short paper that the Academy editors have
appropriately titled On the continuous increase in the perfection of the world:
All things considered, I believe that the world continuously increases in
perfection and does not go around in a circle as if by a revolution . . . The
universe is similar to a plant or animal, in that it tends towards maturity.
But this is the difference, that it never comes to the greatest degree of
maturity, and also that it never goes back or falls into decline. (A VI iv
1642/SLT VI.B.2)
Interestingly, the Academy editors have tentatively dated this text to 1689-
90, and if this is right then in 1671 Leibniz rejected meliorism, in 1689-90 he
accepted it, in 1694—96 he rejected it again, and from 1707/1710 onwards he
was agnostic about it.
If that was not complicated enough, there are a further series of texts in
which Leibniz clearly states that the world does increase in perfection.
Curiously, these were written between 1696 and 1706, and therefore after his
rejection of meliorism in Whether the world increases in perfection and before his
ultimate agnosticism in the Theodicy and correspondence with Bourguet. This
suggests that during two distinct periods of his life (1689-90 and 1696-1706)
Leibniz rejected meliorism, during another two periods (1671 and 1694/1696)
he accepted it, and during another period (1707/1710-16) he was agnostic
about it! I shall try to make sense of these apparent upheavals in Leibniz's
thought shortly; before that, however, we need to consider some of the
passages from 1696-1706 in which Leibniz endorses meliorism. We must
proceed carefully here, however, as some of the passages that have been
mooted as evidence of Leibnizian meliorism are susceptible of entirely
different (and non-melioristic) interpretations. The best examples of
meliorism, in my view, are two that have so far been overlooked in the
literature. The first is from a letter to Andre Morell (May 1698), the second
from a series of notes regarding a conversation with Gabriel Wagner (March
1698):
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I think, moreover, that everything is animate, that all minds except God
are embodied, and that the universe always develops for the better, or if it
worsens it is only in order to make a better leap. (GH27/SLT I.A.5)
It cannot be denied that some things sometimes become worse. Never-
theless on the whole the universe always increases in perfection. (Gr391)
In both of these passages Leibniz is clearly endorsing neither of the two
meliorist accounts he later developed, the triangle and hyperbola hypotheses,
both of which call for a smooth increase in the perfection of the world.
Instead, he argues for a reculer pour mieux sauter, that is, an overall increase
punctuated by times when the perfection of the world actually decreases.
Now consider a famous passage from On the ultimate origination of things
(1697), of which the first part is this: 'Furthermore, it must be recognized that
there is a perpetual and most free progress of the whole universe towards a
consummation of the universal beauty and perfection of the works of God' (G
VII 308/SLT I.A.3/P144). This passage crops up in every discussion I have
seen on whether Leibniz believed the world increases in perfection, though I
am not entirely convinced that it is advancing an ameliorative position at all.
Part of the problem lies in the way the passage has been translated by various
commentators. Arthur Lovejoy, for instance, translates it as 'A cumulative
increase of the beauty and universal perfection of the works of God, a
perpetual and unrestricted progress of the universe as a whole must be
recognized',4 which is a much more clear-cut statement of cosmic meliorism
than in the above translation (which is my own).5 Nevertheless, it may be
argued, although in the above passage Leibniz does not say outright that the
world increases in perfection, he does say that there is a progress of the whole
universe, and that this progress consummates the world's perfection. Clearly,
then, the world must be increasing in perfection. But it would be wrong, I
think, to construe the passage this way. For to do so would be to suggest that
the Leibnizian universe increases in perfection until it reaches the highest
degree of perfection attainable. But in neither the triangle hypothesis nor the
hyperbola hypothesis is it suggested that the world increases in perfection for
a time and then stops because it can go no further.6 In both hypotheses the
perfection of the world is considered to increase without end, and thus if the
universe does increase in perfection then it never reaches a limit. Indeed, if
there is a limit to how perfect the world could be, it would have struck
Leibniz as odd that God did not just create the world at that limit in the first
place: 'If it cannot happen that a perfection is given which cannot be
increased, it follows that the perfection of the universe always increases; for
thus it is more perfect than if it did not increase' (Gr95/SLT VLB.3, cf. G VI
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237/H253—4). Clearly cosmic improvement only made sense to Leibniz when
understood as being a process without any end.
We need now to consider more of the passage from On the ultimate origination
of things:
Furthermore, it must be recognized that there is a perpetual and most free
progress of the whole universe towards a consummation of the universal
beauty and perfection of the works of God, so that it is always advancing
towards greater cultivation. Just as now a great part of our earth has
received cultivation, and will receive it more and more .. . . And as for the
objection that could be made: that if this were so the world should have
become a paradise before now, the response is at hand: although many
substances have already attained great perfection, nevertheless on account
of the divisibility of the continuum to infinity there always remain in the
abyss of things parts that are still asleep, which are to be awakened and
driven on to greater and better things, and in a word, to better cultivation.
And hence progress never comes to an end. (G VII 308/SLT I.A.3/P144)
To my mind, the progress referred to here is tied to the continuous unfolding
of the universe, that is, the maturation of animalcules to fully-grown creatures
(this certainly accounts for the remark about substances being awakened that
have hitherto been asleep, and that about parts of the world being
cultivated). But while this process undoubtedly leads to an increase in the
measure of perfection a creature has, since a fully-grown creature invariably
has more perfection than it did when in an animalcule state, the reverse
process (from fully-grown creature back to an animalcule) does the opposite.
For as is clear from elsewhere in the Leibnizian corpus, death brings about a
lessening of a creature's perfection (cf. G VII 530/W506), so while some parts
of the universe are increasing in perfection other parts will be decreasing. And
it is notable that in On the ultimate origination of things Leibniz does not argue
that these increases outweigh the decreases. Thus it is possible that Leibniz
could be employing a value-neutral conception of progress here, as is for
example the progress (or advance) of time or the development of a story, i.e. a
progression from state to state that has no obvious overtones of improvement
or an increase in value. If so, the world can be said to progress in that as time
goes on, more and more creatures will awaken and 'come to a great
perfection'. And this can be said to be the finishing touch (i.e. the
consummation) of the world's perfection, since it is hardly consistent with
the perfection of the world that it contains the maximum number of things,
most or all of which remain perpetually uncultivated and in seed form.
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We need not concern ourselves with this any further, as whether cosmic
melioration is advocated in On the ultimate origination of things or not, Leibniz did
elsewhere clearly advocate it. In addition to the two texts from 1698 that I have
already cited, the following are sometimes mooted as containing an endorsement
of meliorism. The first is a letter to Electress Sophie from November 1696; the
second is another letter to Electress Sophie, from February 1706:
because there is nothing outside the universe which could prevent it, it
must be that the universe continually advances and develops. (G VII 543/
SLT II.C.I)
there are grounds to think that the universe itself develops more and
more, and that everything tends towards some goal (since everything
comes from an author whose wisdom is perfect). (G VII 568/SLT II.C.2)
It has to be said that neither is a clear-cut endorsement of meliorism:
'advancement' and 'development' do not necessarily mean 'improvement', and
it is possible that in both Leibniz simply wants to say that the universe continues
to unfold, accumulating changes as it does so. With that said, I believe that the
second text, at least, is intended to be melioristic in tone; we shall see more of
that text later in this chapter, where its melioristic tone will become clear. I shall
leave it an open question here as to whether the first of the above two texts also
contains evidence of meliorism.7 For our purposes all we need note is that there
is a series of texts in which Leibniz either openly advocates meliorism or appears
to advocate it, and these all fall between 1696 and 1706 (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1
1671
1689/1690
1694/1696
1696-1706
1707/1710-16
Letter to Wedderkopf
On the continuous increase in the
perfection of the world
Whether the world increases in
perfection
Letter to Morell, Notes on
Wagner, etc.
Theodicy, Letters to Bourguet
Rejects meliorism
Accepts meliorism
Rejects meliorism
Accepts meliorism
Agnostic about meliorism
(Note: The boundary dates are only approximate, corresponding as they do to texts
that in some cases have not been dated accurately.)
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Such a flip-flopping of views on a single matter is not characteristic of
Leibniz at all, and it's very possible that something is amiss with the account
as outlined above. Of the texts mentioned, only two have not been accurately
dated - On the continuous increase in the perfection of the world, tentatively dated to
1689-90, and Whether the world increases in perfection, tentatively dated to 1694—
96. Now the Academy editors note that they assign the date of 1689-90 to the
first of these texts on the basis of watermark evidence, but also note, on the
basis of internal evidence (i.e. what Leibniz actually says in the text), their
lack of confidence in this dating. They suggest that the text could in fact have
been written after 1690, or even after 1700. In other words, it could well have
been written between 1696 and 1706, that is, in the decade in which there is
solid evidence that Leibniz was in favour of meliorism.
I think it quite likely that such a date for On the continuous increase in the
perfection of the world is right, if for no better reason than that it spares us from
having to attribute to Leibniz frequent radical shifts in his thought which are
wholly out of character. For if we redate On the continuous increase in the perfection
of the world to somewhen between 1696 and 1706, or thereabouts, we get
another picture of Leibniz's views (see Table 7.2). Although this account still
involves puzzling changes in thought that require explanation, at least it does
not impute to Leibniz several bizarre back-and-forth shifts in thinking.
However, there is only so much convenience that can be bought by taking
the date of composition of On the continuous increase in the perfection of the world to
be somewhen between 1696 and 1706. Specifically, we now have to face the
Table 7.2
1671-94/6
1696-1706
1707/1710-16
Letter to Wedderkopf,
Whether the world
increases in perfection
Letter to Morell, Notes
on Wagner, On the
continuous increase in the
perfection of the world,
Letter to Electress
Sophie, etc.
Theodicy, Letters to
Bourguet
Rejects meliorism
Accepts meliorism
Agnostic about meliorism
(Note: the boundary dates are only approximate.)
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problem of the different types of meliorism that Leibniz endorsed during that
decade. As we have seen, in On the continuous increase in the perfection of the world
Leibniz argues that the world always gets better and never gets worse. In at
least two of the texts from 1696—1706 that I have cited, however, Leibniz opts
for a reculer pour mieux sauter explanation of progress, that is, an overall increase
in perfection punctuated by occasional periods where things actually get
worse. Hence the type of meliorism advocated in On the continuous increase in the
perfection of the world does not fit with the type of meliorism Leibniz advocated
during at least some of the period 1696-1706. This suggests that On the
continuous increase in the perfection of the world might not be from that melioristic
decade after all. But if it is not, it is hard to identify a particular period of
Leibniz's career to which it does belong. We thus have two choices: first,
accept the Academy's tentative dating of that text (1689-90), and
consequently accept that Leibniz veered from rejecting meliorism to
accepting it, then rejecting it again and then accepting it again before
ultimately falling into doubt on the matter; or second, accept that the text
was written during the decade in which Leibniz was an avowed meliorist, and
consequently accept that during that decade he entertained two distinct kinds
of meliorism. While neither option is particularly appealing from a
commentator's point of view, on account of the fact that neither can be
easily explained, the second seems more intuitively plausible in itself as well as
more in keeping with Leibniz's character, which was not prone to radical
back-and-forth shifts in opinion.
So with due wariness I suggest the following account of Leibniz's view on
whether the world increases in perfection: an initial period of belief in a
statically perfect universe lasted from around 1671 until around the mid-
1690s, and then gave way to an ameliorative view until some time around the
mid-1700s, after which he fell into uncertainty on the matter. While a
number of commentators have ascribed an ameliorative philosophy to
Leibniz,8 none seem to have noted that his thought on this matter went from
one extreme (the universe does not get more perfect) to the other (the
universe does get more perfect) before settling on an agnostic position.9
Three conceptions of Leibnizian progress
The question before us now is this: by what mechanism did Leibniz suppose
that the world increases in perfection during the decade or so he would have
counted himself as a meliorist? A number of suggestions have been made by
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way of answer to this question. We shall deal with three of them only briefly;
the fourth (physical evolution) is more complex and will require a much
longer discussion.
Catherine Wilson construes Leibniz's remarks on the improving universe
as referring to social and cultural progress. This seems to be largely due to her
translating the Latin term 'cultum' in On the ultimate origination of things as
'culture' rather than 'cultivation', so that she takes Leibniz to be referring
there to things being driven on to a 'better culture'. However, there is a good
reason to doubt that Leibniz had social or cultural progress in mind in On the
ultimate origination of things, since by Wilson's own admission such social and
cultural progress was hardly apparent in Leibniz's day. In fact she can find
only one example of it in Leibniz's work — 'Father Spec's successful struggle
against the persecution of witches' (mentioned in G VI 157/H177).10 It seems
somewhat unlikely that a melioristic philosophy could be founded on this
single example of cultural progress.
Another interpretation has been put forward by Juan A. Nicolas, who
argues that, for Leibniz, 'The realisation of the best of worlds does not . . . take
place all at once; it is rather a matter of an historic process, with its
progressions and regressions, and in which man plays an important role.'11
Nicolas offers no textual support for this view other than Leibniz's claim in On
the ultimate origination of things that 'progress never comes to an end'. If
Nicolas's interpretation is right, Leibniz's talk of'substances being awakened'
must be taken figuratively rather than literally, to refer to advancements in
knowledge and understanding (which presumably would lead to Wilson's
idea of improvement coming about via social and cultural progress).
However, it seems something of a stretch to interpret it this way.
A third possible answer emerges from the notes Leibniz made on a
discussion with Gabriel Wagner:
the perfection of any monad whatever endures once acquired by its
imperishable character, even if it may not be able to be perceived
distinctly, so that endeavours impressed on the body are never erased, but
are only added together with the others. (Gr398)
(For our purposes, it is better to substitute 'creature' for 'monad'; the change
does not affect the meaning of the passage in any significant way.) This
passage could be interpreted as saying that creatures that have developed a
certain degree of perfection do not lose it in death. If this is what Leibniz
believed in 1698, then it would certainly account for the melioristic hypothesis
he held at that time, for if creatures could only increase in perfection or
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preserve the degree of perfection they had at the point of death, the world
would continually increase in perfection so long as there were always more
creatures to emerge from their animalcule state (which is confirmed in On the
ultimate origination of things}. The problem with this interpretation, of course, is
that it conflicts with Leibniz's stated view in the same text that the world
sometimes gets worse. If creatures could only ever increase in perfection, or
preserve their degree of perfection, then this would be impossible. It seems to
me that the Wagner passage is merely making the point that if a creature
attains a particular degree of perfection, then although it will go on to lose
most of it in death, the potential for it to be restored at some later time is there.
So when God resurrects creatures, he can bring them back with exactly the
same degree of perfection they had when they died.
The hypothesis of evolution
By far the most intriguing of all the suggestions made as to how Leibniz
understood the improvement of the universe is that put forward by Arthur
Lovejoy. In his seminal work The Great Chain Of Being he argues that Leibniz's
vision of the universe was one of'endless Becoming', and pins this belief to a
large extent on the picture of Leibniz as someone who accepted the
occurrence of 'phylogenetic advance', that is, the transformation, the
evolution, of species.12 For example, in the Protogaea (1690-91), according
to Lovejoy, Leibniz explains that, it is 'worthy of belief that in the course of
the vast changes [which have taken place in the condition of the earth's crust]
even the species of animals have many times been transformed'.13 I say
'according to Lovejoy' here as it is highly doubtful that Leibniz does endorse
a transformationist account in the Protogaea. For instance, in §6 Leibniz draws
back from an outright endorsement of at least one evolutionary hypothesis,
cautioning against the view that animals were once all aquatic before
becoming amphibious and moving on to the Earth, because it 'disagrees with
the Holy writers, to depart from whom is a religious offence' (Pr26/SLT
IV.C.2).14 And in §26, from which Lovejoy's quote comes, Leibniz considers
the question of why there seem to be so many 'species in stones' which cannot
now be found anywhere, and answers that they probably are still around. He
takes the example of a kind of large ammonite that had been found in fossils
yet apparently was no longer present in the sea. He then asks the rhetorical
question, 'But who has fully explored its hidden recesses, or the subterranean
abysses?' (Pr90/SLT IV.C.2), before going on to explain that fossils are swept
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up by floods from distant places, which accounts for why they are found in
places where there are no living animals of the same species. Likewise the
'whirlpools of the sea' account for why some fossils seem to collect only in one
place, 'such as in Malta alone we wonder at the huge number of shark's teeth
which we call glossopetrae', while even now storms 'throw up kinds of
molluscs onto our coasts which fishermen do not find in the nearby sea' (Pr92/
SLT IV.C.2). Leibniz thus envisions a variety of natural processes to explain
why one can look in vain for living members of species that have been found
in fossils, and why one may not find a fossil record of species that are common
today.
But what of the passage cited by Lovejoy that we considered above, where
Leibniz appears to view transformation among species as 'worthy of belief?
This can be attributed to an error on Lovejoy's part, as the passage is more
accurately translated as 'It is quite credible that during those great changes
the species of animals have still remained mostly unchanged' (Pr90/SLT
IV.C.2).15 Lovejoy appears to have been confused by the Latin word
'immutatas' which can mean 'changed' or 'unchanged', but had he taken
account of the context in which the word appears he would have been drawn
to the correct translation of the term, as in the Protogaea Leibniz is clearly
unimpressed by the evolutionist argument.16
Despite this, there certainly does seem to be evidence that in his later
writings Leibniz advocated at least a limited form of evolution among
creatures. For example, in a letter to Thomas Burnett of 1696, he explained
that, 'species can be greatly changed by length of time, just as by the interval
of places, witness the differences between American animals and ours' (G III
184).17 While this seems pretty clear-cut, I believe we should reserve
judgement on it until we have considered Leibniz's remarks on species change
from the New Essays on Human Understanding (1704). Leibniz writes there that
'Various cat-like animals, such as the lion, the tiger and the lynx, may once
have been of the same race and may now amount to new subdivisions of the
ancient cat species' (A VI vi 317/NE317). This remark appears during a
discussion about the mixing and crossbreeding of species to produce viable
offspring that are different from both parents. While Leibniz acknowledged
the existence of these hybrids, his preference was to place them within the
current range of species (as a subdivision) rather than considering them to
belong to a wholly new and previously unactualized species. This approach is
adopted again when Leibniz switches his attention from cats to dogs:
There are such great differences amongst dogs that mastiffs and lap-dogs
can very well be said to be of different species. Yet it is not impossible that
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they are the remote descendants of the same or similar breeds, which we
would find if we could go back a long way, and that their ancestors were
similar or the same, but that after much change some of their descendants
became very large and others very small. (A VI vi 325/NE325)
He then proceeds to throw doubt on the suggestion that different breeds
belong to different species, as 'it would not be offending against reason to
believe that they have in common an unchanging specific inner nature which
is not further subdivided in our world' and 'which is further varied only by
the addition of accidents' (A VI vi 325/NE325). Here Leibniz relies on the
notion of a 'natural species', that is, a species fixed by God. If all species are
natural in this sense, as Leibniz seems to imply, then there is a species called
'cat', another called 'dog', etc., and each is defined by an unchangeable inner
nature that all individual members must possess no matter what their
accidental properties might be.18 Leibniz extends the argument to show that
'Negroes, Chinese and American Indians' likewise do not belong to different
species in spite of their obvious outward differences, but are all in fact human
on the grounds that they all possess reason, which he takes to be the defining
feature of the human species. He then observes that 'as we find among us no
fixed inner feature which generates a subdivision, we have no grounds for
thinking that the truth about their inner natures implies that there is any
essential specific difference among men' (A VI vi 326/NE326). Leibniz would
thus no doubt have agreed with Aristotle's dictum that 'man generates
man',19 though he did allow that within species boundaries there can be vast
differences between individuals, even differences that accumulate over time
(and in many cases because of human intervention) to produce animals with
different accidental properties to those that have come before. This, I think, is
what Leibniz was getting at in his communication with Burnett cited above,
as his remarks in that letter were prompted by the discovery of an 'elephant-
like' fossil. With regard to this fossil, which was in fact a fossilized skull
fragment, Leibniz tells Burnett that he has
no doubt at all that it is from the animal kingdom, and if it is not from an
elephant it is still from an analogous animal, either from elephants or
similar animals that have formerly lived in these countries, or that there
were amphibious sea animals of the nature of the elephant when a large
part of the globe of the Earth was still submerged. (G III 184)
The interesting thing here is that whether the skull fragment turns out to be
from a kind of elephant that is already known, or is from some previously
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unknown amphibious creature, Leibniz still considers it to be from the
species 'elephant'. Obviously if it turns out that the skull fragment was from
an elephant then Leibniz would say that it comes from the elephant species,
but the interesting thing is that he seems prepared to make exactly the same
classification even if it turns out that the skull fragment belonged to some
unknown amphibious creature. For as he says, if the fragment is not from an
elephant then it is from 'amphibious sea animals of the nature of the elephant'.
What Leibniz is saying in the Burnett letter, then, is that the elephant species
may turn out to be broader than was previously thought, as it might contain a
sub-variety of elephant that is amphibious. The reason for this should be clear
from his view, stated in the New Essays, that all species are defined by a 'fixed
inner nature'. So as the elephant species, like all species, is defined by its own
'inner nature', and this inner nature is fixed, the only scope for change is in the
accidental properties of those animals within the species group, as the inner
nature itself cannot change. In fact, given Leibniz's view that all species are
defined by a fixed inner nature, it would have made no sense at all to him to
suppose that species themselves undergo change.
Lovejoy appears to ignore all this and argues that, so far as Leibniz was
concerned, in earlier ages 'the number of [natural] species was obviously
vastly reduced [from what it is today], and the descent of most forms
commonly regarded as of different species from common ancestors differing
very greatly from most of their descendants is implied'.20 But we have seen
that this is not implied at all: the individuals representing a species might
differ from generation to generation and eventually form sub-varieties, but
species themselves do not change. Thus it is important to note that Leibniz
nowhere suggests that the number of species around today is greater than the
number of species existing in the past. In fact he advocates the very opposite
view in a letter to Wagner from 1710: 'a soul or an animal before birth or
after death differs from a soul or an animal living the present life only by
conditions of things and degrees of perfections, but not by entire genus of
being' (G VII 530/W506, cf. A VI vi 305/NE305). To fully understand this
we need to recall Leibniz's acceptance of the theory of preformationism
which, as we have already seen, led him to consider that
[an] animal only comes into being at the same time as does the world, and
that it only changes and develops by generation . . . that it must endure as
long as the world, and that death is only a diminution and envelopment of
the animal. (G VII 568/SLT II.C.2)
So what he told Wagner is that before birth, a creature in an animalcule state
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already belongs to a particular species, and it remains a member of that species
even after it dies (or falls into slumber, as Leibniz often put it). With the total
number of creatures fixed for all eternity it follows that the total number of
species will be too, and there is thus no scope for any increase in the number
of the latter nor, consequently, for phylogenetic advance.
Even if the number of species does not change, perhaps the fact that
Leibniz allowed there to be new hybrids, cross-breeds and sub-varieties within
species is sufficient to support Lovejoy's claim that improvement in the
Leibnizian universe comes about via evolution? Before we assess whether this
is so, it is worth getting clear what we mean by 'new' here. After all, we must
remember that in Leibniz's view there were lap-dogs, for instance, in an
animalcule state long before the first lap-dog was ever born, their seeds being
contained in the bodies of creatures belonging to a different sub-species (but
same species). Technically, then, the sub-species of lap-dog has always been
present in the physical universe, even before the first member of that sub-
species achieved 'large animal' state in the world. Therefore when Leibniz
wrote about the sub-species of lap-dog being new, what he was referring to is
the moment when the first lap-dog animalcule developed into a 'large
animal', that sub-species being new only to the physical world of our day-to-
day experience and not the physical world per se. So this limited form of
evolution can only be the driving force behind the universe's meliorism if
intra-species change, understood in the way described above, gives rise to
more perfect 'large animals'. But nowhere does Leibniz say that the process of
intra-species change makes the world better, or more perfect, or that new
breeds/sub-varieties are better than those already in existence (or those that
have perhaps died out). While Lovejoy needs Leibniz to claim that his
restricted version of evolution leads to there being either more things or better
things, Leibniz in his stubbornness claimed only that it leads to variation
within the strictly defined species groups.
But might it not perhaps be argued that there is a presumption of
improvement here? That intra-species change, even understood as the limited
doctrine I have presented above, entails either the triangle or hyperbola
hypotheses? Such an assertion would be unwarranted. In fact, when
discussing the rectangle hypothesis with Bourguet, Leibniz argued that if
the hypothesis is true then 'change is appropriate, in order that there should
be more kinds or forms of perfection, even if they would be equal in degree'
(G III 593/SLT VI.B.7).21 Lovejoy employs this passage to bolster his own
case, thereby ignoring the context in which it arises, which is only to illustrate
the point that change is consistent with, and perhaps even required by the
hypothesis of the rectangle.22 Leibniz made a similar point in the Theodicy,
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when he considered the suggestion that the best possible world would be an
eternal substance that could not change. There his reply is this: 'the best may
be changed into another which neither yields to it nor surpasses it'. The point
is illustrated by the transition from
enjoyment of music to enjoyment of painting, or vice versa from the pleasure
of the eyes to that of the ears, [where] the degree of enjoyment may remain
the same, the latter gaining no advantage over the former save that of
novelty. (G VI 237/H253)
So while change has occurred, it is not necessarily the case that the universe
has become any better on account of it.
We now need to consider a short open letter to Christian Spener that
Leibniz published in the first volume of the journal Berlin Miscellanea of 1710,
in which, according to Lovejoy, Leibniz 'suggests that it is probable that the
earliest animals were marine forms, and the amphibia and land-animals were
descended from these'.23 The passage he has in mind seems to be this one:
As for the animals unknown in this world, of which we have discovered
vestiges, further enquiry must be made as to whether or not the majority
were aquatic or amphibious; especially since it can be believed that some
terrestrial animals have ultimately descended from marine or amphibious
animals which have now been deserted by the sea, and which have
changed over a long period of time so that they can no longer bear the
water. (Pr204/SLT IV.C.3)
Here Leibniz not only actively considers the possibility that 'terrestrial
animals have ultimately descended from marine or amphibious animals', but
even seems to find it plausible. It ought to be noted, however, that he calls for
further research to establish whether or not the hypothesis is true. Moreover,
later in the same piece he gives the same explanation for the existence of fossils
of unknown species as he had given almost 20 years earlier in the Protogaea,
saying T would certainly not deny that terrestrial animals have been carried
to distant shores and piled up elsewhere by the force of the waters' (Pr206/
SLT IV.C.3). Leibniz, then, was by no means certain in 1710 that terrestrial
animals had descended from sea-dwelling animals. This notwithstanding,
Leibniz nowhere comes closer to accepting what at face value appears to be a
very modern notion of evolution. Yet it is unlikely that he does have a modern
form of evolution in mind here, that is, a form of species evolution, because he
seems to be considering the very same idea raised in his letter to Burnett,
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albeit more broadly applied. To Burnett he made the suggestion that
prehistoric elephants were amphibious, but still members of the elephant
species for all that; in the letter to Spener he raises the possibility that the
prehistoric members of a number of species, not just elephants, were aquatic
or amphibious, though as with the Burnett letter Leibniz does not appear to
construe this as involving actual species change, even though to the modern
mind the descent of terrestrial animals from aquatic or amphibious animals
would seem to involve that. In any case, nowhere in the letter to Spener does
Leibniz suggest that this change brings about an improvement in the world.24
However, the clinching point that demonstrates that evolution was not
Leibniz's vehicle for cosmic melioration is this: by the time Leibniz warmed to
the idea of intra-species evolution he had become uncertain on the question of
whether the world increases in perfection. That is, Leibniz appears to become
more favourable to the idea of intra-species evolution as time goes on,
through the letter to Burnett (1696), New Essays (1704), and the letter to
Spener (1710), yet this does not mirror his attitude towards cosmic
melioration, which had cooled to the point of agnosticism by 1707-10. If
intra-species evolution was taken by Leibniz to be the cause of the world
increasing in perfection, we would expect to find him becoming more and
more certain about the best world being melioristic in nature the more he
warmed to the idea of evolution. But we don't, which is the deciding factor
against Lovejoy's hypothesis.
Happiness, beatitude and damnation
We still need, then, an answer to the question of how Leibniz thought the
world increases in perfection during the times in which he believed it did so.
The following passage, from the February 1706 letter to Electress Sophie that
we considered earlier, gives a clue:
And just as there are grounds to think that the universe itself develops more
and more, and that everything tends towards some goal (since everything
comes from an author whose wisdom is perfect) it can likewise be believed
that souls, which endure as long as the universe, also proceed to get better
and better (at least physically), and that their perfections carry on growing;
although more often than not this happens only insensibly, and sometimes
after large steps backwards. (G VII 568/SLT II.C.2)
132 Leibniz Reinterpreted
Here, Leibniz appears to be saying that the world continually increases in
perfection because creatures continually increase in perfection. More
specifically, he ties the improvement of the world as a whole with the fact
that creatures continually increase in physical perfection, i.e. happiness. The
belief that physical perfection is subject to an unending increase over the
course of time is one Leibniz returns to at various points throughout his
career. For instance, in the Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), he says
our happiness will never consist, and ought not to consist, in a complete
joy, in which there would no longer be anything to desire, and which
would make our mind stupid, but in a perpetual progress to new pleasures
and new perfections. (G VI 606/L641, cf. A VI iv 1642/SLT VI.B.2,
GW18)
Two things ought to be noted about this claim. Firstly, the start of the
continuous increase is deferred to 'the future' (G VI 447/S125), in 'another
life' (R51) after 'the books are balanced' (A VI iv 2234/L218). Secondly, the
perpetual increase only applies to some creatures, not all. A small minority will
experience ever-increasing happiness, while an unfortunate majority will
become ever more unhappy (cf. A VI iii 139). It is clear from this, I think,
that Leibniz was looking to the afterlife to trigger this twin escalation of
happiness and unhappiness, and the event that initiates it is the administering
of divine justice, where some souls are saved and elevated into God's presence
for eternity while others are damned and shut out from his presence forever
(and perhaps cast down to hell).
Leibniz's best of all possible worlds thus comprises two distinct stages. The
first stage is the mortal world we know, where creatures are born, live and
then fall into slumber. The second stage sees the simultaneous re-awakening
of all sleeping creatures in order for justice to be administered, some creatures
being saved and granted an eternal communion with God, others being
damned and forced to eternally wallow in their own misery. Leibniz clearly
considered both stages to be part of the same world as he defined the world as
'the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things' (G
VI 107/H128, cf. G VI 440/S116).
One might wonder why all this is relevant; after all, the fact that a creature's
physical perfection may increase without end in the second stage of the universe
is not the same thing as saying that its metaphysical perfection increases. But as
we know from Chapter 3, it is the same thing, as any increase in physical
perfection can only come about through a prior increase in metaphysical
perfection, as is clear from the following remark in the New Essays:
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I doubt that a greatest pleasure is possible; I am inclined to believe that it
can increase ad infinitum, for we do not know how far our knowledge and
our organs can be developed in the course of the eternity which lies before
us. So I would think that happiness is a lasting pleasure, which cannot occur
without a continual progress to new pleasures. (A VI vi 194/NE194)
What Leibniz reveals here is that happiness increases because of an increase
in knowledge, and knowledge, as we know, is one of the attributes that
determines a creature's overall degree of metaphysical perfection. So the more
knowledge a creature has, the happier it becomes, and if a creature's
happiness increases ad infinitum, as Leibniz confirmed it would in some cases,
then this is because its metaphysical perfection is increasing ad infinitum. It
thus follows, then, that blessed creatures experience a continual increase in
perfection (metaphysical and physical) while the damned suffer a continual
decrease in perfection.25 In the case of the former, the continual increase
comes about via the beatific vision, or direct acquaintance with God (cf. A VI
iii 140, Gr95/SLT VLB.3), which ensures that the happiness of the elect
'cannot ever be full, because God, being infinite, cannot ever be known
entirely'. Thus the happiness of the elect 'will never consist, and ought not to
consist, in a complete joy, in which there would no longer be anything to
desire . . . but in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections'
(G VI 606/L641). The damned, meanwhile, are apparently so unregenerate
as to continue sinning even after being damned, thus attracting further
punishment (a process that presumably goes on for all eternity since Leibniz
tells us that the damned 'damn themselves again and again', A VI iii 139).
Thus in continuing to sin, the damned not only ensure that they stay damned,
but they make it worse for themselves by continually increasing their own
damnation (cf. A VI iii 139, G VI 142/H162, G VI 186/H205).
Now we know that Leibniz believed in a statically perfect universe for at
least some of his philosophical career. We can now see that such a universe
will have to preserve a particular degree of perfection throughout both stages
of its existence. That is to say, the universe must remain as equally perfect
throughout the whole of the first stage as it must throughout the whole of the
second stage, for only then can it truly be said to remain equally perfect at all
times. This view thus entails that, when the second stage of the universe
begins, after divine judgement has been meted out, the increases in perfection
enjoyed by the blessed are equal to the decreases in perfection suffered by the
damned. In Whether the world increases in perfection, Leibniz concurred with this
analysis: 'If the perfection of the world remains the same, some substances
cannot continually increase in perfection without others continually
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decreasing in perfection' (Gr95/SLT VLB.3). This, then, was Leibniz's
opinion during the time he believed in a statically perfect universe. Clearly,
though, it could not have been his opinion after 1696 or thereabouts, when he
ceased to believe that the universe was statically perfect. Given what we now
know about the two-stage universe, and the fact that continuous increases in
perfection are only possible for creatures in the second stage (since no creature
can continually increase in the first stage), it is plausible to suppose that
Leibniz came to reject the idea that the perfection of the universe remained
static in this second stage. So what we might hope to find in Leibniz's later
writings is a consideration of the possibility that the universe might increase in
perfection during this second (post-judgement) stage. And in the Theodicy this
is precisely what we do find:
For it is possible, and even a very reasonable thing, that the glory and the
perfection of the blessed may be incomparably greater than the misery and
imperfection of the damned, and that here the excellence of the total good
in the smaller number may exceed the total evil which is in the greater
number. (G VI 378/H379, cf. G VI 47/H70-1)
What Leibniz is considering here is whether the increases in perfection
experienced by the elect might outweigh the decreases in perfection suffered
by the damned. If that does indeed occur then the world can be said to
increase in perfection, at least in the second of its two distinct stages. But
Leibniz only considers this to be 'possible' and 'reasonable', and he falls some
way short of actually endorsing it, which is perhaps to be expected given that
by the time of the Theodicy he was uncertain about meliorism. Nevertheless his
speculation on this matter, and his reluctance to unequivocally endorse it, ties
in with his documented uncertainty on the question of whether the world
increases in perfection, and offers a plausible explanation as to why he
became uncertain about that. Therefore I suspect that during his time as a
meliorist he was of the opinion that in the second stage of the universe the
increases by the blessed will outweigh the decreases by the damned, though
unfortunately I know of no texts from that period where he actually says this
(though it must be borne in mind that many of his writings from the 1690s
onwards have yet to be published). It is, however, the most likely explanation
of Leibnizian meliorism, given his belief that if the universe can improve then
it must always improve.
Why, though, did Leibniz come to think that the increases in perfection of the
blessed might outweigh the decreases in perfection of the damned? In an early
work, The Philosopher's Confession from 1672—73, he had this to say on the matter:
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the blessed . . . experience delight incessantly . . . because without perpetual
novelty and progress there is no thinking and hence no pleasure . . . [yet]
those who are furiously against the nature of things . . . they will be
continually irritated by new objects of indignation, of hatred, of jealousy
and, to say it in a word, of madness. (A VI iii 139)
Yet almost 40 years later in the Theodicy, Leibniz was not so quick to state
that the damned continually get worse, arguing instead that in their descent
they would eventually reach or at least approach a lowest possible limit:
The blessed draw near to divinity through a divine Mediator, so far as can
belong to these created beings, and make such progress in good as is
impossible for the damned to make in evil, even though they should
approach as nearly as may be the nature of demons. God is infinite, and
the devil is finite; good can and does go on ad infinitum, whereas evil has its
bounds. (G VI 378/H379)
It might seem odd that the later Leibniz was so certain that the blessed
undergo an unlimited increase in perfection and the damned a limited
decrease in perfection, while remaining uncertain on the question of whether
the universe as a whole increases in perfection. But it is not really odd at all,
for with the fates of an infinity of creatures to take into consideration even a
superlative mathematician like Leibniz was at a loss to calculate whether the
infinite gains made by the minority of creatures either balanced or
outweighed the finite losses incurred by the majority of others. And this, I
suspect, was ultimately why he informed Bourguet that he could see no way of
demonstrating which one of the rectangle, triangle and hyperbola hypotheses
was true.
Reculer pour mieux sauter
I have already suggested where Leibniz believed the overall improvement in
the universe came from during his decade-long flirtation with meliorism,
namely the increases of perfection experienced by the blessed outweighing the
decreases in perfection experienced by the damned. Clearly this can at best be
part of the answer though, as it does not explain why he should have thought
that there were times when the universe is subject to deterioration (which it
would be under the reculer pour mieux sauter brand of meliorism). To account
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for this we need to return to the idea of the two-stage universe. The division
of creatures into the blessed and damned and the increase in perfection that I
suggest Leibniz believed (for a decade) ensued therefrom, is clearly
characteristic of the second stage only. So unless it is to be supposed that
Leibniz held that from time to time the increases in perfection experienced
by the blessed are outweighed by the decreases in perfection experienced by
the damned, which strikes me as unlikely, the source of his preference for the
reculer pour mieux sauter brand of meliorism must be found in the first stage of
the universe (the stage of generation, development and death). And I suspect
the source of this reculer pour mieux sauter in the first stage of the universe is
likely to be rather mundane, e.g. that with an infinity of creatures in the
universe, some of which are increasing or decreasing in perfection at any
given time, there will be times when the sum of these changes lead to an
increase in the world's perfection and other times when they lead to a
decrease. This gives us an answer as to why Leibniz seemed to plump for a
reculer pour mieux sauter during his melioristic years. For in the first stage of the
universe, the perfection of the world will sometimes increase and sometimes
decrease, and in the second stage it will just continually increase. So on this
model the perfection of the world will undergo some regressions, but overall
will be subject to an increase. I accept that there is a fair degree of
speculation involved here, which could well turn out to be unfounded when
more of Leibniz's texts are published. But until it is otherwise demonstrated,
I submit that we have before us a plausible account not only of his meliorism,
but also of why his thinking on that subject underwent the convulsions that it
did.
Universal salvation
Before we leave this subject, we need to consider a related explanation of
Leibnizian meliorism put forward by both Alison Coudert and Andrew
Carlson. They suggest that progress in the Leibnizian universe is to be
understood in terms of salvation, or rather in the increase of the numbers saved
over eternity; for, in Carlson's words, 'over endless time .. . even the worst
sinners will eventually be inclined to give up their hatred of God and enter onto
the path of righteousness'.26 Such a belief, if Leibniz did indeed hold it between
1696 and 1706, would certainly explain his melioristic position during that
time, because if everyone is saved then after the time of judgement everyone
increases in perfection for all eternity. The question, then, is whether Leibniz
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did indeed endorse universal salvation during that time. Unfortunately Carlson
offers no grounds for supposing that he did. Coudert, however, does. She claims
that by the mid-1690s Leibniz was under the influence of Francis Mercury van
Helmont, a follower of the Kabbalah, and as a result of this influence Leibniz
embraced universal salvation, which was one of the core Kabbalistic beliefs.
However, according to Coudert the doctrine of universal salvation was not a
popular one during Leibniz's lifetime, and in order to preserve his reputation
he not only had to keep secret his belief in universal salvation but also his other
points of agreement with van Helmont's Kabbalism. Hence Coudert claims
that 'Leibniz fully accepted the doctrine of universal salvation, even though he
was unwilling to advocate it publicly',27 and on this basis attributes a
melioristic philosophy to Leibniz from the mid-1690s onwards.28 Now if a belief
in universal salvation was the reason why Leibniz endorsed a melioristic
universe during those times when he did so, we would expect to find some
unequivocal evidence of this in some of his private papers even if not in his
public writings. But we find precisely the opposite. In some reading notes from
1691 95, when Leibniz was either on the cusp of meliorism or a recent convert
to it, he is unequivocal that salvation is not granted to all:
And so it must be established whether it was indeed possible for all men to
be saved, and the fall of Adam prevented, but that has not happened,
because God, according to the nature of perfect wisdom, has willed to
choose the most perfect out of the infinite series of possibles. But the nature
of possible things makes it so that that series which contains an Adam who
does not fall, and in which all men are saved, is not the most perfect; I
judge this to be so from the outcome, because by that very fact that series
was not chosen. (Gr340-l)
In reading notes from 1705 Leibniz claims that 'no one is excluded by God
unless first excluded by himself (Gr252), which betrays his belief that some
people are excluded by God, i.e. that not all people are saved. In another set
of reading notes, again from 1705, Leibniz writes this:
God wills simply and in earnest that all be saved and that all use grace
rightly, but does not will with the highest degree of will, that is, to speak in
a human manner, he does not will with the greatest effort. Otherwise all
would in fact be saved. (Gr255)
Again, Leibniz leaves no room for doubt that he does not believe that
salvation is granted to all. In another set of reading notes, this time on Bayle's
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Reply to the Questions of a Provincial that Leibniz made no earlier than January
or February 1706, Leibniz again appears to assert that not all men are saved
because he agrees with Bayle's assertion that God does not want the salvation
of all men (cf. Gr493).29 It is worth stressing that the question of Leibniz's
sincerity just does not arise with any of the four texts just mentioned, as they
were all private reading notes and therefore not texts that anyone else was
likely to see. There is thus no reason why Leibniz should have been cautious
about revealing his true views on universal salvation in them. Interestingly,
Leibniz's public views on this matter accord perfectly with his private views,
as in the Theodicy too, Leibniz suggests that those whom God does not save do
not then go on to achieve salvation at some later time (cf. G VI 275/H290).
So in texts written around the time of his melioristic phase, during his
melioristic phase, as well as after it, Leibniz consistently denies universal
salvation by asserting that not all men are saved. Coudert's suggestion that
Leibniz's meliorism was driven by his belief in universal salvation is therefore
completely at odds with the textual evidence.
We must now look to sum up our analysis of Leibniz's concept of the best
possible world.
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more tentative position is taken by Rutherford (1995), p. 52.
9. And, of course, as I have noted, it may even be more complicated than this if On
the continuous increase in the perfection of the world was written around 1689-90, as the
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the world increases in perfection because of social and cultural progress is found
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book The Dark Abyss of Time, Paolo Rossi translates the passage in question from
Protogaea thus: 'And is it not presumable that, in the great upheavals that the
Earth has undergone, a great number of animal forms have been transformed'
(Rossi (1984), p. 62). E. P. Hamm (1997, p. 81) likewise interprets Leibniz to be
in favour of species change in §26 of the Protogaea. In defence of my own
translation I note not only Leibniz's general anathema to an evolutionary
hypothesis in the Protogaea, but also the fact that he consistently uses throughout
that work and others the Latin term 'muto' and its derivatives to refer to change.
So far as I know, he nowhere uses the word 'immutatas' to refer to change (and in
at least one text - A VI iv 1397/LC 243 - he uses the cognate word 'immutantur'
to mean 'they do not change').
17. Lovejoy overlooks this particular reference.
18. Leibniz does say that we cannot be sure if the natural species fixed by God
correspond with the division of species biologists make in their tables of
classification, so consequently the question of whether the word 'cat', for instance,
denotes a true species in its own right, is open to conjecture. Nevertheless we
know species boundaries to be fixed because God takes care 'to ensure that the
species should be immortal, since the individual cannot be so' (G VI 409/H414).
19. Aristotle (1984), 646a35 and 1032a25.
20. Lovejoy (1936), p. 366.
21. And in another letter to Bourguet, he states that, on the hypothesis of the
rectangle, 'Even if the universe were always equally perfect, it will never be
sovereignly perfect, for it always changes and gains new perfections, although it
loses some old ones' (G III 589/SLT VI.B.6).
22. In fact Lovejoy assumes the passage is saying that there should be more 'species or
forms of perfection', but the word 'espece' was typically used by Leibniz to mean
'kind' or 'sort', and it would only be defensible to translate it as meaning a
biological species if the context was squarely biological or zoological, which is not
the case here.
23. Lovejoy (1936), p. 256.
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24. For a rather fanciful interpretation of Leibnizian evolution, which makes it out to
be the precursor to the kind later endorsed by Henri Bergson and Pierre Teilhard
de Chardin, see van Peursen (1969), p. 109.
25. Moral perfection likewise increases and decreases, as the wiser one is the more
virtuous one is, and vice versa (cf. G VII 88/L426).
26. Carlson (2001), p. 643.
27. Coudert (1995), p. 115.
28. It is notable that Coudert believes Leibniz's endorsement of meliorism lasted
from the mid-1690s until his death, and she ignores the remarks he made on the
subject in the Theodicy and in the correspondence with Louis Bourguet, where he
claimed that he was agnostic about whether the world increases in perfection or
not. Quite why Coudert ignores these remarks is not clear. A theme of her book
Leibniz and the Kabbalah is that Leibniz consistently played down his links to van
Helmont and the Kabbalah, even to the extent that he lied about his true beliefs
in some of his published work and correspondence (i.e. in writings that others
were meant to read). He did this, according to Coudert, in order not to damage
his reputation, and to that end he routinely covered up those beliefs that would
be deemed offensive or heretical by orthodox thinkers. It is possible, then, that in
Coudert's view Leibniz was simply not being sincere when he wrote in the
Theodicy and to Bourguet that he wasn't sure if the world increased in perfection
or not. If this is her view then it is a puzzling one. It is certainly true that in the
Theodicy Leibniz was keen not to flaunt doctrines that might be deemed offensive,
as his aim was for the book to be accepted by those from across the religious
spectrum. So if he had identified meliorism as a doctrine likely to cause offence
then that might explain his unwillingness to endorse it outright in that book, no
matter what his real views on meliorism might have been at the time (though
against that it must be said that, if Leibniz had identified meliorism as a doctrine
likely to cause offence, then it is odd that he should have expressed agnosticism
about it in the Theodicy when an outright denial of it in that work would have
been more likely to win widespread approval). The suggestion that Leibniz was
insincere on this matter in the Theodicy might have some force if it were not for the
fact that Leibniz took exactly the same agnostic stance on meliorism in his
correspondence with Louis Bourguet, from 1715-16. During that correspon-
dence, Bourguet actually revealed himself to be a meliorist (cf. G III 588), and if
Leibniz was genuinely of the meliorist camp at that time then he could quite
easily have revealed himself as such without any risk of offending his
correspondent or being seen as unsound. The fact that he did not do so is very
telling, and suggests he was sincere in his claim that he did not know whether the
world increases in perfection or not.
29. The dates here are significant. Leibniz, as we have seen, endorsed meliorism in
the February 1706 letter to Electress Sophie (cf. G VII 568/SLT II.C.2), and
suggested in the notes on Bayle from around the same time that not all people are
saved. This in itself would make it extraordinarily difficult to argue that Leibniz's
meliorism was in any way connected to universal salvation.
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Conclusion
Harmony, richness and simplicity vs. the three
kinds of perfection
Although Leibniz left us no clear-cut answer as to whether the best world
increases in perfection, he presumably did have a view as to the overall
quantities of the three kinds of perfection that can be found in it. So before we
bring our study to a close, we ought to determine what these are, and how
they are affected by the fact that the best world is the most harmonious and
contains the richest composite brought about by the simplest ways.
As I noted back in Chapter 3, a number of influential commentators,
including Parkinson, Brown, Blumenfeld and Rutherford, have argued that
in the Leibnizian best world all three kinds of perfection (metaphysical,
physical and moral) are at a maximum.1 Yet our study has revealed that at
least one of these kinds, the metaphysical, cannot be at a maximum. To
maximize this, God would need to create every single possible thing. But this,
as we have seen, would bring about disharmony, because some possible
individuals are temporally disharmonious with others (or rather they would
be if actualized). Thus there is a clear conflict between two of God's aims; on
the one hand he wants to make a harmonious world, and on the other he
wants to bring about as much metaphysical perfection as possible. But both
aims cannot be realized simultaneously, and as the realization of a perfect
harmony of things is God's primary objective in world making,2 a position
that follows from my analysis of incompossibility, he leaves unactualized those
possibles that do not fit into this harmony. Contrary to the claims of
Parkinson, Brown, Blumenfeld and Rutherford, then, metaphysical perfec-
tion cannot be maximized per se in the best world.
We can therefore say that in planning the best of all possible worlds God
imposes the condition that the net result be as harmonious as possible, and
with that in mind he then chooses as many creatures as this plan will admit.
This will lead to the most metaphysically perfect world as is achievable given
the condition that the world be as harmonious as possible. Does this plan lead
to (or permit) the maximization of either of the other two goods we discussed
earlier, namely physical and moral perfection? It would seem not, for the very
fact that only a tiny fraction of possible beings are chosen for actualization
8
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means that many beings that might have added to the sum total of the
world's happiness and virtue are left unactualized. Moreover, another side
effect of a worldly harmony, of course, is that it involves the actualization of
creatures with varying degrees of perfection - or varying degrees of
imperfection if you like. And this seems to guarantee a certain quantity of
moral and physical evil. For as Leibniz explains it:
men are chosen and ranged not so much according to their excellence as
according to their conformity with God's plan, just as it may turn out that
a stone of lesser quality is made use of in a building or in a group because it
proves to be the particular one for filling a certain gap. (G VI 161/HI81)
Sin and unhappiness are thus the inevitable result of God's drive to fill out the
world with creatures of varying degrees of perfection. But Leibniz urged that
this would not deflect God from his goal of producing a harmonious universe:
nature preserves the utmost order and beauty . . . there is no reason to
suppose that God, for the sake of some lessening of moral evil, would
reverse the whole order of nature. (G VI 168/H188)
Leibniz identified a further drawback with the enormous variety required for
the most perfect harmony - things will inevitably get in each other's way. In a
world of such variety, there will be creatures, for example, whose very
existence causes unhappiness in others, such as disease-causing organisms (cf.
G VI 242/H258). It would seem, then, that God's preference for harmony
restricts not only the number of creatures that can exist in the best world, but
also the virtue and happiness of those creatures that do exist in it. So God's
preference for a harmonious system has knock-on effects for the quantity of
happiness and virtue that the best possible world can contain, as well as for its
richness and the quantity of metaphysical perfection.
But there is yet another factor that reduces the amount of the physical and
moral goods the best world can contain: the excellent laws that God
establishes as a result of his simple ways. As Malebranche noted time and
again, the universality and uniformity of the laws of motion leads to rain
falling uselessly in the sea while the land experiences drought,3 the birth of
deformed 'monsters',4 and other evils such as near-sightedness in men.5 All
are obvious causes of unhappiness, as Leibniz realized. Moreover, universal
and uniform laws have a role to play in immoral free actions too: if a would-
be killer puts a gun to his victim's head and pulls the trigger he will do so in
the fairly certain knowledge that the laws of ballistics will ensure his intended
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result comes to pass. It is possible to provide countless examples of how the
inflexibility of the world's laws allows wayward souls to commit their sins
(and, a fortiori, that wayward souls actually rely on and utilize this inflexibility
for their nefarious ends). Faced with the obvious question, why doesn't God
change these laws, or at least interrupt their functioning when their normal
course will lead to sin and/or unhappiness, Malebranche answered that to do
so would be to spoil the simplicity of the ways which, we will recall, God
favours because they are most in keeping with his perfect nature. Leibniz was
in full agreement with Malebranche that God should not disturb his ways to
prevent an undesirable outcome, and for precisely the same reason:
He [Malebranche] is nevertheless right to say that God must not disrupt
the simplicity of his ways in order to prevent a monster, a sterility, an
injustice. (ML203, cf. G VI 261/H276)6
Must God spoil his system, must there be less beauty, perfection and
reason in the universe, because there are people who misuse reason? (G VI
172/H191)
Moreover, Leibniz denied that God could 'devise universal decrees' that were
as simple as those he has chosen, but which would be 'capable of excluding all
particular evils' (A VI iv 1782). Evils are thus a necessary by-product of the
excellent laws that are bound up with the richness of the best world.
These are all quite revealing admissions on Leibniz's part, and it would
require no small argument to square them with the position attributed to him
that happiness and virtue are maximized in this world. Rather than attempt
such an argument, Leibniz instead flatly admits that this world does not
contain the greatest possible amounts of happiness and virtue:
[there are] possible worlds without sin and without unhappiness . . . but
these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness. (G VI
108/H129)
God (so they say) could have given happiness to all . . . But should he?
Since he does not do so, it is a sign that he had to act altogether differently.
(G VI 177/H196, cf. G VI 324/H337)
We already have some indication of what Leibniz might mean by 'God had
to act altogether differently', i.e. he had to create a world of the greatest
possible harmony and richness, and with as much metaphysical perfection as
is consistent with this (from now on I shall generally take 'richness' to include
'simplicity', i.e. God's simple ways, and so shall not always state them
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separately). Two things emerge from this: first, harmony and richness both
seem to be in conflict with physical and moral perfection, such that if the
former pair are maximized, then neither of the latter pair can also be
maximized; and secondly, that given these conflicts God has opted to focus
exclusively on harmony and richness, and has not compromised on either to
allow for more physical and moral good. And Leibniz confirms both of these
points; in a discussion on why all men have not been granted happiness, he
explains:
he [God] could do the good we desire; he even wishes it, taking it
separately, but he must not do it in preference to other greater goods that
are opposed to it. (G VI 177/H196)
Therefore it happens that the unhappiness of some of these creatures
may come about by concomitance, and as a result of other greater goods.
(G VI 170/H189)
A similar explanation is given as to why the world does not contain only
virtuous creatures:
it may be said that God can cause virtue to be in the world without any
mixture of vice, and even that he can do so easily. But, since he has
permitted vice, it must be that that order of the universe which was found
preferable to every other plan required it. (G VI 178/H197)7
The message is clear — the reason why this world is not that which contains the
greatest sum of happiness or virtue is because more happiness or virtue is only
achievable by compromising other, more important, features of the world, i.e.
those contributing to its harmony and richness. Consequently, there is less
virtue and happiness in the best of all possible worlds than there is in other
worlds that are inferior only by dint of being less harmonious and less rich. If
this is right, then the dizzy claim attributed to Leibniz by Parkinson, Brown et
a/., that the best world features the most metaphysical, physical and moral
perfection, is squarely false (and, to pardon the pun, overly optimistic).
The conflict between virtue and happiness
But the conflicts between goods do not end there. In a series of notes on one of
Bayle's later works, Leibniz identified another:
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There is some opposition between physical and moral goodness. It was
necessary to have consideration for both of them, and more for an infinity
of moral goodness. And wishing to produce the most that is possible of
both, he [God] achieved this by allowing some moral evil and some
physical evil. (Gr492)8
Unfortunately no explanation is given as to why physical and moral
perfection are in conflict. It is all the more puzzling given that Leibniz
claimed throughout his career that virtue gives rise to happiness, both in the
one who acts virtuously and the one who benefits from it (as we will recall
from Chapter 3). Others might argue that the two are opposed because acting
virtuously requires one to overcome temptations, i.e. to forego doing
something that would bring one happiness. However, this does not appear
to be a position that Leibniz actually held (nor is it obviously consistent with
his views of happiness or virtue). It is possible that his identification of a
conflict between happiness and virtue had an a posteriori basis, as he observed
that 'God permits, for reasons unknown to us but doubtless very wise, and
founded in a greater good, that there be many evil [persons who are] happy
in this life, and many good [persons who are] unhappy' (R51). Hence the
data, as he saw it, pointed to a conflict between happiness and virtue, though
the reason for it cannot be discovered by mere mortals. However, the two
presumably cannot always be in conflict, for in the second stage of the
universe (we are told) God will ensure that the virtuous will be happy and the
wicked unhappy. Thus any conflict between happiness and virtue is a feature
of this life only, and does not infect the afterlife.9 At any rate, whether this
correctly captures his view on the matter or not, it is clear that Leibniz saw a
conflict between physical and moral perfection, and that as a result of this
conflict God would give precedence to the latter over the former.
Summary: how to create the best of all possible worlds
What all this suggests is that, in producing the best of all possible worlds, God
is faced with a series of conflicting goods which cannot all be maximized
together. His overall aim, as we know, is to mirror himself in the world in the
best way possible. In order to achieve this end, he makes it his priority to
establish the greatest possible harmony of things, which requires the
actualization of the greatest possible number of compossible things, which
in turn requires that God choose things from the fullest possible ordering of
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kinds of things, i.e. species. By realizing maximal variety of both individual
things and kinds of things God is part way to realizing a rich world too, and
finishes the task by arranging these things in the most perfect way, i.e. in a
plenum. God achieves this arrangement by using the simplest means (i.e. the
fewest number of decrees), which requires inter alia excellent laws. And as this
plan involves the greatest number of compossible things, Leibniz would also
say that God has produced as much metaphysical perfection as he can, given
the condition that the world be as harmonious as possible.10 (I leave aside the
question of whether metaphysical perfection increases over time or stays the
same, because, as should be clear from Chapter 7, Leibniz did not have a
consistent position on this.)11
Given all this, it might seem that the lesser goods of virtue and happiness
cannot figure in God's calculations at all. It seems, in fact, that God will just
have to accept whatever values of physical and moral perfection obtain when
he has finished maximizing harmony and richness. While this is not an unfair
summary of Leibniz's position - after all, he nowhere suggests that God will
ever compromise on the harmony or richness of the world to allow for more
virtue and/or happiness - it should not be overlooked that, by creating the
greatest possible number of compossible things, God ensures that the best
world will feature a great deal of moral and physical perfection too. But it
would still be right to say that there is only as much happiness and virtue in
the best possible world as is consistent with its other, more important
features.12
So the excellence of the best world derives primarily from its harmonious-
ness and richness. It was Leibniz's view, as I have shown, that these place
restrictions on how much metaphysical, physical and moral perfection the
best world can contain. Consequently, in the Leibnizian best world, none of
the three kinds of perfection can be said to be maximized as such. Only by
removing the requirement for harmony could any of the three kinds of
perfection be maximized.13
Leibniz thus recognizes a clear order of priority or value to the features or
goods that the best plan involves; which are, in descending order of
importance, (1) harmony, richness and simplicity, (2) metaphysical
perfection, (3) moral perfection and finally (4) physical perfection.14'15 The
various conflicts between the four goods, and their relative rankings nicely
explains the relative scarcity of moral and physical perfection, and the
existence and quantity of moral evil (sin) and physical evil (unhappiness) in
the best world. But Leibniz can appeal to an even better argument to explain
why we humans are frequently misled into supposing that our world is not the
best: the two most important goods of the four listed above are ones that, by
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Leibniz's own admission, are not readily apparent to us, since to appreciate the
harmony and metaphysical perfection of the universe it needs to be considered
in its entirety. But as we humans are privy to but a tiny portion of the universe,
we cannot observe - in any adequate way — its harmony and metaphysical
perfection, at least at present (e.g. G VII 306/SLT I.A.3/P141-2, R51-2). In
other words, we humans cannot observe the principal features of what makes
our world best. And this fact certainly helps to explain why this world might
not seem unimprovable to us. Which of course is exactly what an optimist has
to do if he is to claim, with any plausibility, that our world is the best one
possible.
Notes
1. Parkinson (1965), pp. 114-15; Brown (1988), p. 590ff; Blumenfeld (1995),
p. 404f; Rutherford (1995), pp. 15 and 46fF. Less fantastic, but equally wrong as
we shall see, is the claim that in the Leibnizian universe happiness is maximized
by maximizing order and beauty. See Franklin (2002), p. 54.
2. In making this claim I take the opposite view to Rutherford (1995), p. 199.
3. Malebranche (1992), I.XIV; (1997), IX.XII. At G VI 187/H206 Leibniz makes
exactly the same point.
4. Malebranche (1980), p. 117ff.
5. Malebranche (1980) p. 74Iff.
6. Cf. Malebranche (1980), p. 665.
7. In light of this, Leibniz's occasional protestations that the world is 'the most
perfect morally' (G VII 306/SLT I.A.3/P141), and that God 'chose the order of
things . . . in which the fewest possible sins would happen' (Gr374/SLT VI.C.2),
seem somewhat hollow.
8. Leibniz seems to make a similar point in the Theodicy (G VI 215/H262), though it
is dressed up in the example of the competing concerns of a prince who orders a
city built.
9. 'And since experience shows us that God permits, for reasons unknown to us but
doubtless very wise, and founded in a greater good, that there be many evil
[persons who are] happy in this life, and many good [persons who are] unhappy,
which would not conform to the rules of a perfect government such as God's if it
were not redressed, it follows necessarily that there will be another life, and that
souls do not perish at all with the visible body; otherwise there would be
unpunished crimes, and good actions without recompense, which is contrary to
order' (R51).
10. I accept the point made by David Blumenfeld that Leibniz appears to overlook
the possibility that a smaller group of individual things might in fact have more
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metaphysical perfection than the largest one. See Blumenfeld (1995),
p. 406nl2.
11. Though the fact that he was able to consider his notion of the best possible world
both inside and outside of a melioristic framework, without changing that notion
in any way, suggests that the best possible world could be the best whether it
increases in perfection or not.
12. I suspect this is what Leibniz meant when he wrote: 'God, altogether good and
wise, must have produced all the virtue, goodness, happiness whereof the best
plan of the universe is capable' (G VI 259-60/H274).
13. But we can see how it would in any case not be possible to maximize all three
together, as to maximize virtue would require the actualization of all those
creatures whose existence would increase the sum total of virtue in the world,
which is presumably not all of them. So virtue could not be maximized if
metaphysical perfection were maximized (i.e. if all possibles were granted
existence). The same is true for happiness - to maximize that, only those
creatures whose existence would increase the sum total of happiness in the world
would be actualized. On the assumption that not all possible creatures would do
this, the maximum degree of physical perfection is not realizable in a world
containing the maximum degree of metaphysical perfection.
14. It is ironic that Leibniz ultimately came to view happiness as the least important
of all the goods, as early in his career he had identified it as the most important (cf.
A VI iv 2235/L218, A VI iv 1587/DM §36). However, it is not clear that his early
claims about creaturely happiness being top of God's agenda ought to be taken at
face value. Consider the following remark from the Discourse on Metaphysics: 'we
must not doubt that the happiness of minds is the principal objective of God and
that he pursues it as much as the general harmony allows' (A VI iv 1537/DM §5).
Although happiness here is cited as God's 'principal objective', the latter part of
the passage reveals that it is nevertheless secondary to harmony, as God will only
'pursue it as much as the general harmony allows'! Thus it can be doubted that
Leibniz was ever serious about creaturely happiness being God's main concern.
In any case, he subjected that view to fierce criticism later in his career (e.g. G VI
169-70/H189).
15. A brief note is in order on Nicholas Jolley's interpretation of the ingredients of the
Leibnizian best world. Jolley (2005, p. 165), argues that 'the best possible world is
the one that achieves the optimal balance between moral and physical
perfection'. While this might seem to be suggesting that the Leibnizian best
world is the one featuring the best trade off of virtue and happiness, this is not
what Jolley means at all. Rather unhelpfully, Jolley uses the expressions 'moral
perfection' and 'physical perfection' in a different way to how Leibniz did; by
'moral perfection' Jolley means 'happiness', i.e. what Leibniz called 'physical
perfection', and by 'physical perfection'Jolley means the metaphysical criteria of
richness and simplicity. So Jolley's position is in fact that the Leibnizian best
world is the one featuring the best trade off between richness and simplicity on
the one hand and happiness on the other (the matter is further complicated by
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the fact that Jolley also takes richness and simplicity to be in conflict and in need
of trading off, as I have already noted in Chapter 5, note 25). While Jolley
correctly notes that there is a conflict between richness/simplicity and happiness
in Leibniz's philosophy, he evidently overlooks Leibniz's many statements to the
effect that richness/simplicity is maximized in the best world, and therefore not
traded off at all. Jolley in fact states, tentatively it must be said, that 'perhaps in
the optimal balance the happiness of minds is weighted somewhat more heavily
than the physical perfection [i.e. richness/simplicity] of nature' (2005, p. 164). As
I have shown, however, it is the other way around - in Leibniz's view, the good of
richness/simplicity is weighted much more heavily than happiness, such that God
will not compromise on the world's richness or simplicity in order to obtain more
happiness.
This page intentionally left blank 
Index Locorum
A = Samtliche Schriften und Brief e (ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften), multiple
volumes in 6 series, cited by series (reihe) and volume (band)
II i
117-18 (L146-7)
Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (May 1671)
169-81 (partial translation in LI48-50)
Letter to Antoine Arnauld (early November 1671)
362-6 (LI77-81)
Letter to Arnold Eckhard (summer 1677)
442-54
Notes on Malebranche's Christian Conversations (1678?)
477-80 (partial translation in L210-12)
Letter to Malebranche (22 June/2 July 1679)
VI i
266-72 (L85-90)
A new method for learning and teaching jurisprudence (1667)
431-85 (partial translation in L131-8)
The elements of natural law (1669 — second half of 1671)
494-500
Conspectus (1668-9?)
508-13 (LI 15-18)
On transubstantiation (1668)
154 Leibniz Reinterpreted
VI ii
280-98
On endeavour and motion; on perceiving and thinking (1671)
287-8
Trinity. Mind (spring - autumn 1671)
487-510
Studies on the universal characteristic (1671-2)
VI iii
116-49
The philosopher's confession (1672-3)
154-9 (W58-65)
On true method in philosophy and theology (1673-5?)
391-7 (D43-9)
Excerpts from notes on science and metaphysics (18/22 March 1676)
466-70 (Dll-21)
On matter, motion, minima, and the continuum (December 1675)
472-7 (D21-33)
On the secrets of the sublime, or on the supreme being (11 February 1676)
480 (D35-7)
On the union of soul and body (February? 1676)
518-22 (D75-83)
On the origin of things from forms (April? 1676)
522-3 (D83-5)
On simple forms (April 1676)
524-6 (D85-9)
On the plenitude of the world (early? 1676)
Index Locorum 155
529-71 (LC127-221)
Pacidius to Philalethes (29 October - 10 November 1676)
572-4 (D91-5)
That a most perfect being is possible (November? 1676)
575-7 (D97-101)
A most perfect being exists (November? 1676)
578-9 (D101-3)
That a most perfect being exists (18-21? November 1676)
581-2 (D103-5)
My principle is: whatever can exist and is compatible with others, exists
(12 December 1676)
587-8 (Dl 11-13)
On existence (December? 1676)
VI vi
156-60 (PI-4)
On an instrument or great art of thinking (March April 1679?)
550-7
General notations (summer 1683 beginning 1685?)
692-713
Recommendations for instituting the general science (April — October 1686?)
867-70
Definitions: being, possible, existing (summer 1687 — end 1696?)
1347-50
Mostly metaphysical notes (1677?)
1351-2
On the necessity of choosing the best (1677?)
1357-64 (SLT VI.B.l)
156 Leibniz Reinterpreted
The elements of true piety, or, on the love of God above everything
(beginning 1677 - beginning 1678?)
1367
How the soul acts in the body (beginning 1677 - beginning 1678?)
1393-1405 (LC237-57)
Metaphysical definitions and reflections (summer 1678 — winter 1680/
1681)
1406-10 (SLT III.A.l)
On free will (summer 1678 - winter 1680/1681)
1410-41
On affections (20-22 April 1679)
1442-3 (SLT I.A.I)
On first truths (middle - end 1680?)
1444-9 (AG19-23)
On freedom and necessity (summer 1680 — summer 1684?)
1449-50
On necessity and contingency (summer 1680 - summer 1684?)
1450-5 (SLT III.B.2)
On freedom from necessity in choosing (summer 1680 - summer 1684?)
1455-60
On freedom and grace (summer 1680 - summer 1684?)
1460-1 (LC261-3)
The origin of souls and minds (March -June 1681?)
1529-88 (DM)
Discourse on metaphysics (beginning 1686?)
1615-30 (LC303-33)
A specimen of discoveries of the admirable secrets of nature in general
(1688?)
Index Locorum 157
1642 (SLT VI.B.2)
On the continuous increase in the perfection of the world (March 1689 -
March 1690?)
1643-9 (SLT I.B.5. Also P87-92)
Logical-metaphysical principles (spring — autumn 1689?)
1653-9 (P106-11)
On freedom, contingency, providence, and the series of causes (summer
1689?)
1661-4 (AG98-101)
The origin of contingent truths (summer 1689?)
1777-83
Notes on Abbe Lanion's Meditations on Metaphysics (summer 1678 — winter
1680/1681)
1992-2010 (partial translation in L280-9)
Preface to a little book on the elements of natural science (summer 1678 —
winter 1678/1679)
2227-40 (partial translation in L216-20)
Dialogue between Theophile and Polidore (summer - autumn 1679?)
2355-2455 (partial translation in SLT VI.G.I. Also CWR)
An examination of the Christian religion (April — October 1686?)
2653-9
Notes on the letters between Arnauld and Malebranche (winter 1685/
1686?)
2718-23 (SLT V.B.I)
On generosity (1686-7?)
2732-5
Notes on Marquis de Sable's Various Maxims and Thoughts (1683-5?)
2758 66
Modalities and elements of natural law (summer 1678 - winter 1680/1?)
158 Leibniz. Reinterpreted
2792-2808 (partial translation in W567-70)
Aphorisms on happiness, wisdom, charity, justice (summer - winter 1678-
1679?)
2842-3
On public happiness (1680?)
VI vi
1-527 (NE1-527)
New essays on human understanding (1703-4)
BC = Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie (ed. A. Buchenau)
II
556-9 (W184-8)
Letter to Varignon (1702)
BH = Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Koniglichen Offentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover
(ed. Eduard Bodemann)
70
Untitled undated fragment
124
Untitled undated fragment
C = Opuscules et fragments inedits de Leibniz (ed. Louis Couturat)
8-10 (P133-5)
On the principle of indiscernibles (c. 1696)
FB = Refutation Inedite de Spinoza (ed. Louis Alexandre Foucher de Careil)
22-70 (AG272-81)
Comments on Spinoza's philosophy (1707?)
Index Locorum 159
FC = Lettres et Opuscules Inedits de Leibniz (ed. Louis Alexandre Foucher de
Careil)
224-8 (partial translation in SLT IV.B.3)
Letter to Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (7 April 1703)
G = Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (ed. C. I.
Gerhardt), 7 volumes
I
360-1
Letter to Nicolas Malebranche (January 1712)
II
37-47 (partial translation in SLT I.B.3. Also AG69-77)
Remarks on Arnauld's letter concerning my proposition: that the
individual concept of each person contains once and for all everything
that will ever happen to him (May 1686)
90-102 (AG81-90)
Letter to Antoine Arnauld (30 April 1687)
111-29 (L338-50)
Letter to Antoine Arnauld (9 October 1687)
168-75 (partial translation in SLT IV.A.5. Also L515-18)
Letter to Burcher de Voider (24 March/3 April 1699)
248-53 (partial translation in L528-31)
Letter to Burcher de Voider (20 June 1703)
III
51 5 (SLT IV.B.l. Also L351-4)
Mr Leibniz's letter on a general principle useful in explaining the laws of
nature through a consideration of the divine wisdom: to serve as a reply to
Father Malebranche's response (July 1687)
160 Leibniz Reinterpreted
58-61 (partial translation in SLT IV.B.2. Also W181-4)
Letter to Pierre Bayle (1702?)
69-72 (LNS130-2)
Letter to Pierre Bayle (1702?)
179-85
Letter to Thomas Burnett (17/27 July 1696)
338-43 (LNS204-7)
Letter to Damaris Masham (early May 1704)
343-8 (LNS220-5)
Letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte (8 May 1704)
386-9 (SLT V.A.I. Also L421-3)
Preface to the Diplomatic Code of People's Rights (1693)
400-4 (W480-5)
Letter to Pierre Coste (19 December 1707)
558-9 (partial translation in SLT VI.C.4)
Letter to Louis Bourguet (late 1712?)
572-6 (L661-3)
Letter to Louis Bourguet (December 1714)
578-83 (partial translation in SLT VLB.5. Also L663-5)
Letter to Louis Bourguet (5 August 1715)
587-8
Letter from Louis Bourguet (7 February 1716)
588-91 (partial translation in SLT VI.B.6)
Letter to Louis Bourguet (mid-to-late March 1716)
591-3 (partial translation in SLT VI.B.7)
Letter to Louis Bourguet (3 April 1716)
Index Locorum 161
IV
354-92 (L383-412)
Critical thoughts on the general part of the Principles of Descartes (1692)
477-87 (SLT II.B.2. Also LNS10-20)
New system of the nature of the communication of substances, as well as
the union that exists between the soul and the body (27 June 1695)
504-16 (L498-508)
On nature itself, or on the inherent force and actions of created things
(September 1698)
517-24 (L492-7)
Clarification of the difficulties which Mr Bayle has found in the New system
of the union of soul and body (July 1698)
533-54 (LNS96-107)
Unpublished comments on Bayle's note L (1705?)
554-71 (L574-85)
Reply to the thoughts on the system of pre-established harmony contained
in the second edition of Mr Bayle's critical Dictionary, article Rorarius (1702)
VI
25-436 (H)
Theodicy (1707-10)
437-62 (SI 14-47)
Causa Dei (1710)
514-19
Letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte (mid-to-late 1702?)
529-38 (L554-60)
Reflections on the doctrine of a single universal spirit (1702)
539-46 (L586-91)
Considerations on vital principles and plastic natures (1705)
162 Leibni^ Reinterpreted
598-606 (L636-42)
The principles of nature and grace, based on reason (1714)
607-23 (Mon §§1-90)
The principles of philosophy/The monadology (1714)
VII
86-90 (L425-8)
On wisdom (c. 1700)
109-11 (SLT III.A.2)
On liberty and spontaneity (after 1690)
289-91 (PI45-7)
A resume of metaphysics (c. 1697)
302-8 (SLT I.A.3. Also PI36-44)
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Letter to Samuel Clarke (June? 1716)
381-8 (L691-6)
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